Nationalism in Cyprus: the effects of institutionalization on nationalist mobilizations and political conflicts as reflected in Turkish Cypriot nationalism and Greek Cypriot nationalism by Masarogullari, Nicel
Marshall University
Marshall Digital Scholar
Theses, Dissertations and Capstones
2011
Nationalism in Cyprus: the effects of
institutionalization on nationalist mobilizations and
political conflicts as reflected in Turkish Cypriot
nationalism and Greek Cypriot nationalism
Nicel Masarogullari
masarogullar@marshall.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://mds.marshall.edu/etd
Part of the Politics and Social Change Commons, Regional Sociology Commons, and the
Sociology of Culture Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Marshall Digital Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses, Dissertations and
Capstones by an authorized administrator of Marshall Digital Scholar. For more information, please contact zhangj@marshall.edu.
Recommended Citation
Masarogullari, Nicel, "Nationalism in Cyprus: the effects of institutionalization on nationalist mobilizations and political conflicts as
reflected in Turkish Cypriot nationalism and Greek Cypriot nationalism" (2011). Theses, Dissertations and Capstones. Paper 215.
 
 
 
 
NATIONALISM IN CYPRUS: 
THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION ON NATIONALIST 
MOBILIZATIONS AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS AS REFLECTED IN 
TURKISH CYPRIOT NATIONALISM AND GREEK CYPRIOT 
NATIONALISM 
 
A thesis submitted to 
the Graduate College of  
Marshall University 
 
In partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
 
Sociology 
 
by 
 
Nicel Masarogullari 
 
 
 
Approved by 
 
Dr. Richard Garnett, Ph.D., Committee Chairperson 
Dr. Markus Hadler, Ph.D. 
Dr. Girmay Berhie, Ph.D., MSW, MS-IS. 
 
 
 
Marshall University 
Huntington, West Virginia 
December 2011 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Cyprus, the island of Aphrodite, the island of beauty and love, so the 
legend goes. But Cyprus has also been a place of conflict and 
animosity. Since 1974 it has been divided, one side being inhabited by 
Greeks and the other by Turks. Divided, the island is united by mutual 
fear and mistrust” (Papadakis, 2005, p. 5). 
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ABSTRACT  
 
Historical events in Cyprus have played a very important role in the 
institutionalization of nationalist movements and political conflict between the 
Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot nationalist movements on the island of Cyprus. In 
order to make the case of the “Cyprus problem” understandable, the sociological 
elements of  the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot nationalism of the island were 
analyzed in this study in relation to some fundamental elements of the conflict. 
Internal and external elements including nationalism, the role of outsiders, 
modernization, and some other cultural factors, such as the educational and religious 
systems and colonial policies, played an important role in the creation of these rival 
nationalisms. Different ethno-national identities on the island caused ethnic and 
geographical partitions among the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities.  In this 
analysis, the effects of nationalist mobilizations and political conflicts in Cyprus as 
reflections of both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot nationalisms will be the main 
elements for demonstrating the rise and fall of both Cypriot nationalist movements 
that caused the failure of the civic nation state in 1960. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Which words can best describe Cyprus? “A heaven in the Mediterranean” or 
“An island that united by fear and mistrust in view of violent conflict” are best 
descriptors of the island. The third biggest island in the middle of the Mediterranean 
Sea, Cyprus has had to deal with a lot of mysteries since the beginning of its history. 
Although it has also witnessed much beauty and love, Cyprus has been conquered 
many times, hosted—and is still hosting—a lot of different nations, been used for 
many reasons, but could almost never succeed at staying away from many kinds of 
conflict. 
 The importance of geographical location, the process of modernization, rival 
nationalist movements, opposing national identities, and the negative influences of 
colonial policies significantly affected the island’s fate. The first seeds of the last 
violent conflict on the island were constructed when the Ottoman Empire conquered 
the island in 1571. Although it was very low-level in the beginning, the fate of the 
island was drawn when the Ottomans brought many Muslims --particularly Muslim 
Turks-- on the island and added them to the existing inhabitants who were Greco-
Christians. Bringing a mass of Muslims into the Christians paved the way for creation 
of religious based dual identification formation in the island, which caused the distinct 
separation between two major communities of the island. Consequently, these two 
major communities could not share the island peacefully and developed rival Turkish-
Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot identities step by step, which would later play a central 
role in developing the Cyprus dispute and the creation of the partition in the future. 
The Ottomans were not the last empire on the island that took over control; 
however, their ruling policy established certain boundaries between the two ethnic 
groups step by step. Following the Ottoman Empire, the British Colonial Empire in 
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1878 settled on the island, which had negative consequences for the Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots. For instance, this created disturbances between the two communities 
on the basis of British ruling policy, which would trigger conflict on the island. The 
regimes of imperial powers—the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire—were 
basically the cause of the development of different nationalisms in Cyprus in their 
own ways. When the construction of rival nationalist ideologies was completed, the 
conflict known as the “Cyprus Problem” continued until the demographic and 
geographical partitions in 1974 occurred. Although, since 1974, there has been no 
visible violent conflict between the two major communities, the deadlock has been 
imminent in the form of political conflict and psychological tension, including 
mistrust, fear and discomfort. Since the partition of the island, the political conflict 
has been continuously progressing among Turkish and Greek Cypriots, while some 
new parameters have been created in order to solve the problem and build a peaceful 
environment on the island. There is, however, still no peace agreement between the 
Turkish and Greek communities today.  
The main reason for this lack of peace between the two poles is based on the 
political equality of the two groups. While Turkish Cypriots were seeking political 
equalities to become a peace partner with Greek Cypriots, Greek Cypriots agreed on 
giving minority rights to Turkish Cypriots and becoming a peace partner with them. 
By extension, while one side wants to share the power of a common government, the 
other side disagrees with that idea. Despite all these factors, the Republic of Cyprus 
was established in 1960 on the basis of equal political power in order to provide a 
peaceful atmosphere among Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the island. However, 
“equal political power” of the administration played the central role in the first violent 
conflict in 1963 and created today’s situation by creating problems that have existed 
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and been left unsolved. While its own multi-faceted problems and unsolved problems 
destabilize the environment of Cyprus itself, these problems also affect surrounding 
areas such as the Middle East, with its own problems of deadlock. The problem has 
moved from a regional political platform to an international one and has affected the 
relationship between local and international politics. The interests of the USA, the 
UK, Turkey, and Greece paved the way for the Cyprus dispute to be placed in an 
international forum. The Cyprus problem was based on rival nationalist movements in 
which external powers had a strong influence in creating the deadlock. Particularly, 
Turkey and Greece, as the mainland homes of both communities, have a strong 
impact on the development of separate nationalist movements by imposing their own 
nationalist ideologies on Turkish and Greek Cypriots and also by determining the 
domestic politics of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In addition, third-party interests 
with regard to the geo-strategic significance of the island played a role in triggering 
the Cyprus problem. There are also many internal reasons—including the location of 
the island, demographic changes (i.e., the population transfer of Muslims from 
Anatolia to the island under the Ottoman rule), socio-cultural factors (including 
religion, education, language, economic and class factors), and strong ties with the 
Turkey and Greece—that have affected the nationalist conflict among Turkish 
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots and created today’s position of the island. In addition to 
sociocultural and political elements behind the Cyprus conflict, the impact of the 
Ottoman Empire and the British colonial rule—and finally the establishment of 
statehood in 1960, were also reasons for the main problem between  the ethnic groups 
on the island to be exacerbated. Briefly, the current situation between two major 
communities of the island could be summarized as a “love-hate relationship” 
(Meleagrou and Yeşilada, 1993, p. 85). 
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I believe that the Cyprus problem, also known as “a problem of Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots,” can be a beneficial case study that includes diverse forms of 
nationalism, rival ethnic identity, and an unfortunate ethnic conflict among Turkish 
and Greek Cypriots who have been living on the same land, who share the historical 
narrative of Cyprus, and who have different comprehensions of the same event since 
the late sixteenth century in the course of developing two distinct nationalist 
movements. While the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement was action-oriented, the 
Turkish Cypriot nationalist movement was born as a response for Greek Cypriots to 
defend themselves. To put it another way, the Turkish Cypriot nationalism was born 
as a defensive nationalist movement in order to protect itself from Greek’s nationalist 
actions. The Cyprus conflict is basically a protracted political conflict that has been 
developing itself among Turkish and Greek Cypriots, which put barriers against the 
enhancement, reconciliation, and re-unification in order to prevent a peaceful 
atmosphere between ethnic communities on the island. Considering the traditional 
hatred between Turkey and Greece based on their historical antagonisms, it could be 
one of the reasons of the development of the Cyprus problem between two major 
communities of the island. Also, as a social and political adaptation from their 
mainland, Turkey and Greece have also had a strong influence on drawing Cypriot 
Turks and Greeks culturally, religiously and ideologically apart from each other, 
which played an important role in the ethnic conflict on the island. Fundamentally, 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots’ political, economic, social, and cultural structures 
including linguistic and religious factors all directly affected the Cyprus issue in their 
own ways and created nationalist struggles on the island. In addition to the influence 
of all these factors of the conflict, the influence of imperial powers on the creation of 
the Cyprus problem cannot be ignored either. 
5 
 
The purpose of this study is to test the nationalism theory by determining how 
ethnic groups can be affected and how their actions can turn into conflict and violence 
while they are sharing a common territory. Although “violence has generally been 
conceptualized as a degree of conflict rather than as a form of conflict, or indeed as a 
form of social or political action in its own right,” violent conflict usually refers to the 
involvement of at least two groups using psychological tension and physical force to 
solve competing self-interests, and it could even be a synonym for war (Brubaker and 
Laitin, 1998, p. 425). At any level where a violent conflict occurs, it usually involves 
at least two confrontations about the interpretations to show what drives ethnic groups 
into conflict (Lacher, 2006). In this sense, this study will explain fundamental factors 
that played a strong role in the development of opposing Turkish and Greek-Cypriot 
national identities. More specifically, this study will show the process of developing 
opposing Turkish and Greek Cypriot nationalism on the basis of their self-interests 
that turned into violent conflict and ended up with geographical and demographical 
separation among both ethnic groups in Cyprus. Additionally, this study will also 
address the importance of the geographical location and the process of modernization 
and colonial policies which played very important and critical roles in the 
development of the Cyprus problem that ended up with violent conflict. Besides 
addressing these elements, this study will show how the involvement of foreign 
powers and their interests affected the development of the anti-colonial nationalist 
movement of Greek Cypriots and the contra-nationalist movement of Turkish 
Cypriots whose construction led to the Cyprus conflict. 
What made two ethnic groups—Turkish and Greek Cypriots—turn into 
conflicting groups on the high-level nationalism and what kinds of elements were 
affected during the creation of distinct national identities? The historical background 
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of Cyprus played a crucial role in the identity of two ethnic groups, and these two 
major ethnic communities had to face a violent conflict in the course of the historical 
events of the island. While the historical events of the island were occurring, Turkish 
and Greek Cypriots developed rival nationalisms on the basis of an affinity towards 
the motherlands’ nationalism. In this sense, in order to prevent Turkish and Greek 
societies’ nationalist movements, a new state was established in 1960 in order to 
protect their interests of Turkey, Greece and Britain by forcing both communities to 
live under the same roof and be united as Cypriots rather than based on ethnicity. In 
this sense, the question of whether the civic nation state successfully achieves the 
creation of “Cypriotism” by putting people into one rather than ethnicity came to 
mind. This study will attempt to answer these questions. There are many studies that 
have addressed the “Cyprus Problem”; however, I am not going to present a solution 
to “the Cyprus problem.” The aim of this study is to provide some historical 
perspectives and conceptual distinctions that are related to thinking about the history 
of conflicting parties and of the process of developing rival nationalisms. The Cyprus 
problem is going to be used as an example in order to illustrate the situation in more 
understandable ways. The importance of the island paved the way to a ground for the 
construction of distinct ethnic identity formations on the basis of ethno-nationalism, 
which ended up with violent conflict. Historical events affecting ethnic groups or 
nations play a very important role on the construction of identity of a community. 
Especially the identity of a country that has faced violent conflict is always affected 
by historical events including pain, fear, and negative elements, as in the example of 
Cyprus. Before doing so, a meaningful way to compare and evaluate the reasons and 
the formation process of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot nationalisms is to 
mention both ethnic groups’ common history. It is also necessary to draw attention to 
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the factors that created the case of nationalism in Cyprus among Turkish Cypriots and 
Greek Cypriots. In other words, the aim of this study, in general, is to analyze the 
establishment of Cyprus nationalism and to distinguish its structure by mentioning 
several theoretical approaches; in particular, it aims to analyze the rise of Greek 
Cypriot nationalism and the rise of counter-nationalism among Turkish Cypriots.   
Following the introduction, in Chapter 1, I will examine definitions of ethnic 
identity formation, nation and nationalism in order to show the historical dimensions 
of Cyprus with regard to nationalism in more specific ways. Finally, I will also 
address different types of nationalism in order to help readers understand what 
nationalism is and how different forms of it can draw the fate of nations. 
In Chapter 2, I will examine the history of the transition from the Ottoman 
Empire to the British Empire in order to illustrate the rise of ethnic communities 
within Turkish and Greek Cypriot nationalist movements, how they were born, and 
how rival national identities were created. Although the fundamental reason behind 
the violent conflict is seen behind the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus 
declared in 1960, the Cyprus problem cannot be completely analyzed without 
considering the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire transitions and their effects 
on the problem. The Ottoman cultural and political policies shaped the structure of 
Turkish and Greek Cypriot nationalist ideologies at a low level. In fact, the British 
cultural and political policies draw certain structural boundaries of ethnic separation 
on the basis of the establishment of rival ethnic identities and opponent nationalist 
movements. For these reasons, the first and most effective historical narratives will 
help the readers understand the roots of Turkish and Greek Cypriot nationalism and 
their institutionalization process, which led to the violent conflict between both ethnic 
communities. Besides two imperial effects on the creation of Turkish and Greek 
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nationalism movements, different political, economic, social and cultural elements 
(including language, religion, educational systems), among others, also turned them 
into enemies. 
In Chapter 3, I will examine, more specifically, the rise of Greek nationalism 
as having taken place before the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. In order to 
illustrate the Greek Cypriot national movements, I will elaborate on the background 
of Greek Cypriot nationalist movements. Moreover, I will state the elements of 
nationalist ideology of Greek community, the factors, and which third parties backing 
its establishment. Overall, in Chapter 3, I will provide the historical background of the 
Greek nationalist movement process and its ideological elements in order to prepare 
the reader for the sociocultural and political underlying of Greek Cypriot nationalism 
and its theoretical discussion. 
In Chapter 4, I will examine the second component of the Cyprus problem, 
which is the rise of Turkish Cypriot nationalism. I will address the differences of 
Turkish nationalism that surfaced as a response of Greek nationalism and how it 
affected Turkish nationalism. Overall, in this chapter, I will provide some background 
on Turkish nationalism throughout history and the process of its ideological 
development. This chapter will also prepare the reader for the socio-cultural and 
political factors underlying of Turkish Cypriot nationalism and its theoretical 
discussion. 
In Chapter 5, I will address the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus by 
examining the historical narratives of the transition period from the last empire power 
of the island to the independent state in order to provide the latest roots of the violent 
conflict and the latest reasons of the partition of the island. In this chapter, I will 
provide reasons for the establishment of the new state, how third parties were 
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involved in the situation, and how the nationalist struggle turned into violence. Before 
doing so, I will state how both communities were affected from the independent state 
in order to provide a clear way for the reader to understand the reasons behind the 
1974 partition. 
In Chapter 6, I will examine how the unequal distribution of values and 
resources are caused by a structural contradiction and conflict among ethnic groups. 
In order to make clear to the reader the situation of Cyprus and the situation of people 
on the island, I will also show how the two ethnic groups changed, how their 
ideologies were replaced with new thoughts, and how the partition affected them. 
In the last chapter, I will explain the effects of nationalist mobilizations and 
political conflicts in Cyprus as reflections of both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot 
nationalisms by applying the nationalist theories. Overall, I argue that the rise and fall 
of both Cypriot nationalist movements created two enemies as well as two rival ethnic 
identities that caused the failure of the civic nation state in 1960. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
PART ONE 
Chapter One: Ethnic Identity Formation, Nation and Nationalism 
A) Ethnic Identity Formation  
The identity of a person as a human being is one of the most important social 
constructions in expressing themselves. Every human being must be able to answer 
the questions “Who I was?, Who I am? and, Where I come from?”. Each answer 
identifies differences of individuals and draws boundaries of their lives. Also it helps 
people to make their own decisions in their own ways in order to draw their future. 
The role of identity is very important for the individual’s life, too. Moreover, groups 
are able to create and shape any kind of group identities, including ethnic identities 
and national identities in terms of their needs and self-interests. The boundaries of the 
identification of ethnic groups were drawn from the beginning of human history. On 
the other hand, along with the creation of collective identity after the revolutionary 
period in the eighteenth century, particularly after the French Revolution, the 
boundaries of the nations on the basis of collectivity were drawn.  
According to Adrian Hastings (1997), ethnic identity is a 
common culture whereby a group of people share the basic of life – 
their cloth and clothes; the style of houses; the way they relate to 
domestic animals and to agricultural land; the essential work which 
shapes the functioning of a society and how roles are divided between 
men and women; the way hunting is organized; how murder and 
robbery are handled; the way defense is organized against threatening 
intruders; the way property and authority are handed on; the rituals of 
birth, marriages and death; the customs of courtship; the proverbs, 
songs, lullabies; shared history and myth;, and the beliefs in what 
follows death and in God, gods or other spirits (p. 167).  
 
 
Obviously, each ethnic group has similar identity, historical narratives, or 
shares the same feelings with other members of the specific group. These groups carry 
and share the common identity. Before nations were constructed, thousands of ethnic 
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groups have existed with their unique ethnic identities. The integration of these 
unique ethnic groups created nations in terms of the different needs of people along 
with modernization. Along with these different needs, the new political based 
ideologies were developed. These ideologies paved the way for the creation of 
collective identities. According to Bernhard Giesen (1998), collective identity occurs 
when people can determine the differences between notions such as “inside and 
outside, strange and familiar, relatives and non-relatives, friends and enemies, culture 
and nature, enlightenment and barbarism” (p. 13). Collective identity drew the 
boundaries of nations and underlined the importance of collectivity starting in 
eighteenth century. Consequently, the construction of boundaries between ethnic 
groups or even between nations had been sharpened by the differentiations based on 
the consciousness of belonging of groups. In order to protect the collectivity of a 
society and determine the certain boundaries of a nation, the collective identity 
represented nationalist feelings of the society. It paved the way for developing 
nationalist movements all around the world, particularly starting in the eighteenth 
century.  
Nationalism is also a feeling of commonality in which a person identifies 
himself similar with other members who share an ethnicity. Here they share similar 
historical backgrounds, socio-cultures, and a common language. It is important to 
analyze ethnic identity formation to understand nationalist movements. Ethnic identity 
is formed according to two main approaches, primordialism and instrumentalism. In 
this chapter I will focus on examining the types of ethnic identity formation and the 
role of ethnic identity on societies. I will also provide an overview of ethnic identity 
and its common theories, nationalism and its common classifications. At the end, I 
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will clarify the rise of nationalism among Turkish and Greek Cypriots by outlining 
nationalism as its origin in the context of global trends. 
 
Primordialism vs. Instrumentalism 
The primordialist approach claims that each ethnic group has “given features” 
such as “natural, given or unchangeable facts” that establish how the ethnic group is 
formed (Bacık, 2002, p. 29). The primordialist approach, more specifically, focuses 
on “genetic origin,” particularly, to the blood ties between members of a specific 
group; thus, the “tradition and the emotions evoked by perceptions of common 
ancestry” (Gil-White, 1999, p. 802). According to Anthony Smith, commonality 
includes having the same blood tie, the same language, religion, territory, and the 
same race, which are involved in the certain boundaries of the specific groups since 
the beginning of the history of human beings. These common social features of ethnic 
or cultural groups differentiate each group from others. The instrumentalist approach, 
on the other hand, is accepted as opposite to the primordialist approach. However, 
instrumentalism does not totally reject primordial elements. The instrumentalist 
approach does not totally disclaim ‘given features’ such blood ties, religion, race; 
however it focuses on ethnicity within the framework of politics. Additionally, 
instrumentalism also focuses on economic interests of a certain group of people rather 
than using cultural elements to explain the ethnic ideologies as primordialism. 
According to this approach, “culture does not contribute directly to the formation of 
ethnic identities; rather, ethnic platforms use selected customs as emblems to 
legitimize ethnic claims in the public domain” (Tilley, 1997, p. 507).  
Generally, the instrumentalist school claims that the origin and the given 
features including blood ties, race, language, and religion are not very important parts 
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of ethnic groups.  It claims that people have their own rights to choose the group 
where they want to belong, no matter where they came from. The premordialist 
school, on the other hand, claims that a person who was born into a family was also 
born into a certain ethnic group without any choices (Özkırımlı, 2008, p. 85). 
Eventually, comparing both approaches, it can be said that the instrumentalist 
approach is more flexible than the primordialist approach. For instance, while the 
primordialist approach claims that “ethnic identity is generally acquired at birth”; the 
instrumentalist approach claims that “the modern state indeed provides the arena for 
the development of ethnic identities” depending on social, economic, and political 
dimensions of a certain state (Gil-White, 1999, p. 812; Tilley, 1997, p. 509). 
Moreover, the instrumentalist approach claims that people choose their own groups in 
terms of their own choice and their needs regardless of the importance of “given 
features” that are acquired at birth. Bacık (2002) highlights the importance of the 
individual’s rights by stating “you are what you feel yourself” (p. 31). It is clear that 
the “instrumentalist” approach excludes genetic origins in some cases. Though, “the 
instrumentalist approach rejects the alleged roles of race, origin, and even language,” 
instrumentalists do not totally reject givens and do accept the importance of given 
features in some point (Bacık, 2002, p. 31). While the instrumentalist approach 
emphasizes the political and economic dimensions which are basically important to 
determine the needs of a nation besides the given features, the primordialist approach 
advocates the given features that are the most important elements of drawing the 
boundaries of communities. According to Giesen (1998), these features “cannot be 
moved socially and passing them is extremely difficult” (p. 27). Furthermore, 
instrumentalists argue that these features are not enough to draw the boundaries of 
nations and to fulfill the demand of the certain group because of lack of political 
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dimensions. These dimensions are very important to build national boundaries. 
Additionally, the consciousness of belonging to a nation is the most important feature 
in determining where the individual belongs. In this sense of identification formation, 
ethnic actors switch to new interests with regards to a new meaning of territorial 
boundaries or political alliances. Also, ethnic identity can be replaced by national 
identity, depending on members’ interests (Gil-White, 1999).  
Instrumentalists claim that nations and national identities are modern 
phenomena shaped by recent history. Some other instrumentalists believe that 
instrumental elements brought political and economic dimensions into the system. 
These elements created the collective identity to “achieve power or to enforce social 
discipline” (Tilley, 1997, p. 507). Although the transition from the cultural system to 
the political system was not made easily, the cohesive social institutions of ethnic 
groups broke down. This break down created many social problems that could even 
“be couched in ethno-nationalist discourse” (Tilley, 1997, p. 508). Ethnic political 
movements are usually “related to the group's internal cultural institutional 
composition, its institutional relation to ethnic others, and its socio-economic position 
in the larger society” (Ibid). Common interests, similar beliefs, and the same life style 
accelerate the ethnic division among mixed ethnic neighborhood. Especially in a 
country where there is a majority and a minority depending on distinct ethnic 
formation, the ethnic division is unavoidable (Bacık, 2002). Besides this possibility of 
the division of ethnicities, another root of division could lie “in the legacy of 
colonialism, especially its administrative policy and the decision to merge the North 
and South into a unitary state (Nasong and Murunga, 2005). For instance, colonial 
administrations such as the British colonial power gained power from the creation of 
ethnic division among Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Cyprus and paved the way for 
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the ethnic division among them. When the colonial power takes ethno-political 
leadership of the settlement, the tension might start to rise. This tension could even 
turn into conflict among ethnic neighborhoods and even against the colonial power. 
These movements against colonial power would keep alive ethnic groups’ identity. In 
these cases,  
The very existence of the ethnic group may lack (or be losing) any 
substance for its members; a deliberate movement is needed to create 
or preserve the group's cohesion as a group - certainly through political 
rhetoric, but also through folkloric programs (dances, festivals, prayer 
groups) which render the identity meaningful and attractive to its 
claimed constituency (Tilley, 1997, p. 509).  
 
 
Therefore, it is often said that this situation leads to the reconstruction of 
socio-politic position of them on the basis of their cultural dynamics. It brings these 
ethnic movements into the political arena and on to the intra- and international 
platforms. Although both approaches claim different theories of ethnicity and identity 
formation, they both agree on the existence of ethnic groups. Thousands of ethnic 
groups have been created with different ethnic identities on the basis of their historical 
origins. Also, the assimilation of small ethnic groups created nations and these nations 
gradually became nation-states starting in the revolutionary period. Tilley (1997) 
states that “the modern 'nation-state' - at least, where it takes seriously the 
international norm that it represents the political interests of its population - clearly 
provides a political motive for inflationary ethnic claims to any who can argue that 
they represent unique needs from among that population” (p. 509). In this sense, 
collective identity is constructed under the roof of multi-ethnic states in order to 
prevent ethnic division. On the other hand, while the new state was trying to instill a 
new collective identity into the people, such attempts could instead cause problems 
between the major and minor ethnic or cultural groups. It could have led to the 
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creation of different nationalist mission among groups. In fact, it might be a reason for 
cultural assimilation among minorities which could even trigger conflicts. Another 
reason for the possibility of triggering conflict between majorities and minorities is 
that the construction of nation-states caused high expectations among people in terms 
of different socio-economic interests. The new interests of nations could be a reason 
for mobilizing different national movements and for the origin of conflict based on 
different ethnic identities. 
In fact, collective identity is also a tool of developing nationalism. Nationalism 
is also a feeling of commonality in which a person identifies himself/herself with 
other members of a common ethnicity. People within a common ethnicity share 
similar historical backgrounds, socio-cultures, and even a common language. 
Nationalism has played a very important role in the development of the modern 
world. Nationalism itself has a very strong influence on the creation of the entire 
world by developing new nation-states and by drawing new borders. Nationalism 
even has strong impact on the creation of either peace or war among ethnic 
groups/nations. 
 
B) Nations and Nationalism 
 The process of developing identity in pre-modern societies can also be 
distinguished in nation-states although it might appear in different form. The nation is 
a broadly-based political movement for democracy and liberty on the basis of modern 
values, institutions and strategies of a certain society. Moreover, it is a tool for 
developing nationalism in that specific society in order to protect its sovereignty and 
boundaries. To describe the process of the “nation” and “nationalism” as a concept 
needs to be examined with regard to the common classifications of nationalism. As 
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the historical background of the Cyprus has played a fundamental role in shaping the 
distinct identity, it is important to understand the ideological structure of Turkish and 
Greek Cypriot nationalisms. Evidently, the opposing nationalist struggles on the 
island created two enemies who represent themselves with different identities. 
Various approaches to nationalism to be discussed in this chapter will be used to 
analyze the framework of Turkish Cypriot nationalism and Greek Cypriot nationalism 
on the basis of the historical narratives of Cyprus in the following chapters.  
 
Overview of Nationalism   
It is often said that nationalism generally embraces the support of a nation; 
however, it cannot be fitted into one definition because there are different 
explanations of nationalism. Generally, each nationalist struggle in the world has 
different aims and origins in terms of serving the needs and self-interests of a 
particular society. Besides not having a clear definition of nationalism, we cannot 
specify the exact time when it first emerged. However, the French Revolution period 
could be considered as the beginning of the nationalist movements in terms of 
modernization. As Ranner states, “the birthday of the political idea of the nation and 
the birth year of this new consciousness, is 1789, the year of the French Revolution,” 
which paved the way for the creation of today’s world on the basis of nationalism 
(cited in Hobsbawn, 1990, p. 125). Assuming the French Revolution as a start of 
nationalist movements that divided societies into two main categories of pre-modern 
and modern periods, nationalist struggles also offered different dynamics for everyone 
with regards to the need for a nation. The main reason for dividing the time eras into 
two main periods is to make it easier to differentiate the dominant consciousness and 
political ideologies of societies with regards to life standards of people by comparing 
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the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries and the beginning of the 18
th
 century to today. In the view 
of the first period, the religious-based national movements dominated in the world, 
particularly in Western Europe. The dominant religion had a strong impact on people 
and their lives in pre-modern times. On the other hand, the second period refers to a 
new politically based ideological movement. Nationalism was considered as a 
crossroad in terms of drawing distinct boundaries between pre-modern and modern 
societies and sharply separated them. Consequently, nationalism means “the clash 
with the traditional societies [which] had been risen and became the dominant 
political struggle against traditional societies” (Godson, 2001, p. 38). As a natural 
result of the collapse of pre-modern societies, nationalism the catalyst for the 
emergence of into modern societies. It purported to provide the best for everyone 
regardless of the specific aims of the administration or the economy. As a result of the 
transition to the modern world, nation states were started gradually established on the 
basis of different expectations for societies. For this reason, nationalism accelerated 
and spread around the world, transcending traditional societies. Moreover, along with 
modernization, nationalism was a combination of all ideas of a nation including new 
political, economic, and sociocultural dynamics. Nationalism created the best political 
system for each nation and offered to protect their sustainability at the same time. 
Moreover, those new political-based expectations and ideologies of societies have 
played a significant role in the creation of the modern world. Also, it helped to switch 
the traditional values, institutions and strategies to the modernist values. In 
institutions and strategies those elements were used in order to characterize the new 
nation states.  
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Pre Modern Societies and Modern Societies 
To better understand the modern state, it is important to understand pre-
modern societies, including their political and economic systems, institutions, values 
and culture. According to Gellner (1983), there are three stages to explain human 
history including pre-modern and modern periods. These stages are (cited in Işıksal, 
2002, p. 6-7): 
1. Pre-agrarian society, where hunting and gathering bands were too small to allow  
                for political divisions. 
2. Agrarian society, where only a minority of the population were specialists in the  
    military, economics, politics, or religion. 
3. Industrial society, where the state is the protector of the community with distinctive  
    factors such as mobility, universal literacy, and individualism. 
Gellner (2009) discusses these three stages of human history in his book. In 
the first two stages, societies were smaller, and insiders and outsiders were strictly 
separated. For instance, although an elite class including aristocrats, soldiers, 
bureaucratic and religious functionaries existed in agrarian and pre-modern societies, 
it was much narrower than the elite class of industrial societies. In general, according 
to Gellner pre-modern societies were different religiously, ethnically, linguistically, 
culturally and politically from other societies. However, the political ideologies of 
pre-modern societies were not developed to create the political boundaries of nations 
and/or nationalism but were created to maintain and protect insiders from outsiders. 
Additionally, the local values, institutions and strategies were decisively distinguished 
from other societies at the time. Also, Gellner emphasizes that pre-modern societies 
generally lacked cultural and ethnic homogeneity where people were classified as 
human, compared with modern people, who were classified as civilized. Pre-modern 
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people were living in local groups in enclaves where the sense of individuality was 
not created separately from the pre-modern cultures during the first period of pre-
modern societies. In that period, religion dominated over people, in order to control 
them easily. People often lived under the force of religion rather than ruling under the 
democratic, secular and liberal state as in nation-states of the modern era. According 
to Gellner (2009), the primary issue was to struggle with poverty rather than 
struggling with cultural or political homogeneity during the period of pre-agrarian and 
agrarian societies.  
The economy in the pre-modern period was based on agriculture. Local people 
were generally engaged in an agricultural system in which the peasant class was very 
wide comparing with the upper class in the pre-modern era. As Gellner (2009) states, 
the subsistence economy of the peasant class was totally dependent on agriculture. 
This helped to develop strong bonds between members of the peasant class rather than 
the use of political force. Compared to modern societies, many things were limited, 
including life standards of people and their beliefs within the religiously based 
authoritarian system. For instance, the division of labor was not sharply formed in 
pre-modern societies and it was pretty limited compared to modern societies. The 
difference between social classes was also limited, and their social statuses and social 
identities were usually determined at birth. Consequently, primordial ties were highly 
influential for ethnic groups in the pre-modern era. According to Gellner (2009), the 
culture was not a very important factor in drawing political boundaries of the territory 
in pre-modern societies. However, the importance of culture consisted of the 
separation of the social classes in these societies. The limited cultural diffusion among 
ethnic groups caused the communication problems that led to the separation of such 
groups from each other. Also, it prevented the growth of societies. Along with these 
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limitations, the rate of illiteracy was very high whereas the level of technology was 
very low.  
In the course of time, the creation of multiethnic societies and empires such as 
the Ottoman, Hellenic and British Empires was completed. All of the Empires 
continued ruling themselves and their colonies from the late 15
th
 century until the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century. This period of time was considered as a bridge between 
pre-modern societies and modern societies/nation-states. The spread of colonization 
increased from the industrial revolution until the 19
th
 century. It ended with national 
liberation movements in the middle of the 20
th
 century. These multi-ethnic societies, 
multi-religious societies and empires were ruled by ethnic hierarchies. They took 
advantages of colonial societies’ economies, resources, technologies and labor in 
order to gain more power. Moreover, as it is often said, they expanded their territorial 
boundaries by imposing their political and cultural values, such as in the British 
Empire (with its “divide and rule” policy that was created conflict among different 
ethnic groups) and the French Empire. Also, they expanded territories on the basis of 
religion, such as the Ottoman Empire’s use of the “Millet System,” which allowed 
some religious autonomy for minority populations. Another way of expanding the 
territories was by colonizing weak but strategically important states or places that had 
a convenient location for their military, as in the Cyprus case. The annexation of 
Cyprus in 1878 by the British Empire could be an example of this type of the 
colonization.  
On the other hand, in parallel with modernization, the economy of modern 
societies was also changed depending on the development of industrial sector. The 
national market took the place of agriculture in the new global world of the modern 
era. In addition to political and economic reforms, the high culture on a specific 
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territory was created and became open to everyone with the transition to modern 
states. Kızılyürek (2005a) states that national culture was provided to citizens in order 
to unity those who shared a territory. Eventually, the meaning of culture had changed, 
and became more important for describing the society in terms of homogeneity rather 
than separating classes from one another (Gellner, 2009). As Geller claims, industrial 
societies require and provide a homogeneous high culture rather than cultural 
differences. A homogeneous high culture requires and provides an educational 
system. It helps to impose the culture and national will on its citizens. According to 
Kızılyürek (2005a) people started getting educated by the central schools in order to 
create the nation on the basis of commonality. Along with educated people, the state 
also developed nationalism to limit ethnic antagonisms in order to better to survive 
(Gellner, 2009).  
There are some visibly important changes in meanings and roles between pre-
modern and modern societies. Evidently, pre-modern societies’ traditional values, 
beliefs, institutions were almost everywhere in the world. As multi-ethnic civilizations 
began to emerge, pre-modern values started being replaced with modern-based values, 
institutions and beliefs. These changes were mainly related with “the Reformation, 
Renaissance, and later the Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution” (Godson, 2001, 
p. 38). Ethnic identities have always been very effective for ethnic groups. Obviously, 
people have been identifying themselves according to their ethnic groups since the 
beginning of human history. People emphasize their identities in different ways such 
as a premordialist-based identity (given features at birth) or an instrumentalist-based 
identity (collectivity). Consequently, in the pre-modern period, people were 
identifying themselves by “using their ethnic-oriented motives and values” and these 
values have always been attached to the societies throughout their history (Bacık, 
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2002, p. 19). In the modern period, on the other hand, people started identifying 
themselves on the basis of the collectivity rather than on ethnic factors. This 
development helped them to differentiate themselves from other nations. Sir Ernest 
Barker pointed out this self-consciousness by stating: 
The self-consciousness of nations is a product of the nineteenth 
century. This is a matter of the first importance. Nations were already 
there; they had indeed been there for centuries. But it is not the things 
which are simply ‘there’ that matter in human life. What really and 
finally matters is the thing that is apprehended as an idea, and, as an 
idea, is vested with emotion until it becomes a cause and a spring of 
action. In the world of action apprehended ideas are alone electrical; 
and a nation must be an ideal as well as a fact before it can become a 
dynamic force (cited in Connor, 1994, p. 4).  
 
As said above, the role of self-consciousness is an extended form of ethnic 
based identities. Ethnic-based identities have still been maintaining their importance 
even in the modern societies albeit different forms. Even though the seeds of ethnic 
and local identities remained after the political-based ideological movements spread 
throughout much of the world, the meaning of identities had been changed on the 
basis of the modern system. Moreover, identity gained a new role, which came to be a 
“national” identity that symbolized citizenship. Evidently, the importance of the 
individuals increased on the basis of the constitution. The rest who were considered as 
foreign with their national identity in a particular nation were seen by default as a 
national “minority” of the state and got minority rights depending on laws (Üstel, 
1999). Thus, the national identity preserved the rights of individuals of a certain 
territory by laws. According to Smith (1991), there are five common features of 
national identity; 
1. a historic territory or homeland 
2. common myths and historical memories 
3. a common, mass public culture 
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4. common legal rights and duties for all members 
5. a common economy with territorial mobility for members. (p. 14) 
 
According to Smith, the commonality in many areas including common 
historical narratives, common rights, common economy and so forth is very important 
in developing a national identity. Culture and nationalist feelings of a society, which 
were strongly interrelated with the process of the establishment of modern societies, 
were also reasons for changing the bases of identity formation among societies over 
time. Therefore, culture became politicized through the transformation from tradition-
based societies in an attempt to modern-based societies to determine the political 
based boundaries of nation. At the beginning of the transformation to the modern 
world, ethnic groups had been transformed into nations along with modernization. 
There are some difficulties in defining the concept of nation. Consequently, it 
is hard to decide what type of groups could be considered a ‘nation’. Generally, there 
are fundamental elements that are used to develop nations and considered as an 
extension of pre-modern societies such as having the same language, culture, national 
will, and historical background. In general, a nation is a group of people united 
around a common political consciousness, which is developed as a political subject in 
history. Benedict Anderson describes “nation” in his book Imagined Communities as: 
An imagined community – and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign. (…) It is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion. (…) The nation is imagined as limited because even 
the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human 
beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other 
nations. It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an 
age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the 
legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. 
Finally it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual 
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is 
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always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 2006, 
p. 6-7).  
 
 
Anderson describes nations as a constructed idea because a social group on a 
national level including its tradition, institutions, and symbols regardless of its 
regional size is also created. He also states that that even a feeling of solidarity is 
constructed because it is impossible to know every single group member even in a 
small nation. 
Another definition of nation, according to Smith (1991), is “a named human 
population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a 
mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all 
members” (p. 15). Smith (1991) claims the commonality in many areas, including 
common ethnic myths and common ethnic heritage, provides a basis of creation of 
nations. According to him, ethnicity has been always existed and is the most effective 
aspect of the process of the nation-states building. He claims that the nation is formed 
with common myths and common historical memories as in an ethnicity but in 
different format. He argues that nations are expanded forms of pre-modern societies 
because he sees that the cultural basis, the importance of historical narratives, 
common symbols, myths, memories and values of pre-modern societies are also very 
important in order to form the modern societies (Smith, 1995). To sum up, Smith 
(1991) claims that nations are definitely modern phenomena. Yet he points out that 
pre-modern factors are also needed in order to develop nations. To make this clearer, 
he lists four criteria; 
1. They require a unified legal code of common rights and duties with citizenship  
    rights where the nation is independent 
2. They are based on a unified economy with a single division of labor, and mobility  
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    of goods and persons throughout the national territory  
3. They need a fairly compact territory, preferably with “natural” defensible frontiers,  
     in a world of similar compact nations 
4. They require a single “political culture” and public, mass education and media  
     system, to socialize future generations to be “citizens” of the new nation (Smith,       
                 1991, p. 69). 
Smith strongly argues that most of the roots of modern societies are an 
extension of pre-modern societies. It seems that the political cultures of nations are 
almost impossible to develop without the elements of pre-modern societies. Thus, 
modern societies are affected by pre-modern elements, and developed these on a 
national level. Smith goes on to say that the technological and political bases in 
modern societies are essential. Political ideologies also became more important right 
after the revolutionary period, because politics barely appeared in religious-based pre-
modern societies. 
Kızılyürek (2005a) also emphasizes the importance of political dimensions in 
modern societies. The major difference between pre-modern societies and modern 
societies is obviously “distinctive political dimensions.” Nationalism is one of the 
factors that paved the way for developing nations with regards to the political needs of 
societies. In order to protect the national interest of nations while drawing their 
boundaries, politically based national movements became very important. The 
political consciousness of modern societies is one of the most important things for of 
bringing the nation to the international stage. (Kızılyürek, 2005a). 
According to Gellner, once societies became nations on the basis of 
institutionalization, nationalism played a very important place in industrial societies 
and started drawing the fate of nations. Violent struggles increasingly drew the new 
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political and cultural boundaries of states during the transformation to industrial 
societies. All these progresses emphasized the importance of communication. 
According to Gellner, everyone had to speak the same “language” and share the same 
culture in order to be a part of a specific nation. He also claims that the constructed 
high culture secures the uniformity of a social group over ethnic cultures “because 
cultural differences will diminish with globalization, economic interdependence, co-
operation, and extended international communication systems” (Cited in Işıksal, 
2002). He also emphasizes that states become the protectors of high cultures along 
with modernity and the nation-state. According to Altay (2005), “The nation has 
continuously existed since ancient times.” However, there is only one constructed 
element that is called national consciousness since the beginning of the modern world 
(p. 18). He also points out that in order to develop a nation, a particular community, 
which has a central role in processing the specific territory as a state, must have its 
own sovereignty and share common beliefs (Altay, 2005). Basically, there must exist 
communality in many areas, including a common language, a constructed high 
culture, a common political ideology and a common sense of consciousness in order 
to develop a nation-state. These commonalities made people recognize differences 
between themselves and others, which led to the creation of nationalism.  
Nationalism has a strong impact on developing national identity, nations or 
nation-states in terms of modernization. Eventually, nationalism is a politically based 
ideology “that places the nation at the center of its concerns and seeks to promote the 
nation’s well-being. Nationalism is an ideological movement for attaining and 
maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members 
deem to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (Smith, 2001, p. 9). Evidently, as 
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Smith claims, the roots of ethnicity must be politicized on the nationalist level in 
order to create the actual or potential nation. 
Smith (1991) identified and listed the goals of the ethnic nationalist 
movements as following: 
1. The creation of a literary “high culture” for the community where it was lacking. 
2. The formation of a culturally homogenous “organic nation.” 
3. Securing a recognized “homeland,” and preferably an independent state for the  
    community. 
4. Turning a hitherto passive ethnie into an active ethno-political community, a  
     “subject of history” (p. 126). 
According to Elie Kedourie (1994), nationalism is a doctrine that holds that 
humanity is naturally divided into nations, with certain characteristics and that the 
only legitimate type of government is national self-government. Along with the 
national self-government of states, “citizen armies, increased administration road 
building, linguistic standardization, popular educational system, occasions for popular 
political participations, and many other changes that helped produce a new 
consciousness of simply create national identity” (Calhoun, 1997, p. 10).  
Accordingly, there are different perspectives for identifying a nation and 
nationalism. Although, there are different forms of nationalist struggles depending on 
the self-interests of nations, nationalist struggles divided nations into two distinct 
areas. Lecours (2000) points out that, within the scholars of nationalism, there are two 
different types of nationalism, ethnic and civil, and two different types of nation, 
cultural and political. More commonly, these types of nationalism are known as 
Eastern (cultural and ethnic) and Western (politic and civic), which are used to 
analyze the different structure of nationalism among nations. Although East and West 
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are geographically related to nationalism, they mostly illustrate the conceptual 
characteristics of national movements. For example, Western Europe is characterized 
by Western nationalism, such as French nationalism. However, although Germany is 
geographically located in Western Europe, German nationalism shows the features of 
Eastern nationalism with regard to some specific cases. In fact, it is obviously clear 
that the conceptual characteristics of the national struggles are more important than 
geographical features to name the nationalist struggles of a nation.  
In some cases, the origin of ethnicity and culture is taken into consideration to 
develop a nation in terms of a national culture or on the basis of political principles. In 
some other cases, politically based features such as citizenship are required to create a 
nation. However, both political and cultural factors are generally important for the 
legitimacy system of modern states in order to pave the way for developing nations. 
The level of political features and the level of cultural features emerges in nations at a 
different level, depending on its type. Additionally, if common factors of a social 
group including language, religion, race, and ethnicity must not be considered 
separately, an Eastern type of nation would emerge. On the other hand, if the unity of 
nations within the framework of a high culture was developed to impose unity on its 
citizens regardless of cultural diversity, a Western type of nation would be born.  
 
Western (Civic-Political) Nationalism vs. Eastern (Ethnic-Cultural) Nationalism  
The Eastern form of nationalism, which defines a certain national grouping in 
terms of ancestry, was extensively developed in Central Europe, Eastern Europe and 
some parts of Asian regions where multi-cultural and multi-national societies were 
established on the basis of cultural and ethnical elements. According to Lecours 
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(2000) some pre-industrial Western nations could be also associated with ethnic 
nationalism. 
 According to Charles Kupchan (1995), “Ethnic nationalism defines 
nationhood in terms of lineage. The attributes that members of an ethnically defined 
national grouping share include physical characteristic, culture, religion, language, 
and a common ancestry. Individuals of a different ethnicity, even if they reside in and 
are citizens of the nation state in question, do not become part of the national 
grouping” (p. 4). Lecours (2000) states, “Ethnic nationalism and cultural nations are 
related to an objective definition of the nation that uses linguistic, religious or ethnic 
criteria to determine membership” (p. 153). Eventually, as both scholars emphasize, 
ethnic elements are a very important part of a certain national grouping.  
Anthony Smith (1995) also emphasizes the importance of ethnic elements 
while discussing an ethnic group or a national group. He also points out that these 
ethnic elements with their own myths and symbols are always needed to protect their 
continuity throughout history. Accordingly, ethnic nationalism must be related to at 
least some basic ethnic factors including common language, religion, and culture in 
order to emerge in a national group. Additionally, blood ties among citizens is also 
one of the important requirements of ethnic nationalism.  
 Eastern nationalism is a very complex foundation that is constructed on “a 
blood related group,” specific territory and religion. “The only label you deserve is 
what you are with the blood you bear” (Bacık, 2002, p. 21). Also, the cultural 
homogeneity and ethnic ties are very important regardless to the citizenship and 
individual’s interests in ethnic nationalism. As Calhoun (1997) points out, a common 
citizenship is generally related to a common ethnicity in Eastern nationalism. In this 
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sense, Harder underlines the importance of a common language, which must be the 
key features of ethnic citizenship in a certain territory (Cited in Özkırımlı, 2008).  
The Eastern type of nationalism is often considered as an opponent of Western 
type of nationalism. According to Bora, Eastern nationalism is more likely anti-
Western nationalism (Bora, 1995). He also claims that Eastern nationalism is based on 
either ethnic ties or cultural-historical-linguistic-based national identity in Eastern 
Europe (Bora, 1995, p. 72). Societies are built on an ethno-linguistic structure where 
rival interaction among them exists. This type nationalism also focuses on ethnic 
background of a certain group. Evidently, it is hard to talk about the high culture due 
to complex multiple loyalties, regarding the importance of the blood ties in the 
Eastern type of nations. Moreover, ethnic nationalism is generally associated with 
ethnic and economic features of the nation rather than political elements. Political 
features are more likely to be associated with a Western type of nationalism. 
According to Kohn, Eastern nationalism is based on emotional and authoritarian 
structures unpaved with rational, pluralistic and optimistic, structures that characterize 
Western nationalism. Ethnic nationalism imposed authoritarian regimes on its citizens 
(Cited in Bora, 1995). For instance, Eastern nationalism is exemplified by the 
authoritarian structure of the administration in Russia and Asia. According to him, the 
collectivity is also more associated with eastern nationalism where civil rights are less 
tolerated in comparison to the individualist Western nationalism where civil liberties 
are embedded in the system. According to Hans Kohn, Eastern nationalism lacks 
individualistic struggle to procure legitimate interests (cited in Özkırımlı, 2008).  
Eastern nationalism was born as a contra trend to Western nationalism. It 
created a different atmosphere with its complex structure. To clarify the difference 
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between Eastern and Western types of nationalism, Kohn (2005) compares Western 
and Eastern nationalisms as following: 
While Western nationalism was, in its origin, connected with the 
concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism current in 
the eighteenth century, the later nationalism in Central and Eastern 
Europe and in Asia easily tended towards a contrary development. 
Dependent upon, and opposed to, influences from without, this new 
nationalism, not rooted in a political and social reality, lacked self-
assurance; its inferiority complex was often compensated by 
overemphasis and overconfidence, their own nationalism appearing to 
nationalists in Germany, Russia or India as something infinitely deeper 
than the nationalism of the West, and therefore richer in problems and 
potentialities (Kohn 2005, p. 330).  
 
 
 In most cases, civic liberties are only taken into consideration when elites’ 
rights/majority rights are in question in Eastern nationalism. Basically, minority rights 
are usually excluded in ethnic nationalism. This distinctive mode of administration, in 
particular the lack of liberal and democratic elements of the ruling system that 
characterizes Eastern nationalist countries could be a reason for the ongoing political 
violence among citizens of the nation-state as in Cyprus. The lack of liberal, secular 
and democratic regimes of Eastern nations is usually associated with underdeveloped 
countries. Especially, considering multi-ethnic based Eastern nations, the Eastern 
form of nationalism “may be conflict-producing mould when a country includes 
several ethnic groups” (Bacık, 2002, p. 22). 
 Comparing Eastern to Western nations, Eastern nations are organic in terms of 
the process of nation-building on the basis of a blood bond. By nation-building, 
William Bloom means that “both the formation and establishment of the new state 
itself as a political entity, and the processes of creating viable degrees of unity, 
adaptation, achievement, and a sense of national identity among the people” (Bloom, 
1990, p. 55-56). These are necessary in order to create nations; however, Bloom 
claims that psychological-based elements should also be included in the process of 
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nation building. According to Bloom (1990), “There are always individuals and ethnic 
groups who, for one reason or another based in previous identifications, do not 
identify with the nation-state” (p. 63). Calhoun (1997) explains this situation in the 
following way: 
Even today, there are other important bases of identity and solidarity 
that don’t fit with the nation-state model-religion, for example, 
particularly for those, like many Islamists, who reject the distinction of 
religious and secular authority and seek to create unified religious 
states (p. 17).   
 
 The Kurdish point of view could serve to analyze the exceptional situation. 
The process of nation-building in Turkey was an ethnic-oriented formation, 
emphasized after the declaration of Turkey Republic in 1923. The Turkish Minister of 
Justice, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, describes the exceptional situation of the Turkish case 
as such: 
Only the Turkish nation has the privilege of demands for such a right 
will be recognized. There is no need to hide the truth. The Turks are 
the sole owners and the sole notables of this country. Those who are 
not of Turkish origin have only one right; to serve and to be the slaves 
without question of the noble Turkish nation (Cited in Bacık, 2002, 
p. 23). 
 
 
 As Bacık (2002) notes, although this explanation might not cover the general 
ideology of Turkey, some words from the terminology of nationalism, including 
“nation,” “national rights,” ”noble nation” which are associated with ethnic 
nationalism, were emphasized. According to Jack Eller (1998), “This view eventually 
gave to a race ideology, however, and Turkey was to be the national home of this race 
exclusively” (p. 171).  
Besides these exceptional cases, on the other hand, there are some certain 
elements, such as political and civil, which are associated with the Western form of 
nationalism. Eventually, Western nationalism is more political and civic comparing to 
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ethnic based Eastern nationalism. As Hans Kohn states, the political and civic origins 
of Western type of nationalist movements started developing in the West (particularly 
in France, the US and England) even before the Eastern form of nationalism, which 
was based on “a community of laws.” For this reason, the nationalist struggles in the 
West were based on individuals’ legitimate interests (Özkırımlı, 2008, p. 60, 61). 
Political elements are very important in shaping the Western form of nationalism. 
Kupchan (1995) also emphasizes the importance of political factors in explaining 
Western nationalism. According to him, Western nationalism “defines the term of 
citizenship and political participation. Members of a national grouping that is defined 
in civic terms share participation in a circumscribed political community, common 
political values, a sense of belonging to the state in which they reside, and, usually, a 
common language” (Kupchan, 1995, p. 4). Hence, “A citizen is national, regardless of 
ethnicity and lineage” (Ibid). The set of givens is not a necessary requirement to be a 
citizen of a nation in Western nationalism. According to Lecours (2000), “Civic 
nationalism and political nations are associated with a subjective definition that 
ignores these criteria and insists on the free will of individuals” (p. 153). Eventually, 
according to Bora (1995), the political ideology of the West excluded the East, 
because Western nationalism was civilized, democratic and supported human rights 
rather than being anachronistic and based on micro nationalism as is Eastern 
nationalism. Eastern nationalism was generally shaped by ethnocentrism, revanchism, 
and isolationism based on anti-Western sentiments (Bora, 1995, p. 74). 
Overall, objective (Eastern) and subjective (Western) “conceptions of the 
nation are said to be related to specific socio-economic and intellectual conditions that 
correspond to particular historical and spatial dimensions” (Lecours, 2000, p. 153). 
More specifically, a civic and territorial model of nationalism is associated with 
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political factors. Briefly, whereas the Western type of nationalism provides liberalism 
and democracy, the Eastern type of nationalism provides authoritarian regimes in 
order to serve their continuity. 
Furthermore, civic identity is a constructed identity and even foreigners can be 
a part of a civic community “but only by participating in the local practices and 
institutions and by slowly adopting the customs and even the modes of reflexive 
criticism” (Tempelman, 1999, p. 18). For instance, anyone could want to be a citizen 
of a civic nation, such as American society or French. He or she could do so, and yet 
have completely a different culture and language, different blood ties, religion, and 
race. The only way to realize this is to fulfill requirements of that specific nation’s 
laws. Laws also have significantly important in shaping and determining Western 
nationalism regardless of blood origin.  
 The constitution plays a very important role in Western nationalism. It 
provides an opportunity to protect the common citizenship and to provide equal 
treatment for all the citizens within multi-cultural structure. The constitution of 
Western nations could be considered very liberal and democratic in order to be a 
protector of individuals. Also, it provides equal rights for its citizens in order to help 
them to express their freedom. Habermas stresses the importance of common 
citizenship in Western nations and explains that as “the political unity of European 
nations cannot be based on the shared traditions, cultures, and languages that 
characterized successful nation-states” (cited in Auer, 1997, para. 10). Accordingly, 
whereas Eastern nationalism emphasizes shared values, Western nationalism 
emphasizes common citizenship. More specifically, Western nationalism is a political 
project in which the citizenship was established for members of a nation in order to 
provide territorial integrity regardless of their blood ties. 
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PART TWO 
Historical Dimensions of Cyprus 
Chapter Two: Transition From the Ottoman Empire to the British Empire 
When the Seeds of Nationalism Speared Across Cyprus 
Cyprus, which has been called one of the islands of heaven in the 
Mediterranean Sea, has faced a lot of mysteries either about the legend of love and 
beauty or conflict since the first human settlement on the island in 10.000 BC. 
However, usually the first thing about Cyprus that comes to mind is the “Cyprus 
Problem” that has existed over the last couple of centuries between two communities, 
Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot. The problem persisted under multiple empires 
and continued through self-rule. Cyprus has always been strategically very important 
to imperial powers because of its location in the Mediterranean Sea, which has made 
it a key position for trade and military bases since 2000 B.C. Because of its 
importance, the island has changed hands many times and witnessed different cultures 
and civilization including Aegean, Anatolian, Egyptian and Levantine civilizations 
during its earlier history.  
Eventually, foreign factors started showing strong interests for Cyprus by the 
beginning of Bronze Age when copper production was found on the island in 2300 
BC. Right after the discovery of copper production in Cyprus, the island became a 
heart of trade route in the Mediterranean area in the first half of 2000s BC. In 
addition, Cyprus gained a significantly higher level of attention by the late Bronze 
Age when the island had witnessed a couple of migrations from the region of the 
Aegean. Following those years, the Mycenaean, who were one of the most important 
factors of Greek civilizations, settled on the island in 1300 BC. The period of 
Mycenaean settlements on the island is considered one of the most important 
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civilization periods in the historic period of the island Cyprus. As soon as the 
Mycenaean conquered the island, their culture flourished. Evidently, different kinds 
of Mycenaean pottery were found in Cyprus, which was considered as a significant 
mark of flourishing culture. Such findings are evidence that the island engaged in 
international trade relations with the Mycenaean. As soon as they conquered the 
island, their language, particularly spoken language, which was “Greek,” spread over 
the land. Their written script affected the whole island as well. In this sense, the 
conquest of the island by Mycenaean is accepted as an evidence of the primordial tie 
of the island with Greeks since 1300 BC because their flourishing culture and trade 
relations paved the way for strengthening the roots of the Greek existence on the 
island and the proof of primordial ethnic ties with Hellenic culture. Thus, the history 
of the Greek existence on the island started since the Bronze Age. The history of the 
Turkish Cypriots of the island, on the other hand, started right after the conquest of 
the island by the Ottoman Empire in 1571.  
The strategic importance of the island increased the interests of other powers 
and paved the way for changing hands many times including Persians, Egyptians, 
Romans, Byzantines, Lusignan, and Venetians. These powers also flourished on the 
island until the full-scale invasion of Cyprus by the Ottoman Empire with the 
conquest in 1571. As many other powers had done before, the Ottoman Empire also 
took the island just because of its strategic importance; but one distinguishing factor 
that differentiated it from the other empires’ motivation was Cyprus’s close proximity 
to the Ottoman Empire’s mainland. When the Ottomans conquered Constantinople 
from the Byzantine Empire, it became the capital city of the Ottomans and was 
renamed “Istanbul” under the leadership of Mehmet II in 1453. The Ottoman Empire 
started dreaming about having the island in order to expand its territory. After ending 
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the Ottoman’s hegemony over Cyprus, the British Empire settled on the island in 
order to provide the sustainability of its colonization strategy. In this sense, Cyprus 
had “considerable geostrategic importance for the regional stabilization of British and 
Ottoman power, they were marginal to the political and economic life” of Europe” 
(Zink, 2008, p. 586). During the administration period of both Ottoman and British 
powers, the empires paved the way for a new and complex structure for Cyprus and 
created the conflicting environment in the historic period of Cyprus in order to secure 
their places on the island. Although the problem itself is more complex than everyone 
would like to believe, there are some visible factors including involvement of third 
parties, effects of modernization, nationalism, different ethnic backgrounds of major 
groups on the same land that have caused the conflict over Cyprus and brought it to 
where it is today. 
One of the factors that affected the dispute on the island was that the Ottomans 
were considered very weak compared with the British and their colonial policy. Some 
of the other factors exacerbating tensions included the educational system of the two 
major communities, the effect of the Orthodox Church, and the developing 
bourgeoisie class of Greek Cypriots. However, even though the Ottomans’ effect on 
the creation of the current dispute on the island was very weak, all these elements, 
including those of the Ottoman period, caused the creation of politics that has led to 
ongoing conflict on Cyprus, brought the extension of Turkey and Greek animosity on 
the island, paved the way for the creation of rival ethnic communities over Cyprus 
and the development of different ethnic identities, and also caused the nationalist 
based demographically and geographically partition on the island in 1974.  
 
 
39 
 
The Ottomans on the Island     
The Ottoman Empire encompassed one of the longest periods of imperial rule 
on the island. Before the conquest of the island by the Ottomans, the Empire attacked 
the island in order to conquer it; however, each attack ended with devastating result. 
Until 1571, Ottoman’s attack destroyed a couple of cities of Cyprus. In the summer of 
1570, the Ottomans landed on the coast of Larnaka with 60,000 troops under the 
leadership of Lala Mustafa Pasha and they fought with Venetians until August 1571 
in order to hold the island. In the summer of 1571, the Ottomans conquered the island 
and declared their authority on Cyprus. Right after the conquest of the island, the 
Empire destroyed “the Venetian feudal structure which ruled the mass of the Greek-
speaking, Orthodox Christian population” and established its own government on the 
island from the late sixteenth century until the British Empire signed a convention in 
the late nineteenth century” in 1878 (Attalides, 2003, p. 1). As soon as the Empire 
fully invaded the island in 1571, the Ottomans abducted Greek Christian children 
from their families and trained them to be Turkish fighters who killed thousands of 
thousands innocent people by that time (Papadakis, 2005, p. 5-8). The Ottomans 
always followed the similar way to gather strength of its military wherever it 
conquered. In addition, there had been some other important structural changes during 
the Ottoman hegemony over Cyprus between the sixteenth and the nineteenth 
centuries that would see the first seeds of paving the way for nationalist struggles on 
the island.  
The first development of the Empire was that the island population increased 
by adding Muslims, particularly Turkish Muslims, to Cyprus step by step up until the 
end of Ottoman rule amongst the native inhabitants of Greeks to create a religiously 
pluralistic structure on Cyprus (Kızılyürek, 2005a). Basically, in order to create a 
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religiously pluralistic structure in Cyprus, “the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots 
prepared to live in the same environment for the long years under the Millet system” 
(Kızılyürek, 2001, p. 19). These religious communities were organized as autonomous 
communities under the Ottoman’s Millet system (Millet: nation, community; national 
ruling system of the Ottoman Empire), which addresses the treatment of non-Muslims 
communities on the basis of Islamic rules, in Cyprus as many other colonial territories 
of the Ottomans. The Millet system generally refers to separate legal courts for the 
millets (Christian communities, etc.) by given them right to govern their internal 
issues with minority laws. Those people who were ruled under the Millet system were 
usually allowed to set their own laws, and collect their tax under the Ottoman 
administration. Cyprus was also one of the countries that was conquered by the 
Ottomans and were ruled by the Millet system. Right after the arrival of the Ottomans 
on the island, the Millet system was put into effect and “guaranteed the Christian (that 
is, Greek) community extensive cultural autonomy under the supervision of the 
autocephalous Orthodox Primate” (Zink, 2008, p. 587).  
Although “the Greek Cypriots were left mostly undisturbed by their Turkish-
Muslim ruler” under the Millet system, the Cyprus problem worsened over time, 
starting with the settlement of the mass of Turkish immigration on the island by the 
late 1500s that would affect the partition between the two communities until the 
present (Zink, 2008, p. 587). As Morag (2004) explains, sending a new population to 
the island in three hundred years during the Ottomans’ period on Cyprus “created a 
new demographic balance that continued to affect the island” by creating two sided 
social stratification (p. 597).  
As shown in Table 1, the population of Turks on the island during the 
Ottoman’s ruling period had reached almost forty-six thousand in three hundred years, 
41 
 
which addresses the new social and political structure of the island, and also shows 
different ethnic based new demographic balance on the island (Kızılyürek, 2001).  
 
Table 1: Ratio of Muslims, Greeks and Others in Cyprus After Bringing New 
Population into Cyprus in 1881 
The Distribution of total population (Religious Group) 
                 Muslims                                                                       45,458 
                 Greek/Orthodox                                                          137,631 
                 Others                                                                            2,541 
                 Total                                                                          185,630 
*Cited in Kızılyürek 2005a p: 213 
 
As is seen in Table 1, the total Muslim population  reached 45,459 on the 
island whereas Christians were 137,631 under the Ottoman administration in Cyprus 
by the year 1881.The ratio of Christians to Muslims was around 3 to 1. The new 
demographic balance of the island would play a very important role on the creation of 
the Cyprus dispute.  
The second development of the Empire involved religions and religious 
institutions. The Orthodox Church was established instead of the Roman Catholic 
Church, which used to be under Venetian rule, until the Ottoman Empire took control 
of the island. The second development of the Empire on the island was an exceptional 
case for the Ottoman Empire, because under the nation system (Millet system) the 
conquered areas were often allowed to keep their own religion and the place of their 
worship; yet the empire followed a different path for Cyprus by instituting the Cypriot 
Orthodox Church, even giving them administrative and economic opportunities. The 
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Orthodox Church had the right to self-govern the Greek community on the island. In 
addition to this exceptional case, “in 1754, the Sultan (the presidential title of the 
Ottoman Empire, NM) issued an ordinance and declared the Archbishop of the 
Orthodox Church as a secondary political figure” (Kızılyürek, 2001, p. 21). The 
Archbishop became the representative of the Christian community in Cyprus by 
gaining some privileges on the basis of the Ottoman ruling system after the arrival of 
the Ottomans to the island (Attalides, 2003). In this sense, the Orthodox Church 
increasingly had an important role in the political ideologies of the Greek Cypriots, 
and founding and strengthening their ethnic roots. The establishment of the Orthodox 
Church “maintained a dominant position among the Greek Cypriots helped them 
preserve their religious, ethnic, cultural, and political identity” (Joseph, 1997, p. 8). 
Along with the establishment of the Orthodox Church, the Greek Cypriots started 
going to their church for security and continuity of their nations during the occupation 
of the Ottomans (Markides, 1977). However, although the Orthodox Church was 
given the authority to govern non-Muslims, “Greek Cypriots were led by a 
conservative Church hierarchy, not modern” (Attalides, 2003, p. 22). By the time, 
conservative religious institutions of the non-Muslim population played a very 
important role in the inhabitants’ lives, including political, social, cultural and 
intellectual life (Joseph, 1997). The Orthodox Church has always played an important 
role in the Greek Cypriot life even under the British administration and today’s island. 
Having the power to self-govern non-Muslims gave the Church an opportunity for 
“fostering and institutionalizing a religiously-based ethnic identity” which would pave 
the way for the developing nationalism within Greek Cypriot community later in the 
Greek history of the island (Morag, 2004, p. 603). The administrative policy of the 
Orthodox Church had a counterproductive hidden aim to pave the way for an eligible 
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environment to develop nationalism among Christians under the rule of the Ottomans 
(Ibid).  
Overall, as Joseph (1997) noted, by following its traditional system, the 
Ottoman millet system created segregation between major communities depending on 
their religion and ethnic background instead of creating a common will for all ethnic 
groups. In general, the relations of the society under the multi-ethnic and multi-
religious Ottoman Empire were followed by the tradition of the Islamic religion which 
directly affected social relations and social life of ethnic groups. Each ethnic group 
under the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire usually showed cultural 
differences in different level depending on the time period among each other, rather 
than sharing a common culture as modern societies do. In addition, the differentiation 
between each ethnic group usually appeared in the relationship between culture and 
politics on the same land. The Ottoman rule was an example of differing from 
traditional societies by not developing a common culture or converting everybody to 
become Muslims. Instead, the religious groups were separated from each other and 
were administrated according to their religious origins by the Ottomans as in the 
Cyprus case. For example, the ethnic groups were divided into two main groups with 
differing political structures by taking into consideration religious differences in 
Cyprus. The Muslims were ruled directly by the Ottoman Empire, whereas the 
Christians were ruled by the Orthodox Church under Ottoman control. Apparently, 
the millet system of the Ottomans only embraced minorities’ religious affiliations 
rather than their ethnic origins and treated them upon their religions. Even though 
social diversity was developed under the Ottoman regime, ethnic or religion based 
conflict never appeared on the Ottoman territory.  
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Basically, religion was a more important factor than ethnicity according to the 
pre-modern Ottomans. That was the main reason for separating groups on its 
territories into two main groups, Muslims and non-Muslims. For this reason, the 
Ottomans restored the Orthodox Church of Cyprus in order to separate nations and 
make them realize the differences between their national identities. Generally, in 
traditional societies such as the Ottoman Empire, people who belonged to different 
religions, linguistic, or ethnic groups could have lived together but they could not 
have united and developed a common political view or a common will for their future 
in the modern sense. In the Cyprus case for example, both major religious groups 
were distinctly separate and created separate political views and plans for their future 
on the island.  
The Ottoman Empire did not only separate national identities on the basis of 
religious institutions; they also separated the educational institutions “with separate 
boards of education” along the same religious lines after the establishment of the 
Ottoman rule on the island (Lindley, 2007, p. 229). As Joseph (1997) noted, Turk 
Cypriots’ and Greek Cypriots’ schools were separated according to their religious 
institutions in order to create two opponent communities on the same island. 
Depending on the time, education had a really strong impact on spreading the national 
feelings among each ethnic group of Cyprus. As Hörner, Döbert, Kopp and Mitter 
(2007) noted, the educational system could be separated into two main periods 
throughout the history of both ethnic groups on the island;  
1. Education before independence of Cyprus,  
2. Education after the independence of Cyprus.  
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The reason for dividing education into two main periods of schools is that it 
emphases the differences between the two communities. It will become clearer later in 
this chapter, the underlying roots of the separation between the periods had to have 
different curriculums and different main goals for education that would shape the 
tensions between Turks and Greeks on the island. This was a guiding force in the fate 
of the island. Additionally the control of education changed hands after the first 
period.  
The Greek educational system in the first period, under the Ottoman and the 
British rules, was governed by the Church by imposing the religious elements among 
Greek Christians. On the other hand, the evolution of the Cypriot educational system 
during the second period covers the period after the declaration of the independence 
state of Cyprus in. Still, until the declaration of the Republic of Cyprus, religiously 
based educational systems strongly dominated the island from the Ottoman ruling 
period through the British ruling period.  
The discriminatory policy of the Ottomans increased tension and fostered 
disputes amongst religious groups on the island, which paved the way for a large 
conflict between the two communities of Cyprus, even though the tension was low 
until the British administration was established in 1878. Greek national movements 
had been already started planting and spreading within the Greek Cypriot community 
under the Ottoman rule, even though they were not prominent. On the other hand, 
there is no evidence of Turkish nationalism by the time Greek nationalism was 
gaining power. While the Greeks started building their nationalist feelings against 
others in these years, these movements were usually non-violent during Ottoman rule.  
Under the rule of the Ottomans, each ethnic society was treated differently 
depending on their religions even in their social life. Because they had to go to 
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different schools, they could not have any chance to create “inter-group relations in 
the educational environment. Each group had the right to be independent of the other 
and to find intra-group solutions for its educational problems,” and also other 
problems (Özerk, 2001, p. 256). Thus, the social mobilization could not develop 
among ethnic groups, considering the strong effects of the characteristics of the 
traditional society on ethnic communities in Cyprus.  
These structural changes on the island after the settlement of the Ottoman also 
built the subsistence economy on agriculture. Two ethnic communities, Turks and 
Greeks, were pulled into the Ottoman’s agricultural system, particularly the peasant 
classes of both communities. Although inhabitants belonged to different religions, 
people who were engaged in agriculture working together under the Ottoman rule 
(cited in Kızılyürek, 2005a). Basically, as is understood, the class factor had different 
effects on people; the differences between each group’s peasant classes were not 
conflictual. On the contrary, as Kızılyürek (2005a) states, the structure of the 
peasantry was not changed and they continued engaging in agricultural pursuits under 
the Ottomans.  
Even though the arrival of the Ottomans to the island brought a new governing 
system, provided privileges to non-Muslims, brought new economy order, etc., 
changes in the social structure also directly affected inhabitants of the island. In 
general, the peasant classes of both religious groups on the island were adversely 
affected by recent social changes of Ottomans because becoming a dependent on 
Europe ended up imposing higher taxes on the public, which directly affected 
peasantry class. As a result of imposing higher taxes to people, the Muslims and 
Christians fostered solidarity in their shared communities within the peasant classes of 
each group where they lived under the same social conditions, including sharing the 
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same needs, way of life, behavior patterns, even the way they dressed. (Kızılyürek, 
2001). Eventually, the peasant classes of Muslims and non-Muslims who were 
working together and sharing a lot of things in their daily life chose unity and 
solidarity and the result put all of them into one side against the current ruling system 
in order to fight for their rights (Kızılyürek, 2001, p. 25).  
Even though the Ottomans main goal was to build a peaceful environment 
between Muslim and non-Muslim communities on the island, it negatively affected 
the relations between them because it imposed high taxes on inhabitants upon their 
religions and their business right after its entrance into the island in order to create 
financial resources and centralized the authority for itself on the island. Because the 
right to collect taxes from the non-Muslim community was given to the Greek 
Orthodox Church due to privileges, a hierarchical structure was also started gradually 
developing itself on the island. These priests who were taking taxes from the Christian 
community were using the money for their personal expenses and for living in 
opulence. This gave them an opportunity to automatically enter the bourgeoisie class. 
Once priests became richer by taking higher taxes from Christians and spending the 
money for their personal expense, priests started living as elites. This was the start of 
the gradual creation of the bourgeoisie class of Christians/Greeks on the island, which 
was not a sign for peaceful environment.  
In order to create better financial income besides collecting taxes from its 
citizens, the Greek Cypriot elites let European products, which were created with 
higher technology, enter into the Ottoman territory. However, this was a main reason 
for losing their power to Europe and becoming dependent on the West because those 
European goods that began entering the country were cheaper than local productions; 
eventually, those local industries were not very developed compared with others, and 
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could not compete with these cheaper products of Europe. These results paved the 
way for opening a way for many European embassies to enter into the Ottoman 
territory. After foreign embassies entered the Ottoman state, they started to contact 
many local people to convince them to be their citizen instead of staying under a weak 
state (Kızılyürek, 2005a). All of these developments over the Empire definitely 
appeared on the island as well, though on a different levels.  
The middle class in Cyprus began to change parallel with the Ottoman in the 
nineteenth century depending on the changes the current administration and also 
changes in the world in the basis of modernization. Due to some major changes in the 
social structure of the island, the nationalist feelings of Christian villagers started 
developing faster on the basis of modernization. Even though the peasant class was 
affected least from these changes, nationalist sentiments in the middle class of the 
Greeks which was influenced by Greece national liberation movement started to be 
planted within middle class of the Greeks on the island in those years (Kızılyürek, 
2001). The nationalist seeds within the Greek middle class started to gain more power 
after 1844 when the “Megali Idea” was adopted as the state doctrine of Greece. The 
reason for not developing violent nationalist sentiments was because the Orthodox 
Church was trying to control any kinds of uprising against the Ottomans in order to 
maintain their peaceful relationship with the Ottoman in order to maintain the 
privileges that were provided by them. Having a close relationship with the Ottomans 
prevented the Orthodox Church on Cyprus refuse from having a close relationship 
with the Greek Church until 1850.  
 Overall, during the Ottoman ruling years, Greek Cypriots were aware of the 
nationalism and started organizing year after year until the British Empire temporarily 
settled on the island and established its own administration in 1878 “to protect the 
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Ottomans from Russia” (Hofstotter, 2008, p. 161). However, “when the new British 
colonists came ashore in 1878, their mission was to safeguard the Mediterranean route 
to the Suez Canal; their moral mission was to prove the fertilizing, fecund influence 
of British reason, oriented towards the ever-hastening future and its promised bounty” 
(Bryant, 2004, p. 24). The British put forward some reasons and annexed the island 
after World War I. The Ottomans had allied themselves ranged with the British 
enemy, the German Empire, and made war upon the British. The main reason for the 
British annexing the island was to achieve their main mission, rather than protecting 
the Ottomans from Russia. Until the annexation of the island by the British, the 
Ottoman Empire power continued on the island, though they were not in charge (cited 
in Hofstotter, 2008).  
 
The British on the island 
The inhabitants of Cyprus, particularly the two major communities -- Greeks 
and Turks -- were governed by the British from 1878 to 1959 (Attalides, 2003). 
Imposing higher taxes more than the Ottomans on inhabitants, and taking over the 
governmental position from them were evidence of not being a modern colonial 
power. Basically, the two major groups became subjects instead of being citizens of 
the island along with the settlement of the British colonial power on the island 
(Bryant, 2004, p. 21). Still, “a modern bureaucratic administration was established, 
the two ethnic groups retained control over matters of religion, education, culture, 
personal status and communal institutions” (Joseph, 1997, p. 76). 
 Four years after the British settled on the island, they established a Legislative 
Council that consisted of eighteen memberships. “Three members were Muslim, nine 
members were non-Muslim, and three were also six appointed members who were 
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civil servant and the Governor has a casting vote” for both Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots (Attalides, 2003, p. 23). This proportion of membership in the council 
depended on the population ratio of each community which Greek to Turks was 3 to 
1. Although this council did not provide the legislative authority for the inhabitants of 
the island, members were supposed to give advice related to the problems of the 
island to the colonial power. Even though the annexation of the island by the British 
created an expectation within the Greek community that the island would acquire 
democratic and national liberation in order to be set free, “the entry of the British into 
Cyprus and the administration of the island by a protestant power changed all of this” 
(Bryant, 2004, p. 22). Eventually, the British established this council in order to serve 
its interest on the island although Greeks saw it as an opportunity to take advantages 
from it in order to find a way to unit with the motherland Greece. As a result of these 
reforms, the British incited more Greek Cypriot community to develop Hellenic 
nationalism on Cyprus. “The reasons for the expression of dissatisfaction in this form 
have partly to do with British colonial policy, and partly with the relations of the 
Greek State to Orthodox” (Attalides, 2003, p. 24).  
While Greek community of Cyprus was developing its nationalist feelings and 
getting closer to Greece, the arrival of the British Empire on the island, a couple of 
reforms came into force that affected Cypriots directly. These reforms removed the 
inhabitants’ privileges that they used to have under the Ottoman Empire. For instance, 
Turks lost their power in the government and the Greek Church lost its representative 
function after the British settled on the island and declared some reforms on the basis 
of its ruling policy. In addition to these unexpected reforms, economic problems also 
started developing among inhabitants on the island. However, the British did not even 
try to take any measures for the comfort of inhabitants (Kızılyürek, 2001).  
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As a result of discriminatory processes, the educational system took the 
responsibility to create and disseminate more nationalist feelings. After the settlement 
of the British on the island along with the discriminatory policy, the educational 
system and churches escalated the tension based on ethnic differences on the island 
(Lindley, 2007, p.  228). Even though both groups used the educational system under 
the British rule to impose nationalist feelings, “education was one arena in which the 
British government, despite its efforts, would never gain full control” (Bryant, 2004, 
p. 124). As Bryant said, British rule did not fully put its hand on the administration of 
schools; however, they made a lot of changes as to quality and quantity the 
educational systems of Greeks and Turks. In addition to these improvements of the 
educational system, the British even provided economic help to inhabitants’ schools 
and helped them to build many modern schools by providing economic help as well. 
Also, they gave both communities a chance to administrate their schools by 
controlling them secretly.  
Although many modern schools were established and were took the right to 
govern themselves; educational system, particularly elementary education was 
continued being under the religious influence because it was a necessary part of 
becoming a full member of the religious community, someone who could engage in 
its rites and recite its text (Bryant, 2004, p. 126, 127). Basically, the Orthodox 
Church, which was established after the Ottomans settlement on the island got the 
control of the Greek society on the basis of a religious regime, which was “considered 
itself to be the responsible body for the education and enlightenment of the younger 
Greek – Cypriots” in order to maintain on its control of Greeks to secure its continuity 
on the island by planting nationalist ideas to Greek students (Özerk, 2001, p. 256). 
“As a result, the educational sector developed in schools was based on the Old 
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Testament, which used a high-status form of old Greek” (Ibid). Also, “to become a 
fully literate Greek Orthodox meant that one learned the languages of Socrates, of the 
Bible, and of Byzantium” in Greek Orthodox according to the Greek Church (Bryant, 
2004, p. 126). The Church was willing to have full control over the education of 
Greek people to impose Greek traditions and culture especially after dissatisfaction of 
not getting any legislative autonomy in the council to be able to fulfill their own 
interests.  
Overall, those unfavorable changes under the British administration negatively 
affected inhabitants of Cyprus and paved the way for violence based on nationalist 
struggles later in the history of the island. The unexpected process of the British were 
the real reasons for the development of the European and anti-colonial nationalist 
struggles on the island against colonial rulers and also were a reason for the 
development of different national identification formations which created enemies of 
the Muslims and non-Muslim inhabitants of the island who had been living in peace 
for hundreds of hundreds years under the Ottomans. In this sense, the “divide and 
rule” policy of the British exacerbated the conflict.  
The Church and educational systems expanded the main functions of the 
process of the development of nationalist feelings against others. Besides the church, 
“the educational system however had, even before the beginning of British rule in 
Cyprus, formed a link between the Greek-Cypriot bourgeois and the Greek State” and 
caused the development of nationalist among the higher class Greeks (Attalides, 2003, 
p. 25). “The schools were seen as a central mechanism for promoting Hellenism and 
Greek identity within the Greek Cypriots” and paving the way for the creation of 
different classes (Lindley, 2007, p. 229). The main goal of education was to convince 
students to believe the idea of enosis (national idea) and to make them follow this idea 
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to become a part of Greece (Lindley 2007, p. 229; Attalides 1979, p. 26). The slogan 
of the Greek national movement which was taught at the Greeks’ schools was “enosis 
and only enosis.” For these reasons, throughout the British rule on the island, Greek 
students were taught to be closer to Greece, whereas Turkish students, on the other 
hand, were taught to be closer to Turkey later in the history of the island. Basically, 
Turkish and particularly Greek societies were using their educational system for their 
own nationalist ideological practices. In 1881, Josiah Spencer (the English director of 
education) pointed out the role of schools on the development of nationalism by 
describing “the well-known policy of Greek nationalist within Greece to use the 
Greek schools of Anatolia and Cyprus to cultivate the meghali idhea, or the irredentist 
ideal of uniting all Greek-speaking peoples in what were seen as historical Greek 
lands” (Braynt, 2004, p. 125).  
Overall, the educational separation on the island created and gradually 
increased conflict between the Muslim/Turkish and Christian/Greek communities of 
Cyprus year by year rather than building a good relationship between them. The main 
reason of growing separately and against each other was because “the two groups 
were encouraged to view themselves as extensions of their respective motherlands, 
and the development of two distinct nationalities with antagonistic loyalties was 
ensured” (Meleagrou and Yeşilada, 1993, p. 57). Moreover, the educational system 
played a very important role in shaping the current fate of Cyprus. Additionally, the 
nationalist-based educational system also prevented the rise of bilingualism among 
inhabitants, which would exacerbate the separation of two major communities.  
The Turkish and Greek languages had been the two main languages of Cyprus 
for more than four hundred years. In those hundreds years, Turkish Cypriots and 
Greek Cypriots met in their daily life very often, especially people who lived in mix 
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villages; however, they rarely went to the same schools because of the colonial policy 
of the British in Cyprus. Although there had been two main languages throughout the 
history of Cyprus, bilingualism had not really taken hold among Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots. Table 2, for example shows how the amount of bilingualism in the island 
was very low. 
 
Table 2: Ratio of Bilingualism Among Muslims, Greeks and Others in Cyprus  
    After Bringing Muslim Immigrants to Cyprus in 1881 
 
        The Distribution of Total Population (Language and Religious Group) 
                  Muslims                             Greek                                   Orthodox 
      Greek                                  2,454                                    137,499 
      Turkish                             42,489                                             95 
      Arabic                                    445                                             17 
      Other                                        70                                             26 
      Total                                  45,458                                     137,631 
*Cited in Kızılyürek 2005a p: 213 
 
As seen in Table 2, the number of Muslim community was 45,458 whereas 
2,454 Muslims were speaking only Greek. Only 95 Greek Orthodox were speaking 
Turkish out of the 137,631 population of Greek Orthodox. As shown in Table 2, 
people were hardly speaking another main language of Cyprus. However, living on a 
bilingual island, but being monolingual was one of the factors damaging the 
relationship between Turkish and Greek Cypriots (Özerk, 2001). Considering how 
important communication is in order to establish friendship and peace between 
groups, it is quite obvious why the two groups had difficulties in building a friendly 
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relationship.  Each community, particularly the Greek Cypriots, chose to be 
monolingual for a long period of time. Despite the fact that second languages as an 
option were added to their educational systems (such as English, Latin), neither of the 
communities added the other’s language to their educational system. However, Turks 
were a little bit more flexible regarding these kinds of nationalist behaviors if we 
compare both communities’ nationalist movements historically. Communication 
problems on the island provide for the development of two enemies and two rival 
nationalist movements. The communication problems on the island also created 
significant difficulties in many areas such as economic, social, cultural, and political 
fields, the educational system, communicating, working together, and so forth 
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots throughout their history in Cyprus. 
In fact, “education in Cyprus was necessary for nationalism because education 
already embodied community traditions and represented communal continuity” 
(Bryant, 2004, p. 11). Each major community on the island had different 
backgrounds, including different languages, cultures, and religions; each group was 
characterized by different elements on the basis of the role of ethnic identity 
formation and this caused the creation different national movements. Although these 
different elements were used in the curriculum of each group on the basis of their 
ethnic backgrounds, they would eventually create different identities which would 
exacerbate the social separation and conflict between them. To sum up, different 
ethnic formation could create nationalism among groups, and national feelings could 
also be imposed by using educational system to socialize people.  
Turks established their schools by using the curriculum on the basis of the 
religious information. “Courses were mainly based on rote learning of religious 
psalms and on training in reading and writing, using the Ottoman alphabet, which was 
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strongly influenced by the Arabic and Persian languages. Most of the schools were 
run in connection with the mosque and were either publicly financed or privately 
owned” (Özerk, 2001, p. 256). Depending on the educational system, two languages 
were developed among Turkish islanders. One of these languages was used in the 
daily life of Turks, the other one was used as a formal language in Turkish schools. 
“Over the years Arabic and Persian became elective subjects in Turkish schools. This 
practice was discontinued as a result of Ataturk’s reforms in the Turkish Republic 
during the 1920s” (cited in Özerk, 2001, p. 256). Arabic and Persian languages were 
“the languages of the Qur’an and of poetry” (Bryant, 2004, p. 126). In the 1860s, 
some modern Turkish schools were established in the capital city, Nicosia. “These 
schools gave more emphasis to algebra, natural sciences and Turkish language in their 
curriculum.” However, at the same time, “religious teaching and the Arabic language 
were still important” in those years (Attalides, 2003, p. 42). He also states that the 
Turkish schools’ curriculums, including those of the modern schools, had nothing 
about “nationalist elements” to be planted in these years. Obviously, according to the 
history of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, national movements were not an option in their 
community until the 1920s. As evidence, “the Greek language had a place in the 
Turkish-Cypriots’ educational system during some periods in history” on the island 
compared with the Greek-Cypriots who “have never given the Turkish language a 
place in their school system” (Özerk, 2001, p. 253). Also, most of Turkish Cypriots 
were using the Greek language to communicate with Greek Cypriots considering the 
Greek language became the dominant language due to the percentage of the 
population on the island. The communication with Greeks became very important into 
the Turkish community, and just because of that they added the Greek language into 
the Turkish school curriculum in the late 1800s until 1955, when the Greeks 
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established the organization of EOKA and this organization was an armed for a 
campaign of enosis from 1955 until the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1959 
(cited in Özerk, 2001). Obviously, “it was in this demographic, sociolinguistic, and 
political/legal situation that the Turkish-Cypriot School Board made the decision to 
offer Greek as an academic subject in Rusdiye in 1896 (Özerk, 2001, p. 257). 
Learning and using the Greek language was very normal in those years, because there 
was no need for developing any kinds of national feeling within the Turkish 
community, as the Greeks had, until the late nineteenth century. One of the reasons 
for that was that the governments of Cyprus including the Ottoman and the British 
periods were providing and protecting the interests of Cypriot Turks. Another one was 
that the governments of Cyprus gave the Turks an important role in the administrative 
council of Cyprus in order to provide them religious-based privileges or to keep them 
on their sides against Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, “in 1896, approximately 20 
years after the British takeover, the Turkish-Cypriot School Board decided to offer 
English as a subject in its Rusdiye curriculum (Rusdiye or secondary high school 
corresponds to today’s junior high and high schools)” (Ibid). The French language 
was put as an optional subject into the Turkish schools’ curriculum as well (Behçet, 
1969). All these privileges explain why there was no need for the nationalist attitudes 
within Cypriot Turks by the time Greeks’ national sentiments were growing. 
However, on the other hand, even though Greeks had never put the Turkish language 
in their curricula throughout their history on the island, besides native languages, 
Greek Cypriots were only taught Latin in their schools as an elective course. This 
situation obviously shows that Greeks strongly continued imposing the Hellenism 
based national feelings on students under the roof of their schools in their own way 
instead of trying to build a good atmosphere on the island. In this sense, “Greek 
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nationalism was intensified by the inherent contradiction between liberal educational 
and other legislation and ultimately authoritarian rule by a colonial power” that started 
from the Ottoman Empire but reached its peak during the British colonial rule 
(Attalides, 2003, p. 3). However, the British rulers could not estimate that Greek 
Cypriots would be using the educational system to achieve the enosis and gave them 
the flexibility to govern their schools themselves and Greek national consciousness 
and culture came into prominence by letting them administer their schools freely, 
particularly “secondary education” (Hörner et al., 2007, p. 202). Also, separating and 
having the right to self-govern educational system in Cyprus “came to take over many 
of the tasks of the family, including a discipline that was explicitly national” which 
was one other reason to pave the way for developing ethno-nationalism between 
ethnic communities and anti-colonialism against the British (Bryant, 2004, p. 11). 
When the British realized that giving both communities, particular Greek Cypriots, a 
chance to administer their own schools was a mistake, they tried to get full control of 
schools in order to prevent any possibilities of losing the island. Evidently, the 
educational system plays an important role in creating nationalist feelings among each 
ethnic group.  
Obviously, once they started practicing their national consciousness in their 
schools, the two communities started to come closer to either Turkey or Greece. 
“Each community honored the national holidays, played the national anthem and used 
the flag of its mother country” (Joseph, 1997, p. 76). This kind of separation between 
the communities initiated the Cyprus problem which started around the early 1900s. 
However, it became more severe in the middle 1900s under the British rule, 
particularly “during the 1912 – 1913 Balkan wars, the First World War, and the 
Greek- Turkish war of 1919- 1923” (Joseph, 1997, p. 76). After the British realized 
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the coming danger of losing its power on the island, “in 1933 legislative measures put 
primary education completely under the control of the British Government” by 
removing Greek history from curriculum by the colonial power to prevent any kinds 
of revolt against them (cited in Attalides, 2003, p. 27).  
Eventually, the British administration had been trying to get full control over 
the socio-cultural structure of Cyprus through using the educational institution 
because they wanted to carry out mobilization for social change to prevent any kind of 
problems with the inhabitants of the island during the period of its administration. 
However, according to Temiz (2009), throughout the history of Cyprus, the 
educational institutions had significant influence on strengthening the sociocultural 
structure of societies. She also pointed out that the historical and cultural features of 
Turkish Cypriot was affected by the colonial policies and began developing of their 
own national identification. She stated two main assertions with regards to these 
processes which are as follows: 
1. The British administration followed a method to implement a social-cultural 
change over Cyprus. 
 The period of 1878-1914, the British focused on changing the socio-cultural 
structure of Cypriots by organizing the educational system in accordance with 
their ruling policy. 
 The British policy created a conflicting structure among ethnic communities 
through the educational system. Basically, this is the classical way of its colonial 
policy, “divide and rule”, through the education in Cyprus.  
 During the period of the British rule, the British promoted ethnic discrimination in 
order to ensure control of the island.  
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 In general, teachers as the main actors in the educational system play a dynamic 
role in transferring the socio-cultural structure through the younger generation.  
2. With the cultural process throughout the colonial period in Cyprus, it is obvious 
that these processes affected the Turkish Cypriots’ struggle for existence and led 
to them to differentiate their national identity.  
 In response to this attitude of the British, the Turkish Cypriot community had seen 
the educational institution as an organization which would help them protect and 
maintain their own socio-cultural existence. 
Due to the educational system and the ruling policy of the British on the island, 
the socio-cultural structure of Turkish Cypriot had been affected. In order to protect 
and to maintain their existence on the island, they started developing nationalist 
feelings against the Greek Cypriots.  
Under the rule of the British, while the political mobilization began in the 
educational area, another mobilization also gave start in the trade field and directly 
affected the changing economic structure parallel with other developments under the 
British. Eventually, the model of traditional society in Cyprus had started to transform 
into the modern society step by step. That was a signal of social mobility which 
already started spearing among societies on the island. Accordingly, societies in 
Cyprus gradually began to gain a new understanding of class which resulted in a 
development of a bourgeoisie class within Greek Cypriot community. Obviously, the 
Greek bourgeoisie class took most of the advantages of the trade sector, which 
provided more power to the Greek bourgeoisie class and played a very important role 
in the development of nationalist struggle for enosis among Cypriot Greeks. Besides, 
the political and cultural influences of Greece should not be ignored when looking at 
the within Greek Cypriot community in these years. 
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Depending on one sided developments on the island, the social unrest was 
triggered among inhabitants, particularly among Greek Cypriots. The social unrest 
turned into violence in the meantime of development of national feelings on the 
island. As a result of all these developments under the British administration, the 
British colonial policy, “divide and rule” became one of the strong methods to create 
full control over communities throughout their administration in many areas such 
education and administration because they “saw it as a unity containing populations 
that spoke different languages and worshiped in different fashion” (Lindley, 2007; 
Joseph, 1997; Bryant, 2004, p. 21). Accordingly, they thought that it would be easier 
to follow a “divide and rule” policy against both ethnic communities by 
differentiating their languages and religions in order to create a conflicting 
environment on the island to put them into an oppositional position with each other. 
While the British were using this policy in order to create separate communities, they 
also used the ethno-cultural structures in order to provide different political elements 
as reflections to each other. In this sense, Turkish Cypriots’ nationalist struggle which 
was planted by the British as a provocation against Greek Cypriot nationalism was 
affected by Turkish nationalism and adopted many of its methods while they were 
struggling for their national movement. Following World War II, the Turkish Cypriots 
started to organize themselves politically. Additionally, Turkish Cypriots’ nationalist 
movement was shaped by Turkish nationalism and also it was born to develop as a 
contra-nationalism against enosis. The Turkish Cypriots’ nationalist aim was opposite 
to the Greeks’ nationalist aim.  While one side was seeking to be close to Turkey, the 
other side was seeking to be close to Greece.  
Overall, even though the British succeed on the separation of the two major 
communities on the island by implementing its division and rule policy right after 
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settling on the island, it could not prevent the development of anti-colonial 
nationalism against it. 
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Chapter Three: Rise of Greek Cypriot Nationalism 
 When the Ottoman Empire invaded Cyprus in the sixteenth century, it “gave 
some basic socio-political features to Cyprus” (Attalides, 2003, p.1). The Greek 
community on the island made especially good use of these opportunities by gaining 
power. Furthermore, the Ottoman Millet system provided the church an extensive 
autonomy under its administrative power; the Orthodox Church gained the right to 
rule the Christian Greek Cypriot population in the island right after “destroying the 
Venetian feudal structure” (Ibid). Because the Orthodox Church gained authority by 
ruling the Christian population, it became very powerful among the Greek community 
on the island. The Church also received a lot of economic and political opportunities 
in order to control the Greek community.  
When the Archbishop became a representative in the Christian millet under the 
Ottoman rule in Cyprus in the sixteenth century, he held the dominant position 
amongst the Greek community by conserving their ethnic identities, such as religious, 
cultural, political and social self-identities Considering the dominant power of 
religious based nationalism over societies in the sixteenth century, the control of the 
Orthodox Church over the Greek Cypriots was inescapable from that time until the 
modern day. The religious based nationalism in Greek Cypriot community had been 
continuously active until the development of Hellenic nationalism on the basis of 
modernization in the late eighteenth century.  
The power dissipation of the traditional bonds and religious values of the pre-
modern period occurred from the creation of modernity, particularly with regards to 
nationalism, that had significant effects on changing the world view and creating 
hundreds of nation-states, such as Greece, in the world. After modern societies were 
born, the view of the whole world including politics, culture and religion had changed 
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due to nationalist ideologies of nationalism. Hellenic nationalism was born with the 
declaration of the independence of Greece in 1828. The transition from cultural and 
religious based ideology to nationalism got its start with regards to the political 
dimensions of a new nation. The development of an enhanced national identity for 
Greece was based on the “Megali Idea” would determine the fate of the Greek Cypriot 
nationalism on the island.   
While the ideology of nationalism was spreading all over the world in different 
forms with regards to the territorial base, the Hellenic nationalism was one of the 
ideological national movements that started spreading over Greece at the time. For 
instance, Greece became a nation-state in the beginning of the nineteenth century 
“with national aspirations to expand its then very limited borders at the expense of the 
Ottoman State” (Attalides, 2003, p. 1). The declaration of the independent state of 
Greece in 1828 affected the Greek society in Cyprus, and at the same time, the 
irredentist national movement of Greece greatly impressed them. 
 In a short time, the national feelings of the motherland spread among all 
Greek Cypriots on the island on the basis of the ethno-national similarities between 
Greek Cypriots and Greek people. Because of the ethno-national similarities, 
including common culture, religion and language, between motherland Greece and the 
Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot community of the island easily adopted Hellenic 
nationalism and put it into practice in a short time. These ethno-national similarities 
became the main target of the Greek Cypriot national struggle. This interaction 
between Greeks and Greek Cypriots was happening, probably, for the first time in the 
history of Greek Cypriots, considering the island had not been a Greek territory 
throughout its history. After the beginning of the modern period, the Greek Church of 
the island became totally dependent on Greece in most areas. Under the influence of 
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the Greek national movement, the “Megali Idea” was adopted as a state doctrine and 
started attracting the Greek Cypriot community of the island (Kızılyürek, 2005a, p. 
75). Also, the level of national pride rose until the partition was completed over the 
island in the late twentieth century. 
 The national feelings of Greek Cypriots gradually increased in the 1820s, and 
at the same time, irredentist positions started taking hold in the Greek community in 
the island. Once nationalist feelings became deeper among Greek Cypriots, they 
found themselves seeking to become a part of motherland Greece. In order to make 
this a reality, they sent a memorandum to Greece asking for guidance while they were 
expanding the national feelings among Greek Cypriots. The memorandum was 
discussed being a part of the new boundaries of motherland Greece, rather than being 
under the rule of any other state. In order to achieve their main target, Greek Cypriots 
started struggling against the current administration year by year. However, the level 
of national feelings among Greek Cypriots was not strong enough to struggle for the 
unification with motherland Greece (enosis) in the beginning (Kızılyürek, 2005a). 
Even though the level of national feelings was very low and there was no violence 
based national feeling among Greek Cypriot community, as Markides (1974) noted, 
the social changes of Greece directly affected on Greek Cypriots in Cyprus. For 
instance, the cultural movement in Greece was also connected with the movements in 
Cyprus. Markides (1974) goes on to point out that: 
The Byzantine Empire included within its domain both Cyprus and 
mainland Greece. Thus, a type of cultural union between the two 
countries was maintained in spite of the 600 miles separating Cyprus 
from the mainland. And, although Cyprus followed a different 
historical evolution after the Byzantine era, the legacy of Byzantium 
lived on. Thus, any major cultural movement in mainland Greece had 
its corresponding impact on Cyprus as well (p. 311). 
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The Orthodox Church dominated Greek Cypriot society, and it started also 
having economic control over it. As explained in the second chapter, the economic 
growth of Cyprus, with regard to modernization starting in the nineteenth century, 
caused the transformation from a basic organizational structure to the complex one. In 
the case of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots benefited the most from the economic profit of 
the island and developed their bourgeoisie class in response to globalization. This 
process of economic growth in the Greek community created the social movements 
among Greek Cypriots, particularly in the market economy. At the same time, the 
middle class was created throughout the island giving the Greek Cypriots an increased 
awareness of their national movement. Mobilizing the middle class against the current 
administration was one of Greek community’s weapons to get rid of the foreign 
administration and unite with their motherland Greece.  
 Modernization resulted in the decrease in the rate of illiteracy, which caused 
people to become more conscious about the world around them. This consciousness 
included a sense of belonging, as in the example of the Greek Cypriot community. 
The rate of literacy also affected the development of nationalism which triggered 
national awareness among most societies, including the Greek Cypriot society of the 
island. Hence, the proportion of the illiterate increased among the Greek Cypriot 
community in these years, and this directly affected on imposing the nationalist 
feelings to Greek people in the island. As a result, Greek community of the island, 
particularly the middle class, started developing nationalist feelings in order to use 
them to stand up for their rights. Also, these nationalist feelings against the current 
administration and the Ottoman Empire gradually became more radical over time. In 
these years, Greek nationalism was not very radical, but it was already starting to 
affect people of Greek Cypriot community. On the other hand, “the severity of 
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Turkish measures ensures that until the occupation by the British in 1878, there were 
no overt Greek nationalist actions” (cited in Attalides, 2003, p. 25). 
 While the Greek Cypriot community nationalist movements were gradually 
developed in the level of radical struggles against others, the British Empire in 1879 
was settled on the island. Right after the arrival of the British Empire in the island, 
some reforms were carried out “which deeply affected Cypriot society, and which had 
effect on an important part of it, particularly the church, which lost its representative 
function in relation to the secular power” (Attalides, 2003, p. 24). All these reforms 
were not just imposed to Greek Cypriots; Turkish Cypriots were also on the target of 
the new administration of the British. One of the effects of the changes among 
Turkish Cypriots was to lose their power in the administration. The balance in the 
council had been changed depending on the population ratio of each community. In 
this sense, Greek Cypriots gained more power in the council according to the 
population ratio of Greek to Turks which was 3 to1. Even though, they were placed in 
the council of new administration, they could have only given advice but not disposal. 
Hence, the British took the population of communities very seriously and treated 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots depending on the ratio of their population in any given 
community. In addition to these changes in administration under British rule, the 
Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie class took the larger portion of the economical profit and 
started developing itself. However, these progresses paved the way for the creation of 
inequalities among the two major communities over the island because while Greek 
Cypriots were developing themselves by catching up with modernization, Turkish 
Cypriot was not even stepped into the modern world in these years (Kızılyürek, 
2005a). Basically, first inequality among Greeks and Turks originated by 
modernization. As Gellner said, the transition from pre-modern societies to modern 
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societies did not simultaneously spread all over the world as in Cyprus case for 
example. Unlike, this process created inequalities based on sharing economic and 
political power and wealth among nations. In the Cyprus case, the transition to 
modernization between communities was not simultaneously among Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots, too. Two-way social development in Cyprus could be one of the 
reasons of unequal developments, especially on the basis of modernization, between 
two major communities in the island. More specifically, there were two ruling classes 
over Cyprus beginning with the Ottoman period. Turkish Cypriots engaged in 
administrative and military fields, and Greek Cypriots engaged in commerce. The 
process of two-way social development between two major communities created two 
separate social structures in the ruling class since the late seventeenth century. In this 
sense, it can be seen, on one hand, Greek community of the island gained more 
advantages, particularly on the economic level, by catching up with modernization 
and developing themselves in parallel with new world. On the other hand, the Turkish 
community lagged behind in modernizing and missed all of the advantages that were 
created with the new economic development. As Kızılyürek (2005a) notes, the 
unequal developments between two communities on the same island would underlie 
the first seeds of the ethnic conflict among groups of Cyprus. Although, the seeds of 
the well-known Cyprus conflict were panted in these years, it would become 
increasingly visible in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.   
 The rapidly evolving modernization process would encourage the Greek 
Cypriots to struggle for enosis (the unification with motherland Greece). As 
Kızılyürek (2005b) states that the modernization of the Greek community in Cyprus 
had been rising in parallel with the motherland Greece, which also encouraged them 
to fight for enosis. This political ideology called enosis was adopted by a mass of 
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Greek Cypriots and had been spread into the Greek community on the island in order 
to achieve their mission. This main political goal of Greek Cypriots definitely 
identified nationalism with “enosis” in its own way. As Attalides (2003) points out, 
“political ideology becomes one with personal identity” in the Greek Cypriot society 
in nationalist level (p. 34). Since the beginning of the development of nationalist 
feelings among Greek Cypriot community, “enosis” was the only type of nationalism 
that sought to unite with motherland Greece. In this case, Greek nationalism could be 
an example of ethnic nationalism that “defines nationhood in terms of lineage” 
(Kupchan, 1995, p. 4). As Anthony Smith states, nations need some common ethnical 
attributes including “physical characteristic, culture, religion, language, and a 
common ancestry” (Bacık, 2002, p. 20). In the case of the Greek Cypriot community 
of the island, Greek Cypriots were seeking to unify with motherland Greece because 
they considered themselves of Greeks ancestry in terms of sharing some common 
ethnic elements. These thoughts and beliefs had strongly influenced the development 
of Greek nationalism on the island against the British and against the Turkish 
Cypriots. Thus ethnic nationalism was on the rise in the Greek community of Cyprus.  
While nationalist-based process was developing in the Greek community 
against others on the island, Turkish Cypriots did not modernize economically as 
Greeks did and they became very weakened compared with Greek Cypriots 
(Kızılyürek, 2005b, p. 32). However, comparing the two communities of the island, 
“there was no opportunity for a nationalist element to be introduced” for Turkish 
Cypriots in these years because there was no one to provoke and support Turkish 
Cypriots to develop nationalist feelings at that time (Attalides, 2003, p. 42). For 
instance, motherland Greek was the one that was supporting nationalism in Greek 
Cypriot community; nevertheless, Turkish Cypriots were lacking the support of 
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motherland in those years. As a result, there was no national feeling rising among 
Turkish Cypriots until the beginning of the twentieth century when the republic of 
Turkey was established. Consequently, they had been collaborating with the British 
rule against the Greek community because they did not have any other way to handle 
the conflict with the Greeks conflicts (Kızılyürek, 2005b). After Turkish Cypriots 
started facing Greek Cypriots nationalist struggles, the national feelings started rising 
among Turkish Cypriots step by step, but it was not spreading as fast as the national 
feelings of the Greeks. Hereby, Turkish national movement led the defensive 
nationalism that was called “contra – nationalism” (Kızılyürek, 2008). Lacher (2006) 
also pointed out that Turkish Cypriot nationalism was definitely a “defensive 
nationalism” that was “constructed not to serve elite interests, but to secure the 
survival of the numerically smaller group which found itself under violent attack” 
(para.11).  
Comparing both communities’ national movements, it is clear that the Greek 
national movement was different than the Turkish national movement. Greek 
nationalist feelings were led by action-oriented nationalism, while Turkish nationalist 
movements developed as a reaction to the Greek nationalist movement. Obviously, 
Greeks developed their nationalist aspirations on the island because they found out 
that that way would help them to reach enosis. The reason of the Greek dispute 
against the British in the island was because Greek Cypriots saw the British as a 
barrier to the unification with Greece in any area including economic, cultural and 
political. On the other hand, the reason for the British assault against enosis was to 
secure its own place on the island. 
 The administrative changes, including economic and political, that would 
encourage Greek Cypriots to fight for enosis arrived on the island with the British in 
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1878. Besides these economic and political changes, the British also intervened in the 
educational system of the Greeks and the Turks and “instituted a dual educational 
system” (Morag, 2004, p. 605). Therefore, there were a lot of changes as to quality 
and quantity in the educational system of Greeks and Turks especially after the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The British elaborated the dual 
education system and let Greek and Turkish Cypriots use their own educational 
systems. The creation of the dual educational system “would be socialized into 
becoming Greeks and Turks” rather than Muslims and non-Muslims (Morag, 2004, p. 
605). The number of Greek and Turkish schools increased gradually; conversely, 
comparing Turkish and Greek schools, it seems that the number of Turkish schools 
was almost half of the number of Greek schools. The unequal rise of numbers of 
schools between each community is an indication that Greeks took more advantages 
from schools for using them as a tool of spreading nationalism. In addition to these 
reforms of the educational system, the British even provided economic help for 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots’ schools and gave them a chance to administer their 
schools themselves; however, they did not fully remove themselves from the 
administration of the schools.  
When the Greek and Turkish communities gained self-government of their 
own educational systems, both communities had the opportunity to create separate 
national identities -- Greek instead of Christians, and Turks instead of Muslims. They 
were even against developing “Cypriotism” on the basis of collectivity in the island 
because both communities preferred to be a part of their motherland and share the 
same national identities on the basis of common cultural factors, religions, and ethnic 
structure rather than adopting a new common identity with others with whom they 
shared no common ethnic elements. Smith explains this case by pointing out that 
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“they signify bonds of solidarity among members of communities united by shared 
memories, myths and traditions that may or may not find expression in states of their 
own but are entirely different from the purely legal and bureaucratic ties of the states” 
(Smith, 1991, p. 15).  
Although the British gave them the right to govern their schools themselves, 
the British did not assume that Greek Cypriots would infuse the identity issue into 
their schools’ curriculum to “overt political, national intents in the content and 
teaching of education” to students in order to achieve enosis (Bryant, 2004, p. 125). 
Greeks on the island brought from Greece many Greek books that were related to 
Hellenism and its history. It was obvious that the main goal of these books was to 
encourage the Hellenic Nationalism among Greek Cypriots. Some Greek intellectuals 
were trying to impose the Megali Idea to all Greek Cypriots by using the educational 
system on the island because “the schools were seen as a central mechanism for 
promoting Hellenism and Greek identity within the Greek Cypriots” (Lindley, 2007, 
p. 229). Eventually, having the right to use their own models of the educational 
system planted the seeds of future dispute between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.   
Parallel with raising the rate of literacy in the island, Greek newspapers started 
publishing in these years as an instrument of imposing the national feelings among 
Greek people in the island in order to mobilize nationalist movements against the 
current administrative power and Turkish Cypriots. Seven Greek newspapers were 
published and 4,600 of them were sold in 1900 (Katsiaonis, 1996). The main theme of 
all these newspapers was to spread the seeds of the “Hellenic Nationalism” and the 
“patriotism.” 
Eventually, every single change of the British administration provided the 
Greek community an opportunity to create nationalist atmosphere on the island in 
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order to unite with motherland Greece. For this reason, they wanted to get rid of the 
British administration. Basically, besides any other types of nationalism, “anti-
colonial nationalism” was also developed on the island right after World War II in 
order for the Greeks to gain fully take over the administration of Cyprus from the 
British. The reason for the development of the decolonization process in the Greek 
community was because Greek Cypriots were seeing themselves socially and 
culturally different in many ways from the British, which led them to develop an anti-
nationalist struggle against the current colonial administration in order to fulfill 
enosis.   
Until the year 1931, Hellenic nationalism and the idea of enosis had been 
spread throughout the Greek villages in the island. The high level of nationalist 
feelings of Greek community led to one of the biggest uprisings, which was called 
“the uprising of October 1931” in the year 1931 “…accompanied by cries for 
‘freedom from British oppression’ and ‘union with mother Greece’.” (Markides, 
1974, p. 315). The biggest attack against the British colonial power carried out in 
1931 to burn down the Government House by Greeks in order to find a way to 
achieve enosis. Following the 1931 uprising, “the Legislative Council was abolished 
and the symbols of Greek nationalism” such as the Greek flag – which had been 
extremely popular among Greek Cypriots who hung them from their homes, schools, 
and public buildings and the Greek national anthem were banned by British rule 
(Morag, 2004, p. 613, 606). The British also decided to create and to impose the idea 
of “Cypriotism” on inhabitants of the island, including both Turkish and Greeks, to 
keep Greek Cypriots away from the national liberation movement of Greece. 
Although, the 1931 uprising was a sign of a demand of decolonization of the island, 
Greeks could not succeed in achieving the plan.  
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 In the 1930s, Greece lost its economic and political power because it lost most 
of the struggles in which it was involved during World War II and elsewhere. In 
addition, there was an ongoing civil war in Greece at the same time. As a result of 
these wars, Greece did not have enough power to struggle for the “Megali Idea,” 
especially right after the struggle with the Ottoman Empire. These wars, particularly 
losing power against the Ottomans, made Greece become weak and became fully 
depended on others, particularly to Britain. After they became a dependent state to the 
British colony, they would prefer not to object to the British and decided to stand 
against enosis because in these years they really needed the British help in many areas 
in order to renovate the country. Therefore, Greece decided not to take a risk by 
insisting on evolving enosis and announced that Greek Cypriots had to change their 
strategy and give up the idea of becoming a part of Greece in order to convince the 
British to stand their side and keep on helping them. However, although Greek 
Cypriots lost motherland support for their national mission, they would not stop 
fighting for enosis. This process was also a reason for uprisings against the British 
rule by the Greeks of the island.  
 Since the arrival of the British on the island, they never wanted to lose the 
island because of its strategic importance related to the controlling of the Suez Canal 
(Attalides, 2003, p. 3). The self-interest of the British explains why they had never 
agreed with the idea of enosis since the beginning. For this reason, the British 
provided a slight concession to the inhabitants of the island. However, the Cyprus 
Church totally disagreed with the new idea of the British and demanded the 
realization of enosis. Although, churches lost their power after the rise of nationalism 
in the Greek community, the Greek Orthodox Church was still trying to control the 
Greek Cypriot community of the island in order to find a way to put enosis into effect 
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and not to lose its full authority. On the other hand, while the right wing, particularly 
the Greek Church, stood against negotiations with others for the island’s future, the 
left wing Greek political party, AKEL, agreed to attend the negotiations in order to 
find a middle course for everyone’s interests on the island.  
The different view of right and left wings of the Greek community created two 
opposing sides of Greeks who believed in and supported different ideas with regard to 
the current situation of the island. The political-based differentiation of Greek 
Cypriots triggered the conflict within them as well. Even though the thought of 
negotiations divided the Greek community into two groups on the basis of political 
ideas, the negotiations with British failed. Still, the competition and the conflict 
between the Greek Church and AKEL become very visible. Hereupon, AKEL decided 
to find a way to negotiate with the church to prevent any kinds of problem with the 
church. In order to pave the way for negotiation with the church, AKEL decided to 
follow a political path.  
In the same year of 1949, Makarios, who was one of the leaders of the EOKA, 
became the Archbishop of Cyprus. He later became the first President of Cyprus in 
1960 and brought the Cyprus dispute into the international arena (Papadakis, 2005, p. 
19). “In 1950, the Cyprus Church prepared a referendum to prove the necessity of 
realizing enosis on an international level. The question of the referendum was: “Are 
you a supporter of enosis or are you against it?” and 95.73% of Greek Cypriot said 
they were supporters” (Kızılyürek, 2005a, p. 233). As a result of the referendum, 
almost all of them agreed on enosis, which meant that problems would continue on 
the island even though third parties were involved in the Cyprus dispute to solve it. 
Obviously, no one, including third parties, really wanted to establish a peaceful 
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environment on the island and build a good relationship between Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots because this way would never serve the self-interests of any of the parties.  
On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot community fell outside of the conflict 
within the Greek community. Each community of the island had different political 
interest; while one side was fighting for enosis, the other one was fighting for taksim, 
which made them incapable of developing any political ideology in common.  The 
main point of both nationalist movements on the island was to bond with their 
motherlands, although Greek Cypriots lost their motherland’s support in these years 
and came under the influence of the United States of America (USA) instead of the 
British.  
 The changes within motherland Greece were seen as a great opportunity for 
Greek Cypriots to start new negotiations with Britain to set the island economically 
and socially independent in order to open the way to be a part of motherland Greece. 
Basically, Greek Cypriots were trying to gain their freedom and set their own state. 
As a result, the tension significantly increased in 1953 on the island. In order to 
prevent Greek Cypriot uprisings on the island, Greece and Britain met to discuss the 
Cyprus problem. Although they negotiated to find a solution for the current problems 
on the island; according to the British, there was no problem regarding Cyprus and, 
therefore, no reason to negotiate about it. Thereupon, Greek Cypriots decided to bring 
the Cyprus case into the international level, particularly into the United Nations in 
order to solve the Cyprus problem by establishing enosis. The purpose of presenting 
the Cyprus problem to the UN was to fight for their self-determination rights in order 
to get rid of the established British colonial regime to be able to put enosis into 
practice. The principle of self-determination emerged in the eighteenth century to let 
nations choose their sovereignty and to set their international political stature without 
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any external influence. Although Greek Cypriots were striving to get their self-
determination rights to achieve enosis, the Republic of Turkey, Turkish Cypriots, 
Britain, and the USA were all against such a proposal, although they all had different 
political interest on the island. The disagreement on the Greek proposal brought all of 
them except Greek Cypriot community into the same side to find a way to prevent the 
enosis. As a result of the disagreement, they intervened with the UN in order to 
prevent the Greek Cypriots from putting enosis into practice. However, this 
intervention was not enough to convince the Greek Cypriot community to give up 
fighting for enosis (Kızılyürek, 2005a).  
After all of these endeavors for enosis, Makarios (Greek Cypriots leader) saw 
the difficulties on achieving enosis even though they tried hard to get outsiders help 
for their self-interests on the island and developed an “armed struggle” as an 
alternative plan after 1950 to achieve enosis (Kızılyürek, 2005a). In order to succeed 
this time with the alternative plan, Makarios contacted with “X” organization 
(extremely nationalist Greek organization brought to the island against British 
administration) which was led by Yorgos Grivas, who was in Greece to get help for 
enosis. After negotiations between Makarios and Grivas, they decided in 1954 to 
establish two new organizations in Cyprus for the purpose of carrying out the armed 
struggle. One of the organizations, called EOKA (Greek for National Organization of 
Cypriot Struggle), was established on April 1, 1955. The main goal of the EOKA was 
to politicize Greek nationalism [to] “draw symbols and inspiration from mainland 
Greece, and the symbols of Greek Cypriot armed struggle (1955 – 1959) were 
carefully selected to correspond to the Greek ones” (Loizides: 2007, p. 175). One the 
EOKA was established, it “began its military campaign against British rule – the 
Greek Cypriots were now in open revolt” (Morag, 2004, p. 613). “Although the 
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targets of the Greek Cypriot insurgents of the EOKA organization led by George 
Grivas were initially either British or leftist Greek Cypriots, violence had also become 
inter-communal during the 1957 – 58 period” (Morag, 2004, p. 600). Obviously, the 
creation of the conflict between two major communities of the island was a product of 
historical, cultural, religious factors and third parties. Thereupon, on the British side, 
in order to prevent losing the island, the British decided to put into practice their 
colonial policy of “divided and rule.” Additionally, the British administration used a 
new strategy by hiring police from the Turkish community to use against Greek 
Cypriots in order to prevent the Greek violence across the island. Eventually, the 
British started planting the seeds of ethno-national conflict between the two 
communities to ensure its self-interests on the island.  
While tension was getting higher on the island among Greek Cypriots, Turkish 
Cypriots and Britain, three guarantor countries, Turkey, Greece, and Britain, started 
negotiations for creating a new state in order to prevent conflicts on the island. As a 
result of these negotiations between the guarantors, building a fourth country, which 
would be called the independent Republic of Cyprus, was accepted. The fourth 
country was also going to provide “through the system of guarantees [to] manage to 
counterbalance the interests of Greece, Turkey, and Britain under the guise of 
maintaining stability on the island” (Richmond, 1999, p. 42). Once the system was set  
to counterbalance the interests of the guarantors, the new state was established in 
1960 with a new constitution that prohibited “the anti-colonial struggle of EOKA” 
and contra-nationalist struggle of TMT. According to the new constitution, both 
communities were supposed to stop practicing their nationalist movements, enosis and 
taksim. Although the new constitution was a way to set a ceasefire between the two 
communities by preventing their own political practices, it just worked for a couple of 
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years until the first break down in 1963. The main purpose of establishing the new 
state was to provide a peaceful atmosphere on the island; however, the conflict 
between the two communities never stopped. 
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Chapter Four: Rise of Turkish Cypriots Nationalism 
A) The Progress of the Turkish Cypriot Community under the rule of the Ottomans 
The arrival of the Ottoman Empire into Cyprus in the late sixteenth century paved the 
way for social and demographic structure changes on the island. Adding a mass of Muslims 
to the native inhabitants of Cyprus was one of the important changes during the Ottoman 
administration. Another important reform with the arrival of the Ottomans was the ruling 
system as the Ottomans brought their traditional system, the Millet system, which treated 
people according to their religions. The Millet system was put into effect immediately after 
the Ottoman settlement to create a religiously pluralistic structure in order to exclude ethnic 
bonds between native and new inhabitants. Considering the ruling system was adopted in 
1571, these Muslims, even after moving to the island, continued living under the traditional 
system of the Ottoman rule although Christians/Greeks composed the majority of the 
population of Cyprus. In conclusion, religion-based identity was constructed in order to 
categorize and separate people on the basis of their religious beliefs regardless of their 
political and socioeconomic status starting from the Ottoman period on the island. Political 
and socioeconomic statuses were afforded no notice under the Ottoman administration as 
“politically, culturally, and socially the significant fact is [that] there are two populations in 
Cyprus, one a Greek Orthodox majority, the other a Turkish Muslim minority” (Taeuber, 
1955, p. 11).  
In the case of religious-based separation, which created unequal stratification on the 
island (i.e., a tax concession for the Muslim community whereas non-Muslims were paying 
taxes related to their business), “welfare difference” had not really appeared in the peasants’ 
classes of either religious group during the Ottoman Empire period on the island. Because 
most of the peasants were located in the agricultural system of the Ottomans, there were no 
real social differences that appeared within peasant classes of both communities (cited in 
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Kızılyürek, 2005a). Most peasants usually lived in mixed villages and shared the same social 
conditions and ways of acting together in their daily lives on most occasions such as wedding 
ceremonies. As a result, before ethnic identities were constructed in Cyprus, there was no 
social conflict based on ethnicity among Muslims and non-Muslims during the Ottoman 
Empire (Kızılyürek, 2005a). On the contrary, the mostly peasant classes of both ethnic groups 
were acting together for specific reasons, regardless of their religion and ethnicity. However, 
this stability only continued until both religious-based groups realized the importance of their 
ethnicity; it was only at that point that would they develop rival nationalist feelings.  
Until the transformation from the Ottoman administration to the Republic of Turkey 
was completed, the Ottomans began losing power in many areas, including politics, 
economics and the military. Although most of the states, particularly in Western Europe, 
were gaining power and technology in these areas, the Ottomans could not compete with 
them and become a dependent state upon the West. Therefore, each of the European 
countries, such as Britain and France, began opening their consulates in the territories of the 
Ottoman Empire, including Cyprus. The settlement of these European consulates on the 
island was a result of the industrial revolution, during which the Christian bourgeoisie class 
of Cyprus turned the settlement process into an opportunity to build a close relationship with 
these foreign embassies (cited in Kızılyürek, 2005a, p. 211). Eventually, Cyprus itself was 
affected by every single process of the Ottoman Empire, including the economic evolution 
and devolution of the empire. However, one-sided developments caused another reason for 
the creation of inequalities between Turkish Muslims and Greek Christians on the island. 
While one ethnic group was attaining advantages from the European countries, the other 
remained under the influence of the current colonial power of the island. While the 
modernization process accelerated in the Greek Christian community, Turkish Muslims 
caught up with modernization almost a century later than Greek Cypriots. Parallel with 
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nationalist movements in the Ottoman territory, modernization-based nationalist sentiments 
of the Christian/Greek community on the island paved the way for a gradual disconnect from 
the traditional structure of government and military-based government of the Ottomans. 
Besides the effect of modernization on the rise of nationalist feelings in Greek Christians of 
Cyprus, motherland Greece nationalist ideology also had a very important influence on 
developing nationalism in the Greek communities on the island. On the other hand, following 
the traditional system and order of the Ottomans pushed Turkish Cypriots away from 
obtaining benefits from the new modern world and its reforms until they realized the 
deficiency of nationalism, at which time they would become a subject of the nationalist attack 
of Greek Cypriots in the beginning of the twentieth century.  
Because of the negative progress in the Ottoman territory, Ottomans declared some 
reforms called “Tanzimat Reforms” in 1839 in order to maintain their territorial sovereignty. 
The West also supported the declaration of Tanzimat reforms in order to provide more 
privileges to Christian communities within the Ottoman Empire after Christians entered the 
territory. More specifically, according to Tanzimat reforms, equality in most cases between 
different religious groups such Christians and Muslims was promoted. As Smith states, 
“Ottoman rule witnessed successive attempts to reform the basis of the empire (Tanzimat), 
including a resort to ‘Ottomanism’ through equality and citizenship for all subjects” (Smith, 
1991, p. 103). Providing equality and citizenship for all subjects to non-Muslims paved the 
way for the creation and development of nationalist sentiments within ethnic groups under 
the Ottoman administration.  In fact, this was a cause of the fall of the Ottoman empire in the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. 
 Although the Ottomans were losing power, they continuously struggled with other 
empires in order to expand their territories, protect existing territories, and more. When the 
time came to struggle with one of the most powerful enemies of the Ottoman Empire, Russia, 
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the Ottomans decided to ask for protection from one of the biggest colonial empires of the 
time, the British Empire. Thus, the British colonial power settled on the island to fulfill the 
purpose of protecting the Ottomans from Russia at the end of nineteenth century.  
 
B) The Progress of Turkish Cypriot Community under the British Rule 
Until the 20
th
 century, the colonial powers imposed their economic, political and 
socio-cultural structures upon many people from other territories -- especially weaker 
territories -- to assimilate them in order to strengthen their place in a specific region. Another 
policy of colonialism was to set unequal relationships between the inhabitants of the colonial 
territory in order to easily dominate the people. As with many other colonial territories, the 
colonial policy was applied in Cyprus by the British empire in 1878 when it settled on the 
island. The empire, by putting the “divide and rule policy” into the effect, created various 
ethnic identities on the basis of different religions, cultures, historical narratives and 
languages between the inhabitants of the island -- Turkish and Greek Cypriots -- in order to 
expand its power and strengthen its place on the island.  
Along with the general colonial policies, the arrival of the British rule on the island in 
1878 changed the current system in many areas on the basis of the status quo. As a result of 
the reforms of the new colonial power, Muslim Turks lost their former power in the 
administration although the British did not entirely change the governmental structure. Even 
though Muslims lost their representative power in government, “the British began to rely on 
Muslims as instruments of repression against the Orthodox Christians” in order to keep 
British dominance on the island (Lacher, 2006, para. 26). In this sense, it is clearly seen that 
the British and Muslim Turks were allied and supported each other against the Greek 
Cypriots. For instance, the Legislative Assembly was used as a tool against the Greeks to 
prevent enosis (the unification with motherland Greece). Another example is the 
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“…(employment of) Turkish Cypriot policemen against the Greek Cypriots EOKA fighters 
(Greek for National Organization of Cypriot Struggle), which was bound to lead the conflict” 
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots later in Cyprus’ history (Papadakis, 2005, p. 65).  
While associating against the Greeks, the bourgeoisie class of Christians was 
continuously growing and enriching as all the economic developments of the Ottoman 
Empire had fallen into their hands. Nothing could succeed in stopping the rate of growth of 
the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie class, as even the British and Turkish were trying to set a bar 
against the growth of the Greek community of the island. Fundamentally, the Greeks did not 
recognize the British colonial rule as legitimate on the island because the transition from the 
Ottoman to the British was merely a step for Greek Cypriots to achieve the idea of “enosis” 
(Zink, 2008, p. 590). For this reason, the Greeks of Cyprus were following their course 
without taking others seriously on the island at first. During the years that followed, however, 
the Greek Cypriot community developed a very strong bond with “enosis,” which caused the 
creation of the anti-colonial nationalist movement within Greek Cypriots on the island after 
they realized the passive violence of the British against them. Year after year, anti-
colonialism grew stronger and “was led by a conservative Church hierarchy” in order to open 
the door to success for enosis, which meant “the freeing of Cyprus from foreign rule” and 
uniting the whole island with motherland Greece (Attalides, 2003, p. 22). Although the 
British did not have any intention of letting Greek Cypriots achieve their mission, the Greek 
Cypriots began stepping forward into an irredentist national movement by using their 
economic power to create a union with Greece (enosis). This one-sided growth on the island 
strengthened the two-sided structure between the ethnic communities of Cyprus because, 
even though “the Cypriot Muslims were opposed to enosis with the Greek Christian state, 
(they) had no alternative motherland other than the Ottoman Empire or the world of Islam. 
Neither unit that was able to (develop) nationalist sentiments” on the basis of modernization 
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or gain support from motherland against Greek nationalist movements (Attalites, 2003, p. 
43). Considering the Greeks as a majority group who adopted “an ethnic nationalism” as a 
principle in order to achieve enosis, “ethnic nationalism directly produces social disturbances 
for the minority/other people” who were Turkish Cypriots, directly causing problems 
between them (Bacık, 2002, p. 33). Overall, Turkish Cypriots as a minority group had 
difficulties supporting their national movements against the majority group’s nationalist 
struggle. They became the weak side on the island because they did not have any supporters 
during those years. As a result, some of the Young Turks, who were “…initially Ottomanists, 
but were pushed increasingly toward Turkism by the defection even of Muslim subjects of 
the Empire from loyalty to it...,” escaped from the Ottoman rule and refugees who were going 
to organize them against the Greek nationalist attacks (Attalides, 2003, p. 37).  
Although Young Turks agreed with the Sultan’s effort in many cases, they were not 
very satisfied by the way he ruled the empire. For this reason, these intellectuals were trying 
to find a way to prevent the Sultan’s “autocratic-rule” and were also attempting to prevent the 
“Sultan’s despotism and failure” that was significantly shown in the effects of the 
administration and order of the Ottomans (Yeğen, 2007). According to the Young Turks, the 
Sultan was acting independently, which could have caused many problems in the territory of 
the Ottoman Empire and would also directly affect its citizens. They also strongly believed 
that the independent behavior of the Sultan could cause a partition in the multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious Ottoman Empire. In order to prevent this partition in the Ottoman territory, 
many of these intellectuals came together under the roof of the “Committee of Union and 
Progress” (CUP) with the members who were known as the “Young Turks” in 1894 (Finkel, 
2005). According to Akşin (2004), there were five common characteristics of the members of 
the CUP used to describe them. These characteristics were (Akşin, 2004, p. 10): 
1. They were young and therefore unable to seize the power. 
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2. They belonged to the civilian or military bureaucracy. 
3. Their education was Western-oriented. 
4. Most of them were Turkish or eventually considered themselves Turkish. 
5. In the aim of establishing a modern, Western-type capitalist society, they had a  
    bourgeois ideology. 
 These Young Turks were involved in many areas such as constitutionalism, 
secularism, the development of Turkish nationalism (while Ottomanism was in practice), a 
new system of government and a national language reform in the beginning of the 20
th
 
century. Their ideological struggle on the basis of those areas had appeared in the Republic of 
Turkey when it was decelerated in 1923. Before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, 
some who had escaped from the Ottoman Empire decided to carry out their campaign in 
Cyprus in order to impose their ideology upon Turkish Cypriots as well.  
Immediately after they moved into Cyprus in order to achieve the Cyprus plan, which 
was the creation of an anti-Ottoman nationalism in Cyprus, the Young Turks provoked some 
of Turkish Cypriots right after World War I (Attalides, 2003). The annexation of the island 
by the British and the close relationship between the UK and Greece were two important 
reasons that dragged Turkish Cypriots into concern over their future and also onto the Young 
Turks’ side. Evidently, the new movement created on the island was not only against 
Ottomanism but was also developed as a response to the enosis movement of the Greek 
Cypriots and against the current administration of the island. More importantly, Greek 
Cypriot nationalism had generated fear and anxiety for the Turkish Cypriots’ future during 
these years. This fear and anxiety compelled Turkish Cypriots to become closer to the 
newborn Republic of Turkey in 1923 and to its founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. They 
became quite close followers of Turkey and began adopting every resolution of Turkey which 
was enhanced to replace the traditional Ottoman system, including its political and cultural 
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ruling policy under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. As Lacher (2006) states, “The 
administrative proto-elite turned to Kemalism and embraced its reforms, not so much to guide 
it to national independence, but as symbols of modernism, as an ideology of Muslim 
reorganization and catching up with the Greek Cypriots” (para. 28). Overall, these Turkish 
Cypriot intellectuals who were provoked by the Young Turks started supporting patriotism on 
the basis of Kemalism against enosis. However, after the introduction of the Young Turks 
onto the island, Turkish Cypriots ideologically divided into two groups. On the one hand, 
some of Turkish Cypriots became quite close to the Young Turks and embraced their 
ideology; on the other, some of them were still insisting on following the tradition of 
Ottomanism and staying on the British side. According to Lacher, “The power struggle 
between the two segments of the Turkish Cypriot elite continued until the mid-1950s” 
(Lacher, 2006, p.29).  
 
Kemalism-Based Reforms in the Turkish Cypriot Community  
The modernist Turkish Cypriot elites decided to be on the Turkish side and follow and 
put into practice the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the first leader of the Republic of 
Turkey. Eventually, following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, a group 
called Kemalist came to power in order to develop a secular state instead of traditionalist 
Ottoman rule. In order to improve upon the main ideas of the Young Turks, these elites, who 
were well educated in secular schools and quite close followers of Western reforms, were 
planning to adopt Western ideas and put them into effect by customizing those reformist 
ideologies regardless of traditional ruling norms of the Ottomans starting from 1923. The new 
state ideology of Kemalism, which was named after its founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, 
generally symbolized nationalism and secularism. Along with the reforms of the new state, 
some of them were generated as legal and cultural reforms to support the new ideology of the 
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Republic of Turkey. The main target of the new nation state was to create a “modern nation” 
as a transitional form of multi-religious and multi-ethnic groups to a common “nationalism-
national identity and ethnic identity formation” on the basis of Turkish origin instead of 
changing the national religion or ethnic heterogeneity in order to prevent national uprisings 
on the land (Bacık, 2002, p. 32). According to Akman (2004), the purpose of these changes 
on the basis of Kemalism was to create a new state in the “level of contemporary civilization” 
by just focusing on modernization (p. 16). In the view of Turkish Cypriots, these reforms 
were symbols of modernization in order to reorganize and catch up with the new world, 
especially with the Greek Cypriot community. For this reason, right after the reforms of 
Turkey were announced, some were put into effect even before they were implemented in the 
Turkish nation itself. Those Western-based reforms were; 
1) The abolition of the Islamic schools and religious courts was put into effect in 
1924. 
2) The Caliphate was abolished in 1924. 
3) The co-education became possible for both girls and boys, which was prohibited 
before on the basis of religion. 
4) The Western-style hats (new dress code) were put in use instead of the traditional 
headgears (fez and sarik), which were prohibited (because according to new state 
elites who adopted secularism and modernism, the traditional hat was alleged as 
“uncivilized” compared to the Western trend) in 1925. 
5) German, Italian, and Swiss models were adopted as new secular codes in 1926. 
6) The Ottoman lunar calendar was changed and replaced with the Gregorian 
calendar. 
7) The declaration of Islam as a religion of the new state was removed from the 
constitution to make the constitution more secular in 1928. 
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8) The reforms of the alphabet and numerals were implemented; more specifically, 
the Arabic alphabet was replaced by adopting the Latin alphabet and Western 
numerals. 
9) Sundays became the official holiday instead of Muslim Friday in 1935. 
10)  The statute of women was changed in a practical way. To a greater extent, women 
were allowed the right to vote first in 1930 (municipal election) and then in 1934 
(national election). They also were allowed the right to be voted for in the national 
parliament under the Kemalist regime. Moreover, the new state regime stimulated 
the public visibility of women. (Akman, 2004, p. 20). 
The main goal of these reforms was to break the sociocultural traditional norms of the 
Ottomans and the multi-religious system in order to create the new Turkish nation-state 
norms, which included new social, identification, and cultural formations. In addition, the 
main purpose of Kemalist reforms was to create Turkish nationalism in order to make a 
Turkish nation and Turkishness the dominant identity on the land. According to Yeğen 
(2007), founding members of the Republic of Turkey were definitely generating an anti-
struggle to the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman heritage, because they wanted to 
create a collective identity on the basis of Turkishness. Basically, while religious-based origin 
was minimized in the system, the importance of ethnicity within the Muslim community of 
the island raised in the beginning of the twentieth century parallel to the transformation from 
the Ottomans to the Republic in 1923. In this sense, the term “Turkish” became a symbol of 
the Republic of Turkey regardless of religious origin. At the same, the term “Turkish” 
became a symbol of Turkish Cypriots in the beginning of 1900s as well, following the 
identification formation within the Greek community of the island.  
Muslims of the island did not only adopt the ethnic-based identity but also embraced 
the new state of Turks which was called the Republic of Turkey because they felt religiously, 
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linguistically, politically, and culturally closer to them. Feeling closer to motherland Turkey 
was not expressed by naming Turkey as the motherland until the second half of the twentieth 
century. In this sense, they would be “socialized into developing a Turkish rather than a 
Cypriot identity” that would make them “extreme nationalists” in order to defend themselves 
against the Greek Cypriot nationalist movements during these years (Morag, 2004, p. 606).  
Although all of these reforms were made under the Kemalist regime, which was the 
landmark for the Turkish nation, the new Turkish regime adopted a Western-oriented path, 
including the legal and cultural structures of Europe, to establish the new Turkish state and 
Turkish nationalism (Akman, 2004). Perhaps this path was a reason for creating and 
spreading a national liberation movement and the consciousness of belonging on the basis of 
Turkishness rather than the Ottoman identity toward the Anatolia. Basically, “It was 
Ataturk’s realization that the internal consolidation of a secular modern state involved the 
renunciation of “Turanism” or the pan-Turk ideal that resulted in the establishment of a 
Turkish nationalism based on the Anatolian homeland as the official policy of the Turkish 
Government” (Attalides, 2003, p. 37). In this sense, it is clearly seen that after this 
significantly important evolution of the Turkish nation and nationalism, the new state became 
more dependent on European adaptation and European countries by adopting Western-
oriented norms. 
On the other hand, in Cyprus’s case, it is obvious that Turkish Cypriots were excited 
about adopting and putting all of these reforms of the Republic of Turkey into practice in 
order to prove that they were part of them and gain attention for the current nationalist-based 
struggle of Cyprus between themselves and Greek Cypriots. As Kızılyürek (2005a) noted, 
although traditional and religious elites of Turkish Cypriots were still insisting on being on 
the British side, the Young Turkish Cypriot elites were seeking to modernize together by 
adopting Turkish reforms in order to catch up to the same level with Greek Cypriots in the 
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modern era and also to develop a solid nationalist identity against the Greek nationalist 
struggle. Along with these actions of the Turkish Cypriot elites, Turkish nationalism was 
gradually starting to be revealed and organize against the Greek nationalist movement, which 
created two enemies on the island. For this reason, intellectuals of the Turkish Cypriot 
community who were seeing themselves as a part of mainland Turkey and were following 
secular Turkish nationalism demanded to unite with Turkey in order to respond to the Greek 
Cypriots’ call for enosis. However, Turkey was refusing to become involved in the Cyprus 
conflict during those years. This new situation would open the door for the inter-communal 
violence later in the history of Cyprus.  
While both ethnic groups grew angry toward each other, the British and traditional 
groups of Turkish Cypriots were not satisfied with the new movement of intellectual Turkish 
Cypriots who adopted Kemalism and started developing a contra-nationalism against Greek 
nationalism. For this reason, the British government deprecated the nationalist struggle of the 
Turkish Cypriot community. As a result, the British abolished cooperation with Turkish 
Cypriots and refused to assist them in spite of the development of the nationalist ideology of 
the Turkish. The traditionalist Turkish Cypriot elite, however, stayed on the British side by 
being against the new nationalist movements of the Turkish Cypriot elites. Obviously, along 
with the detainment of the British, the Turkish intellectuals who “were affected by 
Kemalism” were having problems through the imposition of their thoughts and beliefs toward 
the Turkish Cypriots community (Kızılyürek, 2005a, p. 33). Eventually, the British and 
traditional Cypriot Turks were two barriers to the development of Turkish nationalism on the 
island because they were seeking to hold the current position of the island and were totally 
against spreading national feelings on the basis of Kemalism within the Turkish Cypriots. 
The only way to be operative on the island and spread and impose their national ideologies 
was to gain acceptance by the British administration (Ibid). In this sense, intellectual Turkish 
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Cypriots had to convince both the British and the traditional Turkish Cypriots to develop the 
nationalist movement of the Turkish community of the island. For this reason, “They opened 
a campaign against the religious and traditional elite” in order to eliminate any kinds of 
barriers in front of them and to ensure nationalism on the basis of modernization within the 
Turkish Cypriot community (Ibid).  
While both communities were faced with some differences of opinion within their 
groups, the tension and conflict between the two groups grew very deep by sharpening their 
national goals on the basis of the motherlands’ nationalism against each other. With that 
progress, they had been approaching a step forward for the action-oriented conflict which 
would become a reason for the separation of the island into two parts. For instance, enosis 
became accepted and spread the seeds of hatred between Turkish Cypriots and the British 
administration by Greek Cypriots in the first half of the twentieth century. Along with discord 
against others on the island, the uprising against the British in 1931 showed the seriousness of 
the Greek Cypriots during those years (Kızılyürek, 2005a).  
After the 1931 uprising of the Greeks against the British, the British administration 
closed the joint council and suspended the constitution, focusing on the social life, schools, 
and teachers of Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities in order to interrupt nationalist 
movements and protect the British position on the island. However, these kinds of 
interventions, such as oppression and bans throughout the island’s history, focused mostly on 
the colonial period, would not be accepted by the affected societies and caused different 
problems between the groups and the colonial power. For instance, those societies that were 
under the colonial rule system usually refused to follow the colonial policy and refused to be 
assimilated, fighting to keep their social structures alive instead of accepting new social 
elements of colonial policy. Generally, socio-cultural dimensions are more difficult to be 
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accepted when they are imposed by force by any other groups. Such cases usually end up 
with an uprising against the colonial rule in order to secure independence of the land.  
In the case of Cyprus, to prevent assimilation by the British colonial power, both 
societies focused on their own educational systems in order to keep their socio-cultural 
dimensions alive and to impose their nationalist feelings toward members of their groups. In 
addition to this, considering the Turkish Cypriot community as a weak side of the island, 
those under colonial rule needed to develop their nationalist struggle to defend themselves 
against nationalist Greek attacks. In order to face the Greek attacks and to compete with their 
nationalist movements, Turkish Cypriots decided to develop a contra-attack on the nationalist 
level by using the educational system, the socio-cultural structure, and other methods to 
impose nationalist feelings in their community and get the community members to accept 
their national identity. Because of this, the educational system was divided into two 
institutions. Whereas Cypriot Turks were using the educational system as a tool of protecting 
and maintaining the existence of themselves, Greeks were using schools to achieve their 
mission of “enosis.” In general, both groups’ schools were totally focused against the colonial 
power usage and opposed each other’s nationalist movements. 
As the educational system became a center for spreading nationalist feelings toward 
group members, the curricula of Turkish schools were programmed on the nationalist level. 
In this sense, the educational system, particularly the primary school’s educational system, 
became the center of teaching the national feelings “to spread the image and heritage of the 
“nation” on the basis of ethno-nationalism among members of each ethnic group of Cyprus” 
(Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 115). The curricula of the Turkish schools of the island were intended 
to include social reflexes in order to protect the structure of their identity regardless of their 
defeat by the colonial force. Briefly, in Turkish schools, as Temiz (2009) claims, the duties of 
teachers were to transmit the Turkish historical heritage and social values to students and to 
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help them put these values into practice in order to develop nationalist sentiments within the 
Turkish community of Cyprus. Obviously, teachers became the center of the nationalist 
struggle in both communities. Basically, if the society is a developing society, such as the 
Turkish Cypriots were under the control of the British colonial power, the role of teachers is 
very important in order to maintain their identity and historical narratives of their community. 
Keeping socio-cultural dimensions alive is one of a teacher’s responsibilities to develop a 
solid structure of the society where doing so is a risk through political, cultural and social 
assimilation by others. In Cyprus, considering the Cypriot Turk community as a non-
dominant community under the British colonial rule, schools and, particularly, teachers 
played a very important role in developing a solid nationalist struggle by keeping alive their 
national identity by using historical narratives. While both societies were working on 
building their national identities separately against the other, the British were also paving the 
way for deepening every difference including religion, language and cultural differences and 
economic inequalities among both communities of the island in order to destroy the 
relationship between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and to create two separate communities in 
order to be able to keep their control easily under British administration.  
After the Turkish Cypriot side developed an anti-enosis nationalist movement on the 
island, differences between the ethnic groups had gradually been sharpened within the two 
motherlands –Turkey and Greece. In the case of the Turkish Cypriots, getting closer to 
motherland Turkey and adopting the ideology of Kemalism, which resulted in construction of 
“Turkishness” within their community, were becoming extreme nationalist movements. 
Obviously, as Greek Cypriots began identifying themselves as Hellenes, Turkish Cypriots 
identified themselves as Turks under the new state of Turkey, which was another solid reason 
for the creation of two rival identities on the small island. Getting closer to mainland Turkey 
partially eliminated the fear and anxiety of the Turkish Cypriots and made them look to the 
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future for a bright outlook in those years. However, “The conflict started precisely when 
identities became constructed in these terms, which placed them in a direct continuity with 
the various Greek/Turkish conflicts on the Balkans, the Aegean islands and Anatolia over the 
150 years preceding the separation of the island in 1974” (Lacher, 2006, para. 25). 
Obviously, the development of rival national identities also paved the way for the creation of 
two separate national movements on the island. In order to compare and differentiate both 
national movements of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot nationalism 
was developed as “counter-nationalism since the beginning, which means it was formed as a 
response of enosis” (Kızılyürek, 2005, p. 230). As Loizides (2007) states, “in the case of 
Turkish Cypriots, nationalism has been driven by reaction to Greek Cypriot demands, 
insecurity, and fears of marginalization” (p, 174). Although the Turkish nationalism began a 
bit later than the Greeks nationalism, “the more urbanized nature of Turkish Cypriot society – 
compared to the Greek Cypriots – ensured that the Turkish Cypriots were able to organize 
quickly and put forward national demands once they felt that Greek Cypriot national 
demands might lead to enosis” (Morag, 2004, p. 600). As a result, the nationalist feelings of 
the Turkish community on the island were identified against Greeks and their national 
ideology enosis. 
As ethnic groups became closer to their motherlands by adopting all reformations and 
developing rival movements against each other, the British were still struggling against the 
development of national movements of ethnic groups on the island. However, after repressive 
measures were taken in 1931, when the British power realized that schools of Turkish people 
and Greeks had become an instrument of spreading nationalism toward inhabitants, the 
administration seized the educational system and made both communities use the British 
educational system until 1950s. Basically, the British rule saw the coming danger and 
“decided to get full control over Cypriot Turks” and over Cypriot Greeks “to assimilate them 
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by imposing the ‘Cypriotism’ in order to serve its self-interest on the island” (Temiz, 2009). 
The main idea of the British was to create a new common identity based on geographical 
location of the island in order to prevent the development of separate national identities 
depending on their blood, states Temiz (2009). Interestingly, even though the British were 
using its “divide and rule” colonial policy in order to separate the two major communities, the 
British decided to create a geographical location based upon an upper identity to impose 
inhabitants of the island to “mark the difference between inside and outside” of the island and 
to prevent the construction of primordial identity with the motherlands to safeguard the 
British place on Cyprus (Giesen, 1998, p.13). Eventually, the British were trying to create a 
collective identity to impose upon Turkish and Greek Cypriots in order to destroy their 
primordial-based identity with their motherlands, as both started seeing themselves ethnically 
and historically tied with their motherlands of Turkey and Greece.  
A short while after the 1931 uprising against the British administration, the British 
gradually began allowing the two major communities to install their own political parties 
after the British realized the impending danger of a potential revolt by the two communities. 
This proved be a mistake, as both the right and left wing parties of the Greek community 
strongly supported the idea of enosis, which was developed at the level of anti-colonialism.  
Subsequently, the Greeks started fighting for their self-determined rights to achieve their 
mission of enosis.  
 According to Kızılyürek, “The British helped Turkish Cypriots to install an 
organization which was called the Turkish Minority of the island of Cyprus (known as 
KATAK) in 1943” (Kızılyürek, 2005b, p. 224). The organization of KATAK was the first 
Turkish organization that was established against enosis on the island. Although the British 
and the traditional group of Turkish Cypriots were against the elite Turkish Cypriots, all of 
them stood on the same side since the enosis was in question. During those years, the British 
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realized the potential danger of Greek attacks and began negotiations with Turkey to get their 
attention toward nationalist attacks in order to secure the British position on the island. 
According to the British, the involvement of Turkey in the Cyprus problem was significantly 
important to be able to prevent Greek Cypriots from achieving their mission of unification 
with Greece at that time. For this reason, the British administration started “Cyprus 
Lobbying” in Turkey in order to persuade Turkey to help Turkish Cypriots (Kızılyürek, 
2005b, p. 233). While they were lobbying with Turkey, the British were continuously trying 
to create more trouble between the ethnic groups of the island on the basis of British colonial 
policy. Although the British were showing the world that they were the mediator of the 
Cyprus case, they were actually trying to provoke inhabitants against each other. Along with 
this negative progress against Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, Turkey decided to jump into the 
Cyprus problem in order to protect Turkish Cypriots rights on the island in the 1950s. The 
effort of intellectual Turkish Cypriots cannot be ignored in convincing Turkey to adopt their 
positions, “which allowed them in turn to gain almost complete dominance within their 
community” (Lacher, 2006, para. 35). Immediately after the announcement of the Turkish 
decision on the island to assist the Turkish Cypriots, the British arranged a meeting with 
Turkey and Greece to fix the current problem of the conflicts in the communities between 
themselves and against the British. However, the Greek Church of Cyprus was not satisfied 
with the involvement of Turkey in the Cyprus problem because, according to them, Turkey 
could have been a visible obstacle to the issue of enosis.  
Also, being a member of NATO in the 1950s was another reason for Turkey to 
involve itself in the Cyprus problem and to help Turkish Cypriots (Kızılyürek, 2005b). Along 
with the decision of Turkey to become involved in the Cyprus problem, Turkey drew a new 
political strategy for the island. Dependent upon the new political strategy on Cyprus, Turkey 
immediately began provoking Turkish Cypriots against Greek Cypriots by organizing them 
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more carefully than before. Moreover, all this progress on the island proved to be a strong 
attachment to the motherland simply because of the “perceptions of common origin and 
history with Turkey or Greece have been instrumental in mobilizing each community in favor 
of competing nationalist projects” (Loizides, 2007, p. 174). The competition-based nationalist 
projects on the island caused an enormous problem for the future of both communities on the 
island because these projects created barriers to reconciliation. After the development of rival 
nationalist movements, the settlement of the peaceful atmosphere on the island became very 
difficult. The British were trying to find a common way to reconcile the two communities in 
order to secure its position on the island. Therefore, Britain invited both Greece and Turkey 
to the Conference of London to reconcile them; however, none of the British offers on the 
conference satisfied either Turkey or Greece. As Greece was still insisting on achieving 
enosis, Turkey was insisting “that Cyprus should remain under Britain or revert to Turkey” 
but not become a part of Greece (Richmond, 1999, p. 41). As a result, “The first ever violent 
confrontation between us (Turkish and Greek, NM) took place under the British in 1956” 
(Papadakis, 2005, p. 65).   
 In 1956, while the negotiations between Britain and Turkey were continuing, 
“Taksim” (the Turkish Cypriot political belief that was developed against enosis) was 
suggested by Britain. This suggestion was placed as a national Turkish political belief in the 
Cyprus issue. When Turkey officially became a part of the Cyprus dispute in the late 1950s, 
“…aid from Turkey for the organization of a Turkish Cypriot underground organization was 
provided. This was named Volkan, subsequently to become The Turkish Resistance 
Organization (TMT)” (Attalides, 2003, p. 47, 48), because “Turkish Cypriots opposed this 
(EOKA, NM), asking for the partition -- Taksim -- of Cyprus, and set up their own fighter’s 
organization called TMT” (Papadakis, 2005, p. 39). Basically, “TMT…existed as the Turkish 
Cypriots Counter part of EOKA” (Attalides, 2003, p. 48). The organization of TMT became 
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“a barrier to the Greeks’ national aims” (Attalides, 2003, p. 41). The new slogan of TMT was 
“either division of the island or death.” After the establishment of the Turkish organization, 
tensions became very high among both communities and Greek attacks were turned toward 
Turkish Cypriots. More specifically, nationalist Greeks attacked mixed villages where 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots were living together. After the problem turned violent, Turkish 
Cypriots gradually started leaving the mixed villages. As is clearly seen, both ethnic 
communities were organizing themselves “at different points in the political dialog” for their 
struggle against others and were developing new organizations against each other. 
Eventually, the violence conflict broke down (Richmond, 1999, p. 41). Obviously, while the 
Cyprus conflict created internal tensions, it also revived tensions on an international level, 
particularly between Greece and Turkey. 
 As a part of the conflicting nationalist projects of Greece and Turkey, the irredentist 
ideology of the motherlands expanded, which resulted in violent conflicts between Turkish 
and Greek Cypriots on the island. Additionally, while Turkish Cypriots were organizing 
themselves against the Greek Cypriots’ national movements, their national feelings were 
determined by the concept of “others” not “us” (Kızılyürek, 2005a). The meaning of “others” 
was Hellenic Nationalism and Greek Cypriots who were politically against them. As a result, 
Turkish Cypriot nationalism was shaped as contra-nationalism in order to respond to Greek 
nationalism instead of developing itself to serve Turkish self-interests. Considering “enosis 
(as) an additional guarantee against the expansionist intentions of a reviving Turkey,” 
nationalist Turkish Cypriots took the nationalist Greek Cypriots actions as an opportunity to 
create a contra-nationalist movement against them (Richmond, 1999, p. 41). 
 Parallel to this progress on the island, Turkey and some of the Turkish Cypriot 
intellectuals who became extremely nationalist, started giving Turkish names to villages 
where Turkish Cypriots lived separately from Greek Cypriots and also began giving Turkish 
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names to the Turkish shops. Besides these changes, Turkish Cypriots were prohibited from 
being in a trade relationship with any of the Greek Cypriots and were also prohibited from 
building a friendship with them. What they were trying to do was to create a socially ethnic 
separation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Overall, after Turkish nationalism was built 
and planted as a national idea of Turkish Cypriots, Turkish belief systems were transformed 
from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey and concentrated on Turkish 
nationalism. 
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Chapter Five: 1960 Republic of Cyprus  
Cyprus has been ruled by many empires and colonial powers during its 
history; however, it has never ruled itself until the Republic of Cyprus which was 
established in 1960. To a greater extent,  during the last couple of centuries, the 
inhabitants of the island -- Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots -- were first led first 
by the traditional Ottoman Empire from 1571 to 1878, and then second, by the 
modern British colonial power from 1878 to 1959 until it became the Republic of 
Cyprus, in which inhabitants of the island had an opportunity to rule themselves 
regardless of third parties and which was established in 1960 in order to build a 
peaceful environment to prevent any kind of conflict. 
Until the republic was established in 1960, inhabitants witnessed many 
conflicts, particularly under the British administration, because it was one of the 
major European colonial powers that imposed its own nationalist world-view toward 
its colonial states (Attalides 2003, p. 22). After the tension and violence had gradually 
increased, giving a signal of danger to the British during its administration on the 
island, the British decided to build a new state on the island in order to change the 
course of the events and to prevent nationalist movements on the island before 
incurring any damages. Following the idea of the British, a new plan was prepared 
and offered to the motherlands of Greece and Turkey in order to create the fourth 
country to find a middle course for the island’s future and also to find a way to secure 
their own self-interests on the island. Additionally, Kızılyürek (2005b) claims that the 
three members of NATO, with cooperation from Turkish and Greek Cypriots, created 
the fourth country to keep their friendship in peace between each other, as well. 
According to the plan of building a new state in order to secure the British, all 
of the parties, including Turkish and Greek Cypriots, the British, Turkey and Greece 
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were supposed to be a part of the plan because all of them were already involved in 
the Cyprus problem. Therefore, two representatives from the motherlands of Greece 
and Turkey discussed and signed the plan after a long negotiation period and came out 
with three major agreements -- (Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, the 
Guarantor of the Alliance Agreement, and the treaty of alliance) -- at the end of 1959 
in Zurich. Finally, Turkey, Greece and Britain, who were members of NATO, 
announced the establishment of the “independent” state on the island, which was 
going to be declared the Republic of Cyprus in 1960.  
In 1960, the Treaty of Zurich and London was signed by Turkey and Greece, 
and after the United Kingdom, Turkish Cypriots, and Greek Cypriots representatives 
also approved of these agreements, the Republic of Cyprus was established. Thus, the 
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots dominated a bi-communal society by August 16, 
1960 (Joseph, 1997). The island, under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, officially 
became an independent state that was built as “a power sharing model” and that 
“received almost universal international recognition” (Zink, 2008, p. 589; James, 
1989, p. 483). Turkey, Greece, and the UK became guarantor countries of the 
Republic of Cyprus along with the Treaty of Guarantee by which they were 
responsible of the sovereignty of the island. Evidently, the Treaty of Guarantee 
provided these three guarantor countries the “right to intervene militarily in Cyprus to 
prevent any abrogation of the constitution or a fundamental change in the status quo” 
(Morag, 2004, p. 615). Bülent Ecevit (the prime minister of Turkey at that time) 
interpreted the new state of Republic of Cyprus in the following way; 
… the continuity, peace and security of the independent republic of 
Cyprus thoroughly depended on the relationship between the Turkish 
and Greek communities in the island, and also depended on the 
friendly relationship between three guarantor countries, Turkey, 
Greece and the United Kingdom. (cited in Kızılyürek, 2005b). 
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As Ecevit stated, the fourth state was founded to create a peaceful atmosphere 
to provide a secure environment for inhabitants of the island and to build a good 
relationship between the three guarantors, which was very important to ensure the 
safety of the new state and the surrounding of the island. However, although the 
fourth state was also created in order to serve all of the guarantors’ self-interests and 
to prevent conflict on the island and in the Mediterranean, the visible peace survived 
only three years in Cyprus. 
Along with the new-born state, a new constitution was also created in order to 
serve the common will of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. According to the new 
constitution of Cyprus, “in the executive branch, the political framework of the bi-
communal republic provided for a presidential regime, the president Greek Cypriot 
and the vice-president Turkish Cypriot, elected by separately by the two 
communities” (Joseph, 1997, p. 77). Under the constitution of the new-born republic, 
the administration was dependent upon a ratio of 70% - 30% Greek and Turkish on 
the island. According to the rate of the population of ethnic communities, seven Greek 
and three Turkish ministers were to be elected for the new legislative council of the 
republic as a way to protect Turkish Cypriots right under the republic; however, this 
was like a “dual authority polities,” which easily creates a dispute among ethnic 
groups who are on the coalition, particularly if both ethnic groups were intended to 
have opponent ethnic nationalism (Horowitz, 1982, p. 345). Under the compromise of 
the new constitution of the new republic, “Cyprus was to be independent and 
sovereign, allied to Greece, and Turkey but not to NATO. The Republic of Cyprus 
was enjoined to fore-go both union (enosis) with Greece and partition (taksim) 
between Greece and Turkey” (Camp, 1980, p. 47). As Kızılyürek (2008) asserts, the 
new republic inhibited the ideology of enosis and gave equal rights to both 
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communities. On the other hand, as Lindley claims, the main reason for excluding 
enosis and taksim was because these underlay the conflict in Cyprus and could create 
problems by the merging of churches, school/education, and politics in a divisive and 
nationalistic way (Lindley, 2007, p. 229). In addition, Turkish and Greek languages 
were also added into the new constitution as national languages.  
After the announcement of the independence of Cyprus in 1960, the 
constructed common environment for both communities could not stay in peace for 
long because Greek and Turkish Cypriots were not satisfied with the situation of the 
establishment of the federation and, especially, sharing the state equally with other 
groups, which did not fully meet with their expectations. “The Greek Cypriot 
leadership under the new Republic’s president, Archbishop Makarios, was extremely 
unhappy with the structure of the government as it gave the Turkish Cypriots almost 
unlimited veto powers over any significant legislation or policy sponsored by the 
Greek Cypriot community” (Morag, 2004, p. 617). Eventually, “It was inevitable that 
the Greek Cypriots would maneuver to gain majority rights and the Turkish Cypriot 
side would follow in order to defend itself from minority abuse” (Richmond, 1999, p. 
43). On the other hand, in addition to the dissatisfaction of the creation of the state 
and equal power sharing with Turkish Cypriots, a civil war in the Greek community 
was started between nationalist wings who totally disagreed with the establishment of 
the new independent state, and president Makarios and his followers who signed the 
agreements of the new state. The new situation in Greece brought conflict within the 
Greek community and divided them into two sides. Basically, the new independent 
state brought a complex system on the island rather than peace.  
In many cases, the result of the transition from multi-ethnic and multi-
religious traditional society to modern society generates a “common will” on the basis 
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of the political and social transformations within and between communities. 
Nevertheless, in the Cyprus case, the results demonstrate that the establishment of the 
Republic of Cyprus underlined two distinctly separate national ideologies and 
generated two separate national consciousnesses into conflict instead of constituting 
the “common will” under the same roof of the republic between two ethnic groups -- 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Also, the establishment of the new state created civil war 
within the Greek community. Kızılyürek (2005b) explains the situation in one of his 
studies as the fact that modernization could not arrive at an arrangement between the 
two communities in Cyprus; still, the modernization brought nationalism and also 
created ethnic conflict between the two communities of Cyprus. On the other hand, as 
a result of modernization, the socioeconomic differences significantly increased 
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots after the declaration of the new republic in 1960. 
Along with the unequal environment on the island, both communities continued 
sharing the administration of the new republic for a couple of years without violent 
actions. The peaceful environment on the island only served the self-interests of 
Britain, Turkey and the USA, because any possible problems on the island in these 
years would have definitely run against those interests. Another visible danger was 
the possibility of creating a war between two NATO members -- Turkey and Greece -
- if  problems appeared between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. For this reason, the 
new constitution was prohibited, giving the Greeks their self-determination rights and 
allowing them to put enosis into effect in order to achieve their mission. Another 
possible danger might have been “a much wider conflict in the eastern 
Mediterranean” (Richmond, 1999, p. 43). In order to prevent all these possibilities, 
the constitution of the new state provided rights to interference for the guarantors to 
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temporarily stop the conflict between the two major communities and provide the 
peace on the island.   
Nevertheless, Turkish and Greek Cypriots only co-existed in peace for just 
three years under the independent state. One of the main reasons was that each 
community wanted to get more advantages from the new state. “For the Turkish 
Cypriot side, their task now became one of retaining their extra privileges. For the 
Greek Cypriot side, their task now became one of reducing and destroying the 
perceived circumscription of their sovereignty and allowing the will of the majority to 
come to fruition” (Richmond, 1999, p. 42). The Greek Cypriot community had never 
been satisfied with sharing administrative power with the Turkish Cypriot community 
because Greeks saw themselves as a majority who had the right to take more 
advantages from the republic, whereas Turkish Cypriots were a minority group of the 
island. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots believed they had the right to gain 
equality from the new state because they were also owners of the land. Considering 
that Greek Cypriots had been dreaming of the unification with Greece since the 
nineteenth century, living in and sharing the same state with Turkish Cypriots would 
not satisfy them. Being “forced to live with Turkish Cypriot under the Republic of 
Cyprus instead of living with their agnates” paved the way for extreme 
disappointment within Greek Cypriot community (Kızılyürek, 2005a, p. 103). In sum, 
then “due in part to the high degree of sociocultural segregation and mistrust between 
the communities, neither a common sense of nationhood nor a shared acceptance of 
the legitimacy of state authority emerged” (Zink, 2008, p. 592). Basically, the power 
sharing administration of the new state between two communities who were 
sociocultural separated “failed to defuse intercommunal tension” on the island (Ibid). 
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Even though the state constitution abolished the nationalist movements of both 
communities, the Cyprus problem had never disappeared within the Greek Cypriot 
community and continued even after the establishment of the republic in 1960 until 
the outbreak of conflict in 1963. Obviously, “all political leaders among the Greek 
Cypriots considered the 1960 form of independence as a temporary arrangement” 
(Attalides, 2003, p. 120). For this reason, Greek Cypriots tolerated sharing equal 
rights with Turkish Cypriots in regard to the independent state for only three years 
before they put forth an action-oriented struggle in order to achieve enosis. 
Although Greek Cypriots deprecated the new state and continued to importune 
the unification with Greece by following Hellenic nationalism, as Kızılyürek (2005a) 
noted, the new state was a symbol of failure of the Hellene national movements in 
Cyprus. Even though independent state in Cyprus became very weak in the front of 
the symbolic meaning of nationalism and represented the failure of the Hellene 
national movement, president Makarios was planning to abolish all agreements in five 
years and implement self-determination rights in order to achieve the Greek Cypriot 
mission (Kızılyürek, 2005a). Following the plan of Makarios violence shortly began 
against the Turkish Cypriot community, during which unrest between both societies 
started again. At the same time, there was ongoing civil war between the right and the 
left wings of the Greek community. However, Republic of Cyprus President Makarios 
had not given up planning to make the island as a part of Greece, in spite of different 
opinions in the Greek community. Eventually, President Makarios’ ambition was to 
take advantage of the proclamation of the republic. In order to succeed in enosis, 
Makarios proposed to change “thirteen points” from the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus 
(Camp; 1980, p. 49). Regardless, this proposal was one-sided because “president 
Makarios, rather than talking with the Turks, made the proposals public and 
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concurrently tried to gain international support” (Kaloudis, 1999, p. 8). As a result of 
this one-sided proposal, the Turkish Cypriot side of the republic, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom, rejected the proposal of Makarios, because all thirteen proposals 
were determined to “ … end the power of the Turkish-Cypriots minority to block 
action desired by the Greek-Cypriot majority, including the abolition of majorities in 
both Greek and Turkish sides of the legislatures, the abolition of separate judicial 
systems for the two groups, the elimination of separate city governments in the five 
major towns, and the elimination of the veto power of the Turkish-Cypriot vice-
president” (Camp, 1980, p. 49-50). Basically, Makarios was planning to achieve the 
idea of enosis legally, by keeping Turkey out of the island and pushing Turkish 
Cypriots out from the administration of the republic by proposing these thirteen points 
(Camp, 1980; Attalides, 2003).  
Additionally, following these tensions on the island, as James (1989) claims, 
“in November 1963, the (Greek Cypriot) President Makarios announced a plan for its 
amendment which resulted in the withdrawal (or as the Turkish Cypriots say, the 
exclusion) of Turkish Cypriots from all governmental arrangements” (p. 2). In 
December, problems developed and created more racial and cultural issues against 
Turkish Cypriots on the island. Basically, “The nationalism of the two ethnic groups 
naturally fed each other. The leaders planned for the time when the Republic would 
break down and there would be a free-for–all for territory that would became Greek 
on Turkish” (Attalides, 2003, p. 55). The outbreak of hostilities in December 1963 
brought about a complete breakdown of inter-communal relations and a process of the 
physical separation of the Turkish and Greek communities began (Joseph, 1997, p. 
78). Thus, at the end of 1963, the Republic of Cyprus was abolished by the Greeks. 
The state of Cyprus only lasted three years without any visible problems until the 
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proposal was reported; evidently, the two communities were waiting for the right time 
to express their political feelings on the island (Kızılyürek, 2005a). After their victory 
over the Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots and Greece started work on abolishing the 
London and Zurich agreements. Finally, after campaigning to abolish these 
agreements, both agreements were announced as abrogated by President Makarios in 
1964. This was the second victory for Greek Cypriots to achieve the elimination of 
barriers for enosis; the Greek community has been in force as the only real 
representative of the 1960 constitution and continue to be recognized internationally 
as if they were the only representatives of the republic.  
Following these events on the island, the tension became more dangerous for 
both societies. According to the constitution, both guarantor countries, Turkey and 
Greece, were supposed to avoid conflict on the island on any level between Turkish 
and Greek Cypriots, but they could not succeed at maintaining peace between them. 
“On March 4, 1964, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 186, by which it 
recommended the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) (The International Debates, 2005, p. 70) and “the UNFICYP was 
deployed on March” 27, 1964” (Lindley, 2007, p. 230). The United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) was deployed to prevent any intrusions onto the 
island. According to the UN charter as a mediator, “states do not want the states 
system to be broken up, and so the best the mediator can do is get parties themselves 
to agree to a modification of sovereignty and a lessening of demands for ethnic self-
determination” (Richmond, 1999, p. 49). Eventually, in order to prevent the problem 
among the two ethnic communities, the United Nations had a debate and declared a 
mandate. This mandate of UNFICYP was originally defined in the following terms: 
                in the interest of preserving international peace and security,  
                to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, 
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                as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration   
                of law and order and a return to normal conditions. 
 
 (The Peace and Security Section of the United Nations Department of Public 
Information, as cited in the International Debates, 2005, p. 70) 
 
According to the International Debate (2005), the mandate goal was to 
confront both societies, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, in 1964, and was 
extended by the Security Council to try to “build a negotiating culture” on the island 
to solve the problems (Richmond, 1999, p. 49). For this reason, “The basic U.N. 
strategy for dealing with Cyprus has been to stabilize the existing situation with its 
peacekeeping force while urging the two sides to settle their differences” (Loizides, 
2007, p. 62). Although the UN military was settled on the island in order to convince 
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots to settle on “a mutually acceptable agreement” 
in order to build a peaceful environment on the island, the crisis was still continuing 
to increase (Richmond, 1999, p. 50). Evidently, “conflicts involving ethnic groups 
have always been difficult to resolve, and the Cyprus dispute is no exception” 
(Kaloudis, 1999, p. 4).  
The high tensions over Cyprus after 1963 created a geographical separation 
between the two ethnic groups. After the physical separation started, Turkish Cypriots 
moved onto a small part of the island from 1963 until 1974 when the partition was 
completed by the Turkish military. To put it another way, “The Turkish Cypriot 
leadership and public servants withdrew from the government and began setting up a 
separate administration” (Joseph, 1997, p. 78). Along with nationalist feelings after 
the beginning of the enclave period, “the Turkish Cypriots began giving Turkish 
names to their villages where the control was in Turkish Cypriots hands.  After the 
invasion of 1974, they replaced Greek symbols and monuments with Turkish ones in 
the part of Cyprus that they controlled” (Morag, 2004, p. 607). Indeed, it is highly 
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likely that ethnonationalism played a very important role in creating the irredentist 
struggle between the two communities on the basis of their motherlands’ irredentist 
policies and led them to become enemies. Ethnonationalism, in turn, paved the way 
for the ethnic and geographical separation first in 1963 and again in 1974. 
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Chapter Six: 1963 – 1974 Nationalism in Cyprus 
The unequal distribution of values and resources including economic, political, 
sociocultural activities, social organizations and social classes or groups in a society 
could cause structural devolution and conflict between two or more ethnic groups 
with regard to their self-interests. In the Cyprus case, the different values and needs of 
each ethnic group of the island led to the structural separation and high level conflict 
on the basis of ethno-nationalism during the history of Turkish and Greek Cypriots on 
the island. The incompatibility between institutions and different ethnic backgrounds 
of both groups on the island resulted in the creation of different sociocultural 
structures that could not succeed in creating a peaceful environment between Turkish 
and Greek Cypriots on the island. The result of having different interests by two 
major ethnic groups of the island paved the way for the high level of violent conflict 
which ended with a demographic and geographic partition in 1974. No one could 
prevent this result, although three guarantors -- Britain, Turkey and Greece -- were 
involved in the Cyprus case to restore the peace and order on the island. Besides these 
three powers, as Morag (2004) states, the United States and the Soviet Union also 
became involved after the Cold War to solve the Cyprus problem. As Morag claims, 
“The course of the national conflict on Cyprus has been intimately connected both 
with the fact that nationalism in Cyprus was imported from the respective mainlands 
and the fact that the island has had great geo-strategic significance -- not only for 
Greece, Turkey, and Britain but for the United States and the Soviet Union as well” 
(Morag, 2004, p. 618). In view of the United States’ self-interest, the U.S. involved 
itself in the Cyprus problem to benefit from the situation by trying to solve it because 
“the oil problem and the burgeoning Middle East crisis, the need to reconcile the 
NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, or at least to avoid the worst outcome -- the 
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neutralization of both as reliable bases” all increased Cyprus’ “locational importance” 
and created US interest over the island (Attalides, 2003, p. 138). As Morag (2004) 
stresses, the hidden reason for third parties to involve themselves in the Cyprus 
problem was to prevent the possible war between two NATO allies (Turkey and 
Greece NM). Obviously, interests of other powers during that period were mostly to 
own the island; however, the U.S. had different attitudes regarding Cyprus, and the 
involvement of the U.S. in the Cyprus dispute never turned into an action. The 
importance of the Mediterranean to the U.S. drew the island’s importance to a high 
level for the U.S and made the U.S. get involved. Basically, the aims of the U.S. were: 
1.  To maintain naval superiority over the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean. 
2. To strengthen NATO militarily and politically, including the “border” allies:  
    Greece and Turkey. 
3. To encourage Yugoslavia’s military and political independence from the Soviet  
    Union. 
4. To protect and strengthen Israel as a western outpost in the Middle East and to  
     counter the Soviet presence in some Arab states. 
5.  To contain and reduce Soviet influence with states of the region (Cited in           
     Attalides, 2003, p. 149). 
Despite the fact that the island was very small, it was strategically important 
for the world. Therefore, these countries were involved in the Cyprus dispute and 
caused the nationalist struggle among Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island rather 
than establishing a peaceful environment among both ethnic groups. According to 
Morag (2004): 
The external aspect of the Cypriot conflict thus had two components. 
The first is nationalist and emotional and has to do with domestic 
politics within Greece and Turkey – which were affected by the plight 
of their respective compatriots in Cyprus. The second components has 
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to do with considerations of international Realpolitik – that is to say, 
the geo-strategic value of the island both in the context of the ongoing 
tension and hostility between Greece and Turkey, and in the context of 
the Cold War. (p. 618). 
 
 
The solution that all parties, including the U.S., arrived at was to create a new 
state on the island where both ethnic groups and their motherlands, Turkey and 
Greece, could all be satisfied. In order to prevent the stated aims of the U.S. and to 
serve third parties’ interests, the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 established a new 
constitution, even though the Republic of Cyprus was not expected to have a long life 
by the powers which were involved.  
The 1960 Constitution proved its inadequacy within three years after the 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and “highlights the inter-ethnic violence that 
did exist between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots between 1957 and 1974, and 
correctly identifies the Greek Cypriot pursuit of first enosis, and letter of a 
majoritarian political system as crucial to the inter-ethnic conflict on the island, it too 
remains self-serving” (Lacher, 2006, para. 19). As Attalides (2003) states, “That is 
why the inter-communal conflicts of 1963 – 1967 are probably the most tragic events 
in the history of Cyprus” (p. 90). Briefly, the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of 
Cyprus failed because Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots failed in ruling the 
power-shared state. The main reason for this was that both could not succeed in 
creating a common will to develop a peaceful environment, regardless of creating an 
environment without fear and anxiety on the island. It is often said that this instability 
of the post-colonial state brought ethnic conflict to high levels on the island and 
promoted the two rival ethnic identities that tended to provide two different national 
interests shaped by the motherlands’ nationalism between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots. Furthermore, the new unstable position of the land resulted in unavoidable 
115 
 
separations, first in 1963 and later in 1974, which came into existence by an inability 
to construct a common will for the shared state and for the future of the island. 
Basically, a lack of common will of both communities destroyed the newly 
established state in 1963 and never succeeded in developing any peaceful 
environment, meaning that the “two communities in a failing consociation democracy 
believed that the other community was intent on gaining more powers and therefore 
turned to their motherlands for support” (Richmond, 1999, p. 43). According to 
Morag, “This was especially true of the Turkish Cypriots who, lacking the economic, 
political, and international resources if the Republic of Cyprus, were forced to be 
completely dependent on Turkey” (Morag, 2004, p. 619).  
When the Cyprus dispute broke out into a violent conflict in 1963, the way 
that nationalist Greek Cypriots followed in order to achieve their self-interests drew 
the island’s fate. In order to achieve their aim by 1963, one wing of Cyprus 
government, the Greek Cypriots, prepared a new plan called the “Akritas Plan” for 
weakening the other wing of the government, the Turkish Cypriots, and to unite with 
Greece. The action-based new plan was required to destabilize the Republic of Cyprus 
and abolish the new constitution and finally unite with Greece. Along with the new 
plan, the Greek Cypriot community wanted to prove that the Cyprus problem would 
have always existed even though the Republic of Cyprus was created in order to solve 
it. The Akritas Plan was supported by a Greek organization, which was against the 
possible peace with leftist AKEL (left wing Greek political party) and the Turkish 
Cypriot community. The main reason for developing rival movements against AKEL 
by the right wing of the Greek Cypriot community was because AKEL supported 
peace with the Turkish Cypriots and followed different political thoughts than the 
right wing of the Greek Cypriots. Although, the strategy of AKEL was changed after 
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the 1940s and stood for statements of nationalism, the right wing of the Greeks had 
never accepted them as an indicator of their nationalist struggle regarding the Cyprus 
predicament. 
The way that right wing Greeks chose to put their plan into practice made 
Turkish Cypriots leave the administrative position of the state and forced them to 
move out from the mixed villages where Turkish and Greek Cypriots had lived 
together until 1963 through enclaves. As Morag (2004) states, the “Enclave Period,” 
which means “the island was de facto partitioned into Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot areas – each with its own political leadership and administration,” was started 
right after the problems turned violent between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the 
middle of the twentieth century (p. 601). Besides political assumptions, the enclave 
period was the first step of social and geographic ethnic separation between Turkish 
and Greek Cypriots. As Lacher asserts, “So the return of inter-ethnic violence in 1964 
finally saw the large-scale relocation of the Turkish Cypriot into such enclaves” 
(Lacher, 2006, para.36). At the inter-communal level, nationalist struggles of both 
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots culminated in violence starting from the enclave 
period. Basically, the “enclave period,” as Volkan (1979) said, was a solid trauma to 
the Cypriot Turks when they were obligated to live in enclaves starting in 1963-1964. 
Most of the Cypriot Turks became refugees during this time, a period which lasted for 
eleven years. According to Volkan (2008), the enclave period of the Turkish Cypriots 
could be divided into two main periods, which were:  
1. First period (1963-1968): “Cypriot Turks were virtually imprisoned in the enclaves,      
    which covered only three percent of the island.” 
2. Second period (1968 and the summer of 1974): “They were “allowed” to move out      
    of them and pass through the Cypriot Greek territory to visit other enclaves. Still        
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    the land they were forced to flee to in 1963-1964 was not available to them for  
    resettlement (Cited Volkan, 2008, para. 6). 
  After the start of the enclave period, the number of mixed villages had been 
gradually reduced year by year until the partition in 1974. As is seen in Table 3, the 
number of mixed villages in the late 1970s when the British arrived on the island was 
at 43 percent, which was the highest ratio of mixed villages on the island compared to 
the historical stages of the island from the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, along 
with the start of the enclave period, as is shown in Table 3, the number of mixed 
villages in the late 1900s was at %10. The ratio of ethnic demography in the mixed 
villages of the island had been gradually diminished in line with the growth of the 
Greek villages, particularly starting from the British Empire period. As a result, along 
with the enclave period, the ratio of mixed villages had been replaced with separated 
villages. 
 
Table 3: Ethnic - based Demographic Segregation       
Year  Mixed Villages  GC Villages  TC Villages  #Villages  %Mixed   %GC    %TC 
 1891      346              342                114                 802             43            43        14 
 1931      252               358                 84                  694             36            52        12 
 1960     114                392               117                  623             18            63        19 
 1970       48                 444                11                  503             10            88          2 
*Cited in Lindsey, 2007 p: 231 
 [GC, Greek Cypriots; TC, Turkish Cypriots] 
 
Recent situations, including the result of the bloody violence in 1963 during 
which “soon after the beginning of the conflict the Government of Cyprus fell 
exclusively in to Greek Cypriot hands” and starting with the “Enclave period,” 
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provided satisfaction among the Greek Cypriots community in the 1960s (Morag, 
2004, p. 620). When the Greek Cypriots achieved full administration rights of the 
Republic of Cyprus, they brought it to the international level as if they were 
succeeding in ruling the state since the beginning of its establishment. However, after 
the Turkish Cypriots’ movements through enclaves, “1.6% of the area of the new state 
started being under control of the ‘Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration’ and 
contained almost half of the Turkish Cypriot population under its control” (Attalides, 
2003, p. 33). Additionally, “conditions inside the Turkish Cypriot enclaves had indeed 
been very bad but this had had the effect of making the Turkish Cypriots increasingly 
dependent on Turkey for economic aid thus strengthening their separate identity,” 
which opened a new page of problems for the Turkish Cypriots (Morag, 2004, p. 
602). 
As Kızılyürek (2005a) asserts, the same year that the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union became involved in the Cyprus problem, the Greek junta secretly came to the 
island. Following this, the Greek Cypriots and Greece continuously proceeded step by 
step to achieve their goal of enosis; however, the U.S., the United Nations and NATO 
decided to find a way to solve the Cyprus dispute. They created a new plan which was 
called the “Ancheson Plan” in 1964. Theoretically, this plan was offered for Cyprus to 
make two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, create an agreement in order to keep 
Cyprus secure from the West. Although Turkey and Turkish Cypriots agreed with the 
plan, Greece and Greek Cypriots were not satisfied with it. This plan even brought 
different opinions into the Greek Cypriot community; while one side of the Greeks 
who were supporters of enosis stood against the Ancheson Plan, others sympathized 
with the plan and agreed to give a small portion of land to Turkey (Kızılyürek, 
2005a).  
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Although there had been some ongoing negotiations for building a peaceful 
environment on the island, high levels of violent conflict on the island emerged 
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in 1960s. The reason for this intense conflict on 
the island was that the military of Greece tried to conquer the island and confiscated 
the administration of the Republic of Cyprus. While “the biggest crisis [was] 
occurring in 1967,” “Turkey almost invaded” the island to prevent the violent conflict 
in which Turkish Cypriots became the subject of the context (Lindley, 2007, p. 230). 
Although Turkey’s plan was to enter Cyprus and find a solution for the military coup 
of Greece in order to prevent the violent conflict against Turkish Cypriots, the U.S. 
did not allow Turkey to do so during the 1967 crisis (Camp, 1980). In addition to the 
U.S. force on Turkey and Greece, Turkey put some conditions before Greece with 
regards to not entering onto the island. Greece accepted all of Turkey’s conditions 
and, as Kızılyürek (2005a) noted, the Greek army and their leader Grivas left the 
island and went back to Greece.  
After stopping the biggest crisis in 1967, the negotiations between both 
communities started once again in 1968; however, no solutions could be reached to 
eliminate the current situation of the island. Ethno-nationalism inhibited the 
negotiations with regard to drawing the tension higher between Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots regardless of creating a peaceful environment on the island. Although Greek 
Cypriots were losing their prestige in front of the West by paving the way for 
difficulties on negotiations, President Makarios did not want to compromise with the 
Turkish Cypriots. Because of negative moves by Makarios, two NATO allies, one 
from Turkey and one from Greece, were invited as representatives for negotiations in 
order to find a way to put both ethnic communities under the same state of peace.  No 
agreement, however, could be reached. 
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While negotiations were in progress during this time, Makarios and Atina 
started developing different ideologies for the island. Hence, the nationalist movement 
of Greek Cypriots changed its route through different methods. By extension, 
Makarios as a president embraced the Republic of Cyprus and decided to fight for the 
republic in order to make the island “a Greek Cypriot dominated Cyprus” on the basis 
of ethno nationalism (Vural and Peristanis, 2008, p. 4). Eventually, “the forcible 
removal of the democracy in Greece made enosis a much less attractive ideal” for the 
Greek Cypriot community and made them embrace the republic in order to fight for 
their political aims (Richmond, 1999, p. 44). All of these unexpected results in the 
Greek Cypriot community led to incompatibility with the interests of Makarios. From 
this point of view, it is obvious that enosis was gradually coming to the end instead of 
succeeding.  
One of the main reasons for discarding enosis was to become divided on a 
question with Greece and the U.S. with regards to having different interests for the 
island. The meaning of leaving enosis and embracing the Republic of Cyprus was still 
covered to exclude Turkish Cypriots from the government of the republic. Thereupon, 
Greece, with the U.S.’s secret hand, decided to assassinate Makarios because he was 
against any kind of agreements with Turkey and Turkish Cypriots (Kızılyürek, 
2005a). While this progress was ongoing around Cyprus, however, General Grivas 
went back to the island in order to establish a new organization, which was called 
EOKA B to struggle against Turkish Cypriots and to achieve enosis. By that time, 
Greece realized how the island was geographically important as a military base for its 
own interests. As a result, “Greece engineered a coup d’etat against Makarios led by 
Nikos Sampson and the National Guard, (and) a full-fledged enosis leader came to 
power in Nicosia” which caused violence to arise on the island again in 1974 (Morag, 
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2004, p. 620). The violence reached its highest level between the two communities 
immediately after the intervention of Greece in 1974. This new situation brought 
thousands of Greek troops into Cyprus (cited in Attalides, 2003, p. 17), soldiers who 
were secretly transported by the Greek foreign minister to the island in July, 1974 
(Ibid).  
While the intervention of Greece was ongoing on the island, the Turkish Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit was trying to “persuade the British Government to intervene 
jointly in Cyprus, as guarantors; (however) the British Government refused” 
(Attalides, 2003, p. 164). “Thus Turkey had objectives above and beyond those of the 
Turkish Cypriot community, whose role now became one of finding a sufficient 
reason to demand decisive Turkish intervention” (Richmond, 1999, p. 43). On the 
20th of July, 1974, the Turkish military, as a guarantor country, brought its military 
service onto the island to prevent the conflict and to protect Turkish Cypriots without 
permission from third parties, including the UK and the U.S., because the Greek junta, 
who had begun the bloody violence over Cyprus in 1974, were mistreating and killing 
Turkish Cypriots. The unexpected Greek intervention to Cyprus was the cause of the 
Turkish intervention on the 20th of July, which ended with a geographic and 
demographic partition. Basically, “the coup and the invasion of the summer of 1974 
represent a severe setback to the full decolonization of Cyprus. The setback was 
administered by the two countries which had influence over political movements and 
ideologies in Cyprus itself, that is, Greece and Turkey” (Attalides, 2003, p. 58).  
Eventually, “this was a victory for the Turkish Cypriots, as this was the first time that 
Turkey had taken unhindered and direct action on their behalf and much of their later 
efforts were to be directed at preventing the withdrawal of Turkey from Cyprus” 
(Richmond, 1999, p. 45).  However, this case was the second reason that caused the 
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Greek Cypriots to leave struggling for enosis and embracing the new state. The main 
reason was that the intervention of Greece caused the unexpected Turkish 
intervention, which ended with the partition in 1974. The Greek Cypriots were very 
frustrated by the result of the 1974 clash of Greece, which changed the island’s fate. 
The partition “was not only that the Turkish-Cypriots fled from their house 
and property, but also from a bilingual society” (Özerk, 2001, p. 258). “In the eyes of 
the Turkish-Cypriots the Greek language was no longer the language of neighbors; it 
was now the language of enemies. This, of course, had consequences for the view of 
the Turkish-Cypriot School Board on the use of Greek and any school issues 
involving the Greek language” (Ibid). Also, “at the end no one won” but the partition 
was done (Papadakis, 2005, p. 165). As Papadakis asserts, no one won anything in the 
end; however, as a result of the partition, the island was divided demographically and 
geographically into two main lands, including north and south, where immigration 
forced communities to move from one region to another. Turkish immigrants who 
were living in the southern part of the island were forced to move to the northern part 
of the island where Turkish military gained control over the 37% of the north part of 
the island and placed Turkish Cypriots and its military camps. Greek immigrants who 
were living in northern part of the island were forced to move to the southern part of 
the island where all Greeks were reunited under the republic. “In fact, the events of 
1974 filled most Greek Cypriots with strong feelings of anger and anxiety about their 
future” after the Turkish military was settled on the island (Loizides, 2007, p. 177).  
When the Turkish Cypriots settled in the north part and developed a country, 
called the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983, it was recognized 
only by Turkey. The Greek Cypriots settled on the south part of the island under the 
Republic of Cyprus, which was recognized by the world. Unilateral declaration of the 
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independent TRNC under the leadership of an instrumentalist leader was announced 
as an independent state to keep political self-interests on the same level with the 
Greek Cypriots who still had control over the Republic of Cyprus for possible 
confederation (Walker, 2005). However, as Volkan states, 
“
 …in the end, when the 
island was de facto divided into the northern Turkish and the southern Greek sections, 
Cypriot Turks felt safe, due to the presence of the Turkish Military on the island” for 
a while (Volkan, 2008). 
Immediately after the demographic and geographic partition was completed, 
“the UN Security Council had moved to call for a cease-fire” on the island (Attalides, 
2003, p. 164). The ceasefire, between the 25th and 30
th
 of July, was negotiated 
between the Foreign Ministers of the guarantor powers, the United Kingdom, Turkey 
and Greece, in Geneva by leading the Security Council in “agreeing to the 
implementation of the cease-fire and for a return to constitutional normality in 
Cyprus, as well as to the implementation of security Council Resolution 353 which 
called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island” (Attalides, 2003, p. 
164). In July and August 1974, “the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions 
that have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and have required the force to 
perform certain additional functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the 
ceasefire” (The International Debate, 2005, p. 70).  After meeting in Geneva one more 
time in August, it was not possible to put all these agreements into effect because the 
ethno-nationalist debate between the groups was still continuing into communities in 
the island. During the negotiations, the United Nations, Greece and Greek Cypriots 
were on one side, and Turkey and Turkish Cypriots were on another in which they 
stood against each other in spite of finding a way to solve the Cyprus problem. 
“Following the de facto ceasefire, UNFICYP inspected the deployment of the Cyprus 
124 
 
National Guard and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces, and ceasefire lines and a 
buffer zone were established between the areas controlled by the opposing forces” 
(The International Debate, 2005, p. 70). UNFICYP went to Cyprus simply “to help 
the parties implement their wish to maintain peace” instead of setting “a position to 
enforce the peace,” (James, 1989, p. 482). Overall, according to the International 
Debates, since 1974, the UN secretariat and the representative of the Cyprus case 
have been trying to find a formula that both sides --Turkish Cypriots and Greek 
Cypriots-- can accept and sign for peace (The International Debate, 2005). However, 
they have not arrived at any solutions since the partition occurred in 1974 and there is 
still a cease-fire instead of a peace agreement on the island today. As Richmond 
states, “Ethnonationalism was responsible and once again the international 
community found it expedient not to take a clear stand, thus reducing the 
effectiveness of peacemaking” (Richmond, 1999, p. 51). 
 
The Greek Cypriot Society in Cyprus since 1974 
While all these politically based negotiations had been in progress on the 
island, there were some other ongoing issues within the ethnic communities of 
Cyprus. Since 1974, besides the demographic and geographic separation of the island, 
most things had also changed, including each community’s political aims and future 
plans for the island and for themselves on the basis of time. To some extent, the Greek 
Cypriots were fighting for implementation of their national movement called enosis 
on the basis of Hellenic nationalism in order to unite with Greece. However, since the 
partition in 1974, Hellenic nationalism was not answering the expectations of the 
national struggle of the Greek Cypriots anymore. Thus, the Greek Cypriots moved 
away from Hellenic nationalism and built up Greek Cypriot nationalism by 
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identifying themselves with the independent state, the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, 
“the desire to fight for enosis began to wane in Cyprus, primarily because it was seen 
as unattainable and risky, but also because Cypriots enjoyed more liberties, and a 
better standard of living than mainland Greeks, not to mention full control of the state 
apparatus” (Loizides, 2007, p. 183). 
Regardless, the new process created a new form of nationalism on the basis of 
dual opinion, which meant that the political left and right wings of the Greek 
community developed two individual nationalist perspectives within the Greek 
community (Kızılyürek, 2005a). One side that had been trying to be a part of Greece 
left the action-oriented nationalism and moved through to the defensive nationalism 
against the Turkish intervention and stood for “sending Turkish military back to 
Turkey” in order “to get rid of Turkish invasion” (Ibid). Eventually, this group’s new 
mission was to reunite both parts of the island, a mission which was called “Epan 
Enosis.” According to Kızılyürek (2005a), that was an obligation that brought 
disagreement in order to prevent the establishment of the federal state in Cyprus. The 
other side stood for establishing “a federal state with Turkish Cypriot” by creating a 
multicultural community on the island and governing it with Turkish Cypriots. 
Obviously, the leftist side of the Greek Cypriots was persisting in developing “a post-
nationalist common vision” based on “the principle of federalism, bi-community, bi-
zonality and political equality” whereas the right side was persisting in traditional 
nationalist ideology of enosis (cited in Vural and Peristianis, 2008, p. 46).   In the end, 
the new national movement of the Greek Cypriots fundamentally made a claim and 
adopted the Republic of Cyprus (Kızılyürek, 2008) and Greek Cypriots adopted 
‘Cypriotism’ as a national identity and started identifying themselves as a “Cypriot.”  
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After the struggle of the Greek Cypriots with the Turkish Cypriots and third 
parties with regard to the Cyprus problem, both communities on the island were 
continuously negotiating in order to find a way to solve their issues. Along with these 
negotiations and with newly adopted ideologies of both communities established in 
the 1977 agreement, the federation-based solution was adopted as a new ideology that 
depended on two separate states and two separate communities on the island. As 
Kızılyürek (2005a) asserts, the federal state of Cyprus was approved as one of the 
principles of Greek community. Depending on the new principle of the Greeks, the 
Greek Cypriot community was started gradually, gaining a good impression before 
the world’s political platform simply because they supported a federation-based 
solution. Gaining a good impression in front of the world would help Greek Cypriots 
to become a member of the European Union (EU) in 2004. Although a peace solution 
on the basis of federalism was the new target of the Turkish side from the beginning 
of the Cyprus dispute, the Greek side embraced it as their idea and thus started 
gaining the good impression of the world. This was the case, even after the first 
violent conflict which started in 1963 and continues until today, because the Turkish 
could not defend themselves in the world’s political platform and, as a result, lost all 
the good impression of the world.  
While Greeks were making a good impression in world diplomacy by 
supporting the “federation” on the island, they still disagreed over political equality 
with Turkish Cypriots under the same administration. Although the idea of a federally 
based solution among Turkish and Greek Cypriots was confirmed by Spiros Kibrianu 
(Leader of Greek Cypriots at that time) and Denktash (Leader of Turkish Cypriots at 
that time), according to Kızılyürek (2005a), Makarios and most of the Greek Cypriots 
definitely disagreed with sharing the administration on equal terms with Turkish 
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Cypriots. According to them, it would not be appropriate to give the minority as equal 
a voice as the majority because they still considered Turkish Cypriots as a minority 
group of the island. One of the well-known examples of this thinking is the 1963 
clash, which was based on sharing the administration on equal terms with Turkish 
Cypriots and which ended in disaster. The year 1965 when Greek Cypriots were 
trying to provoke the UN in order to prevent Turkish Cypriot getting equal rights from 
the administration of the new state was another example of this.  In this case, the only 
thing that they would have agreed on was to give Turkish Cypriots minority rights 
instead of majority rights. Eventually, beside ratio of population, the only reason for 
disagreements on equality in power sharing was that “Greek Cypriots asserted that the 
Republic of Cyprus was a nation-state which was only belonged to them” (Kızılyürek, 
2008).  
Although there were different opinions on how to solve the Cyprus problem, 
the negotiations between two communities under United Nations control were in 
progress until the end of 1990s.  However, no solutions regarding how to create a new 
state on the basis of federation or confederation have been reached. In addition to this 
deadlock, Greek Cypriots changed their reunion (Epanenosis) route to the EU.  On 
July 4th, 1990, they appealed to be a member of the EU; however, the EU refused 
them the first time because, according to the EU policy, the Turkish side was 
disqualified for admission into the EU. In 1993, Greek Cypriots made their request to 
the EU once again, and finally, in 1999, during the EU meeting in Helsinki, the Greek 
Cypriots’ application was approved to be put into process. Throughout negotiations 
for the possibility of Greek Cypriots’ membership to the EU, Greece tried very hard 
to press the EU to accept Greek Cypriots in as a member of the European Union. 
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After the Turkish invasion in 1974, Greek Cypriots gained some advantages 
from the situation of the recent history of the island in front of the world. One of the 
positive advantages gained was membership of Greece in the EU because, after their 
entrance into the EU, Greece tried very hard to put the Greek Cypriot community into 
the UN schedule to make them a member of the UN as well. A second positive 
advantage was that Greek Cypriot started getting economic and cultural help from 
their motherland Greece in order to create re-Hellenic nationalism within the Greek 
Cypriot community (Kızılyürek, 2005a). The positive advantages that they gained 
helped them to develop after the partition and to defend themselves in front of the 
world on the Cyprus case. As a result of the motherland’s help there was acceptance 
into the European Union (EU) in 2004. In this sense, the Turkish Cypriot community 
was excluded from the EU and declared to be an illegal state. In addition, embargoes 
were imposed on them because they were blamed for the partition of the island. 
Accepting Cyprus as a member was against the principles of the EU, as long as non-
violent conflict on the basis of ethno nationalism still existed on the island, they did. 
“They have found a strong precedent in the international system for their positions, 
and are the victim of ethnonationalist sentiment on the island, and between Greece 
and Turkey” (Richmond, 1999, p. 53). As is seen, although both communities tried to 
impose negotiation culture in order to solve the ethnic conflict on the basis of 
“…agreeing on a federal solution within the EU sphere of influence…” they could not 
succeed in solving the problem by that and were accepted into the EU without finding 
a solution for the Cyprus problem (Richmond, 1999, p. 53). Overall, although national 
feelings of Greek society were reduced, their target for the island has changed. After 
entering into the EU, Greek Cypriots turned their attention toward their new state 
where they have full control.  
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The Turkish Cypriot Society in Cyprus since 1974 
 While one side of the island was gaining advantages from the world, things 
were going differently for the other side of the island. Eventually, the demographic 
and geographical separation of the island brought a conclusion in which the island had 
been divided into two parts: north and south. Turkish Cypriots who came under the 
influence of the “territorial isolation” by the world settled on the north part of the 
island and Greek Cypriots who became an internationally recognized state in the 
world settled on the south part of the island (Vural and Peristianis, 2008, p. 48). 
Basically, the geographic and demographic separation created fragmentation among 
Cypriot Turks and Cypriot Greeks in the post-1974 (Özen, 2009). Volkan (2008) 
explains this situation in his words as; 
A world opinion accepting the Cypriot Greeks as victims and the 
Cypriot Turks (or Turks in general) as aggressors has been established. 
Although this was perhaps due to the failure of Turkish diplomacy, 
psychologically speaking it might also be due to the Western World’s 
stereotypical perceptions of Turks as the heirs to the Ottomans, who 
were the enemies of the West. Whatever the cause, the Greek side of 
the island was recognized legally as a state by all nations, except 
Turkey, while only Turkey accepted the Turkish side as a legal entity. 
This reality created an invisible enclave for the Cypriot Turks. (p. 11). 
 
 
Eventually, the Turkish part of the island has never gained the advantages that 
the Greek side did, and has remained a less developed region compared to the 
southern part of the island. To some extent, whereas the territory of the Greeks 
received full access to the political and economic benefits of international recognition, 
the territory of Turkish Cypriots became dependent on Turkey for economic, political, 
and military support. This caused the northern part of the island lag behind the 
southern part of the island. In addition, being an unrecognized region resulted in 
“international isolation” and “Turkey’s interference in Turkish Cypriot community 
affairs, economic stagnation, and the colonization of Cyprus by Turkish settlers,” thus 
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preventing the Turkish community from developing itself and catching up with Greek 
Cypriots (cited in Loizides 2007, p. 177). In order to colonize Turkish Cypriots and to 
make them fully dependent on Turkey, the “Turkish Government refused financial aid 
from the UN and did not let Turkish Cypriots take advantages of that opportunity” 
(Attalides, 2003, p. 96). 
 In order to alleviate the current situation of the island, the negotiations started 
right after the partition in 1974 and still continue today. The cease-fire instituted at 
that time continues to exist. While negotiations were in progress between the two 
communities following the year of the partition in 1975, the Turkish Federated State 
of Cyprus was established by the Turkish Cypriot community. After the establishment 
of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots were faced with a 
multiparty system for the first time in their history. In these years, particularly after 
the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, the Turkish leaders 
changed their political ideology from federation to confederation until the Turkish 
Cypriots declared a new state called the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 15th 
November 1983. “The declaration of statehood in 1983 implied not only a desire for 
international recognition, but a promise to be realized domestically,” and also to build 
a self-sustaining liberal state in order to gain fully independence on the island (Lacher 
and Kaymak, 2005, p.32). However, according to the United Nations (UN), the 
declaration of the new state of Turkish Cypriot was against international law and 
“they forced Turkish Cypriots to dismantle the new unrecognized state” and continue 
negotiations with Greek Cypriots (Kızılyürek, 2005a; Kızılyürek, 2005b).  Kızılyürek 
also points out that in addition to the UN’s offer to the Northern Cyprus, the United 
State of America (USA) was also against the newly established state of Turkish 
Cypriot community. For this reason, the USA also asked the Turkish community to 
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step back and continue negotiations with Greek Cypriots to try to find a mutual 
solution that would provide a peaceful environment for all communities of the island 
regardless of ethnicity. The main reason for US involvement was to prevent disputes 
in the Mediterranean area in order to secure the peace and to protect its self-interests 
in that area.  
Moreover, the partition and the newly established state of Turkish Cypriots 
were internationally unacceptable situations because they were against international 
law. As Kızılyürek (2005a) notes, according to the European Union, the only 
recognizable state on the island was the Republic of Cyprus, which was controlled by 
Greek Cypriots.  It can be said that the new “enclave period” started for Turkish 
Cypriots after the partition of the island in 1974, although it took a different form than 
the first enclave period in the 1960s. Volkan (2008) also contends that historical 
developments after the summer of 1974 have continued to traumatize Cypriot Turks 
in a slow and often unrecognized fashion. Therefore, along with all negative progress 
that had characterized the Turkish Cypriot community, Turkish Cypriots decided once 
again to negotiate with Greek Cypriot in order to improve their international situation. 
However, improving the current situation would not be easy for Turkish Cypriots 
because, although one side agreed to some conditions, the other side was against 
them. But each time, Turkish Cypriots seemed to be inconsistent in the negotiations. 
For instance, although Denktash who was the leader of Turkish Cypriots’ community 
adopted as a principle the UN’s proposal for a solution in 1985, the Greek Cypriot 
leader rejected the proposal because “Greek Cypriot negotiation tactics have been 
balanced between the need to pander to international opinion --which supports the 
bicommunal, bizonal framework -- and local opinion, on the part of the nationalists, 
or simply a continuation of the status quo.” (Richmond, 1999, p. 46).  
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While on one hand the political issues were ongoing and between Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, each community started their new lives separately 
on the divided island. Even though the Greek side was gaining advantages and 
developing itself, the Turkish Cypriots were faced with an unexpected surprise on the 
northern part of the island. Even though the arrival of the Turkish army into the island 
brought happiness to Turkish Cypriots by rescuing them and also by drawing 
boundaries of a new state with the promised security, freedom, democracy, liberation, 
and other presumed benefits, life in the northern part of the island ultimately 
disappointed them. These expectations of help from the Turkish motherland were the 
main reasons for seeking help from them since the first enclave period in 1963; 
however, they received nothing but a problematic life from the Turkey after the 
partition. According to Papadakis (2005), 
Those (Turkish Cypriots NM) who remembered described how 
initially they felt overjoyed with the arrival of the Turkish army in 
1974. Their lives in the 1960s, when they were locked up in enclaves 
under constant fear, were not lives. In 1974, they were worried when 
Greek Cypriot extremists came to power with the coup, some of whom 
had become heroes by killing Turkish Cypriots in the late 1960s. They 
thought their lives were over. The arrival of the Turkish army brought 
new hope and their own state with the promise of safety and liberation. 
But all the promises of freedom, democracy and prosperity were 
betrayed. (p. 200). 
 
 
 The reason for Turkish intervention was to provide safety and better living 
standards for Turkish Cypriots by taking them out of the Greek Cypriots hegemony 
and by providing them freedom, democracy, and liberation; however, nothing went 
through as expected. Eventually, the disappointments of Turkish Cypriots, led many 
of them to blame themselves for being blind until 1974 by expecting help from 
Turkey (Papadakis, 2005). Volkan (2008) sums up this frustration by stating, “After 
experiencing an initial increased “we-ness,” and exaggerated nationalistic feelings 
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and excitement over “being free” during the years following 1974, large-group 
identity splits began to appear clearly in TRNC” (p. 28). Therefore, the changes for 
Turkish Cypriots after 1974 became clear and this would gradually be reflected in a 
different nationalist ideology of Turkish Cypriots. 
While Turkish Cypriots were frustrated by lack of support from Turkey, they 
were simultaneously forced to be Turkized by starting to replace all Greek names with 
Turkish names after they moved to the northern part of Cyprus in 1974. Although this 
policy was put into effect starting with the enclave period in 1963, Turkey focused on 
Turkizing Turkish Cypriots purposefully after 1974 in order to colonize them and get 
full control of them. However, after facing disappointments in the post-1974 period, 
imposed Turkishness did not satisfy most Turkish Cypriots. Following this new 
implementation, each family was compelled to choose a new Turkish family name on 
the basis of Kemalist reforms in Turkey, in which each family was supposed to have a 
Turkish family name. However, Turkish Cypriots were still using their fathers’ names 
as a family name until Turkey interceded in the island in 1974. This was another step 
of imposing the seeds of “Turkishness” among Turkish Cypriots. Eventually, Turkey 
started organizing everything on the basis of “Turkishness” in order to take control of 
the northern part of the island. After the partition, a large number of Turks were 
brought to the northern part of the divided island to impose Turkism on Turkish 
Cypriots. However, the new people brought new problems to the Turkish Cypriot 
community because these new inhabitants and Turkish Cypriots were different in 
many ways, including culturally and linguistically (different dialect of Turkish 
language) from each other.  
In order to impose “Turkism” among the Turkish Cypriots, the new 
administration of the Turkish Cypriot community was trying to enforce idea that 
134 
 
everyone on the northern part of island was Turkish. Some Turkish Cypriots refused 
to accept this new political ideology and made their own statement along the lines of 
“I am a Turkish Cypriot and it is my right to live in my country with my own separate 
identity” (cited in Kızılyürek, 2005b, p. 250). Volkan (2008) summarizes this general 
sentiment of Turkish Cypriots after 1974 as: 
There are Turks who defensively feel more Westernized and superior 
to the Turks who settled on the island from mainland Turkey after 
1974. And there are those who emphasize being Cypriots over being 
Turks. There are simply “Cypriots” who feel closer to Cypriot Greeks 
than to mainland Turks, in spite of being rejected by the Cypriot 
Greeks again and again. (p. 27). 
 
While these problems were occurring on the northern part of the island, the 
new generation of Cypriot Turks started changing their philosophy of life and gaining 
a new voice against Turkish nationalism step by step in the post-1974 years. The main 
reason for developing rival nationalist feelings against Turkish nationalism was 
because the disappointment of Turkish Cypriots that had been raised after the 
partition. Turkish Cypriots gradually started leaving the ideology of “taksim” and 
developing a new ideology on the basis of Cypriotism. The new generation of the 
northern island developed a different worldviews (including working class, 
bourgeoisie class, leftists and rightists) that focused on Cyriocentrism in order to 
differentiate themselves from new Turkish inhabitants of the island and to protect 
themselves against the assimilation by Turkey. More specifically, while the left wing 
Turkish Cypriots were identifying themselves as “Cypriots” to justify their new 
nationalist struggle, which was “peace on the island,” most right wing members of the 
bourgeoisie class were identifying themselves as “Cypriots” to distinguish themselves 
from the new citizens of Northern Cyprus and to differentiate themselves from the 
new inhabitants on the basis of social classes (Kızılyürek, 2005b). However, this 
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situation led to a tendency to discriminate, which created “otherization” against the 
Turkish population who came to the island after 1974 (Kızılyürek, 2005b). At the 
same time this otherization created opposition to “taksim” (Ibid).  
One of the reasons for developing an opposition to Turkey was that Turkish 
Cypriots became second-class citizens in their own country, particularly those who 
were supporting “peace on the island” and were against “taksim and enosis,” although 
they thought that the Turkish military was there to “protect their rights,” (Kızılyürek, 
2005b). Moreover, those Turkish Cypriots who were leftist were treated differently as 
a result of their thoughts and political views, in order to persuade them to give up 
their aim to create a “Turkish state” on the island. They were put into different social 
classes and treated unequally on the post-1974 island. This situation also caused 
partisanship over the northern part of the island. A large proportion of Turkish 
Cypriots who still believed in peace remained unemployed in their own country. On 
the other hand, Turkish Cypriots who supported the right wing and people who came 
from Turkey after 1974 were usually hired because their political thoughts and beliefs 
were the same, or at least similar, with Turkey’s. To a large extent, people were 
divided into two distinct groups on the basis of their political ideologies, left and right 
wings, which created two rival groups in a small territory.  
Another unexpected issue after the partition on the northern part of the island 
involved housing and employment policies, which were “inequitably deployed” and 
which triggered discomfort in the Turkish Cypriot community once again (Kızılyürek, 
2005a, p. 292). Although the Turkish who were brought to Cyprus after the partition 
obtained land, houses, and jobs, which made them better off economically compared 
to their lives back their home in Turkey, most of the Turkish Cypriots who moved 
from South to North were mistreated. These immigrants of could not even consider 
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owning a portion of the property that they used to have before the partition, and most 
of them who were leftist became poorer than before in their own country. Political 
discrimination emerged in the Turkish Cypriot community, although they had never 
faced these kinds of problems before the partition of 1974. Along with the inequality 
in the northern island, Turkish Cypriots started viewing the Republic of Turkey and 
Turkish immigrants, who were imported into the island after the partition, as enemies 
but these were not unilateral feelings. As Kızılyürek (2005b) notes, after facing all 
these unexpected issues after the partition, they stood by “Cypriotsm,” even though 
Turkish Cypriots stood by “Turkishness” while Hellenism was on the rise against 
them (p. 259). 
Besides the partisanship, which caused the unemployment problem within the 
Turkish Cypriot community, the economy could not be developed in northern Cyprus, 
which was also an underlying factor behind the housing and unemployment problems 
throughout the northern part of the island. In the post-1974 years, the Greek Cypriot 
community succeeded in rebuilding its economy and reconstructing its own industry; 
however, Turkish Cypriots failed to do the same on their part of the island. In this 
sense, as a result of partisanship and lack of industry in the north of Cyprus, the 
unemployment problem increased in the northern part of the island. As a result of the 
rise of the unemployment in the Turkish Cypriot community, many Turkish Cypriots 
migrated to other countries, including the United Kingdom and Australia, and left 
their own country in the hands of Turks who had arrived from Turkey in the post-
1974 period.  Richmond explains this situation by stating that “the Turkish Cypriot 
side was now faced with assimilation into Turkey, which, although true to the 
ethnonationalist ideology, would not improve the lot of the Turkish Cypriot 
community” (Richmond, 1999, p. 47). All this progress created anxiety, fear, and 
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worries about the future of the Turkish Cypriot community while they were expecting 
a future in a peaceful environment and created a situation in which many of them left 
their own country and became refugees in other countries in order to find a better life.  
Beyond the politically based problems, there were also culturally based 
problems that had appeared between Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish (from Turkey) 
after 1974. Even though socialization consists of being with and a part of others in the 
same environment, Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people could not socialize well. 
Turkish Cypriots even started seeing themselves as owners of the island and did not 
accept the Turkish as islanders. Basically, they both failed to develop a common 
ethno-cultural environment on the northern part of the island. The main reason for the 
failure was that things had changed among Turkish Cypriots and they started 
discovering and identifying the differences between the Turkish and themselves after 
the partition (Kızılyürek, 2005a). For instance, the two communities in northern 
Cyprus distinctly separated from each other by having different customs, attitudes, 
traditions, life standards, etc. According to Kızılyürek (2005b), daily life was 
precisely the problem because each group was sharing different customs on the basis 
of their historical narratives that were reflected differently in cultural elements and in 
turn, shaped their identities differently. Eventually, unity and solidarity were not 
achieved in the expected way between Turkish and Turkish Cypriots on the northern 
part of the island; instead, social unrest between them emerged, and this characterizes 
Cyprus today.  
Obviously, the new situation caused fragmentation among these groups. For 
this reason, Turkish Cypriots, mostly left wing, realigned into groups where people 
identified themselves as “Cypriots” instead of as “Turkish,” to advocate Cypriots 
rights and thoughts, and to keep Turkish Cypriots’ culture alive. Turkish Cypriots 
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established new organizations including KOGEF --which was a left wing 
organization-- and Halk Der -which was a right wing organization. Turkish Cypriots 
leftists generally concentrated on building a struggle on the basis of Cypriotism on the 
island in order to build Cypriocentrizm by focusing on “culture.” The reason for 
focusing on the cultural factors was because Turkish Cypriots had been becoming 
very introverted and experiencing cultural shock, which led them to drift away from 
their culture after 1974 (Kızılyürek, 2005b).  
Although KOGEF and Halk Der had different political views, their shared 
purpose was to struggle for “Cypriotism” and “peace it Cyprus.” Whereupon, the 
KOGEF charged itself to start a new cultural movement by creating some events and 
organizations in order to develop consciousness of Cyrpriotism regardless of 
Turkishness, especially after the new state of Turkish Cypriots was established post-
1974. In order to make Turkish Cypriots perceive the Cypriot consciousness, the new 
cultural movement was focused on Cypriot folk dance, Cypriot’s songs and lullabies, 
and the Turkish Cypriot dialect as cultural factors, which they believed would help to 
unite Turkish Cypriots (Kızılyürek, 2005b). 
Besides the domestic issues of the Turkish Cypriots, on an international level, 
they had been subject to political and economic embargoes in many areas, which was 
one of the Greek Cypriots’ victories after the partition. “The political debate among 
Greek Cypriots centered on how to gain concessions from the Turkish Cypriot side 
under the new framework, and in order to do this the Greek Cypriot side establishes 
an economic blockade against the Turkish Cypriot community and began to wage 
potent diplomatic war against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side” (Richmond, 
1999, p. 46). Basically, living in an unrecognized country provides its people invisible 
lives as they were not able to have a passport, to travel freely, or to have an industry 
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to develop a trade sector (Papadakis, 2005). Political and economic embargoes 
imposed on Turkish Cypriots included not being recognized by international 
organizations, not being able to trade directly with any other countries in the world, 
not being able to send and receive mail to the Turkish side of the island after the 
partition, and also not being able to travel/fly directly to any other countries except 
Turkey. Travel documents issued to the Cypriot Turks by the northern Cypriot 
Turkish authorities were not recognized by the international community. People have 
to fly through Turkey to get to the Turkish side of the island or to the rest of the 
world. The same process existed for mail, also. For instance, if a Cypriot Turk wanted 
to send or receive mail, he had to add under his address “Via Mersin 10 Turkey”; 
otherwise, he would never be able to send or receive the mail. “Cypriot Turks were 
not allowed to compete in sports in foreign countries (except in local competitions in 
Turkey)” (Volkan, 2008, para. 12). However, there are some exceptional situations, in 
which Turkish Cypriots are not allowed to compete with Turkish teams. For instance, 
professional football teams are not allowed to have any match by UEFA. As Volkan 
(2008) points out, “The northern part of Cyprus is inhabited by people who do not 
have typical human rights, who do not have a large-group identity that is legally 
accepted by billions of others surrounding them (except Turks on the mainland) and 
who, in a sense, are second-class human beings. After living in actual enclaves for 
eleven years, the Cypriot Turks from 1974 to the present time have continued to live 
in an invisible enclave” (p. 12).  
As a result, Turkish Cypriots have been paying the price since 1974 because 
they have been facing political, economic, and sociocultural problems throughout 
their history including both the pre-1974 and post-1974 eras on the island (Kızılyürek, 
2005a). The Turkish Cypriots realized that the post-1983 goal for independence and 
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international recognition was unattainable while, at the same time, they risked losing 
EU accession (cited in Loizides 2007, p. 181). “Nevertheless, it is clear that the war 
during the summer of 1974 massively traumatized Cypriot Greeks. The most 
traumatizing event for the Cypriot Turks, however, was a long-lasting, eleven-year 
state of humiliation, dehumanization and annihilation anxiety, in spite of their 
continued hope that one day mainland Turks would save them” (Volkan, 2008, para. 
10). However, in the end, the Turkish militarily intervention was not a solution for the 
Turkish Cypriot’s future as it was hoped by Turkish Cypriots that it would be. In 
conclusion, Turkish Cypriots could not attain a better life, and they have been still 
struggling for their future with Turkey instead of with Greek Cypriots. The scenario 
of assimilation of Turkish Cypriots of the island still exists, but the characters are 
different. 
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PART THREE 
 Theoretical Review and Conclusion 
Chapter Seven: Ethnic Identity, Nationalism and Their Development in Cyprus 
Historical events in Cyprus have played a very important role in the 
institutionalization of nationalist movements and the political conflict between 
Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot nationalist movements on the island of Cyprus. 
Evidently, “internal and external realities and conditions played an important role in 
the eventual creation of these rival nationalisms” and different ethno-national 
identities in the island that caused ethnic and geographical partitions among the 
Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities (Morag, 2004, p. 622). In order to make the 
case of the “Cyprus problem” understandable, the sociological elements of Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism of the island were analyzed in this study in 
relation to some fundamental elements of the conflict, including (1) the importance of 
geographical location of the island, (2) the process of modernization, (3) the internal 
impact of colonial powers, including the Ottoman and British Empires on the 
development of nationalism on the island, (4) the class structure of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot societies and their direct and indirect effects on the development of 
nationalism on the island, (5) the historical clash between two major societies of the 
island and within each societies between right and left, (6) the strong relations 
between inhabitants of the island and the motherlands of Greece and Turkey, (7) inter-
communal relations between Greek and Turkish communities on the basis of 
traditional animosity and their effects on the process of the development of Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot nationalism on the island, (8) the involvement of third parties 
including the United States of America (USA), in relations to their self-interests, the 
stabilization of international power particularly in the surrounded of the 
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Mediterranean area and between two NATO members Turkey and Greece, and (9) the 
clash between inhabitants and current nationalisms in the motherlands are discussed 
in order to make clear and more understandable nationalism itself and the 
identification formation with reference to the specific case of the “Cyprus problem.”  
Besides the influence of these external factors, several other factors influenced 
the ongoing divisions between the two communities. Among these were the 
following: demographic changes on the island (Muslims entering the island after the 
conquest of the Ottomans), different sociocultural factors (including Islam and 
Christianity), the educational system, different languages (Turkish and Greece), the 
economy, class factors, strong ties with the two motherlands (Turkey and Greece), 
separate domestic politics of Turkish and Greek Cypriots (taksim and enosis), the 
opposing nationalist organizations of Turkish and Greek Cypriots (TMT and EOKA), 
and the establishment of statehood in 1960 were all factors that paved the way for the 
development of two separate national movements and caused the development of two 
rival nationalist identities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots which set the island’s 
current position. All these internal and external factors played a very important role in 
developing nationalism on the island. Although all these factors played a significantly 
important role in the creation of nationalism among the inhabitants of the island and 
paved the way for the position of today’s situation, the major factor in the creation of 
the Cyprus conflict lies in the constitution of the “Millet System” of the Ottoman 
Empire right after the annexation of the island by Ottomans in 1571. The Millet 
system divided the inhabitants of the island based on their religious view and put them 
into different categories—Muslims and non-Muslims—and treated them differently. 
Since the arrival of the Ottomans to the island, inhabitants of the island, depending on 
their religion, acquired a different character and paved the way for the creation of two 
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rival ethnic identities and two different national movements. The rest of the factors, 
internal and external, exacerbated the process of the development of the conflict 
environment on the island.  
Besides all these factors, the powerful effect of the educational system on both 
ethnic groups could not be ignored during the development of nationalism and the 
creation of two rival ethno-national identities on the island. Obviously, considering 
the role of the educational system in the process of the development of separate 
nationalist movements and rival ethno national identities would make it easier to 
understand how the two major communities of the island have gradually become 
enemies and why their relations turned into a violent conflict, especially right after the 
annexation of the island by the British and the establishment of colonial rule in 1878. 
Basically, nationalist ideologies on the basis of primordialism (same blood, language, 
religions, and culture) over Cyprus played an important role in the creation of the 
rival ethno-nationalist identities, although the Western type of constructed state of 
Cyprus established in 1960 provided common citizenship under the name of 
“Cypriotism” and provided equality (shared power in the administration of 1960 state) 
for its citizens. Obviously, separate ethno-national identities of the ethnic 
communities of the island always created problems throughout of the island’s history 
since the 1500s. To some extent, having different kinds of national aims for the same 
land by two major communities of the island, along with intervention by third parties, 
exacerbated the nationalist tensions among ethnic groups until the partition was 
completed in 1974. Although the island was ethnically and geographically divided 
into two parts in 1974, historical narratives of the island have still played a significant 
role in shaping the current forms of nationalism among Turkish and Greek Cypriots, 
especially in the post 1974 years. For instance, in the Republic of Cyprus where 
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Greek Cypriots live, the birthday of the nationalist organization “EOKA” has been 
celebrated every year in a sign of nationalist celebration on the part of Greek 
Cypriots. Another example of nationalism in the southern part of the island is the use 
of flags. Anyone can see flags everywhere they go in the south region of the island. In 
other words, whenever Turkish Cypriots go to the Greek side of the island for some 
reason (for instance sightseeing), they can see Greek flags everywhere. In parallel 
with the example of the southern part of the island, on the northern side of the island, 
in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), there is a huge Turkish Cypriot 
flag that can be seen from the entrance of the border in the capital city Nicosia. 
Whenever Greek Cypriots pass the border from the South to the North, they definitely 
see the enormous Turkish Cypriot flag on the highest mountain of northern Cyprus. 
Lately, flags of Turkish Cypriots and the flags of Turkey in the region of TRNC can 
be seen on the top of hills in most places, particularly in the Karpass peninsula where 
a lot of Greek Cypriots usually prefer to visit. Another example of nationalism in the 
post 1974 years in the TRNC is the celebration of “20th July,” which is a day when the 
island ethnically and geographically divided in order to rescue Turkish Cypriots from 
the Greek junta. Turkish Cypriots celebrate the day of the Turkish intervention 20
th
 of 
July, 1974 every year, whereas the other side of the island considers it as a black day 
in the history of Cyprus. Obviously, the current form of nationalism of Cyprus 
between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots was not an invention of recent history 
of the island. On the contrary, both nationalist ideologies had been formed on the 
basis of the policies that were pursued by ethnic communities on the island under the 
influence of the nationalist ideologies of the motherlands over the last two centuries. 
In other words, although the recent forms of nationalism on both sides of the island 
have been shaped by the current politics of both communities, they are an extension 
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of the first forms of nationalist ideologies established by both Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots.  
After the British came to power on the island in the late nineteenth century, it 
can be clearly seen that the changes of the political system and social hierarchical 
structures of the island on the basis of the colonial policy of the British paved the way 
for developing nationalist feelings within two ethnic communities of Cyprus as an 
extension of the motherlands’ nationalist ideologies. Along with the beginning of the 
British colonial administration over the island, the traditional structure of the Ottoman 
authority structurally changed, and these changes directly affected the elites of the 
island, particularly the Greek Cypriot elites who engaged in the trade sector and had 
become the most powerful class of the island under the Ottoman administration. The 
Orthodox Church also lost its representative power after the British came to the island 
because the new administration wanted to dominate the inhabitants directly. The 
Orthodox Christian Church of the island was established under Ottoman rule in the 
late 1500s and gained representative power of religion under the millet system of the 
Ottomans, which provided non-Muslims some privileges, such as freedom, until the 
British came to the power. Along with the Millet system, the structure of the political 
system, the legal system, and the educational system of Muslims and non-Muslims 
had been organized according to their religions and ethnic ties. However, the 
sociocultural and politically based internal developments among both communities, 
which evolved throughout the period of the Ottoman Empire, changed directions and 
affected the separation of Muslims and non-Muslims on the island. The religion-based 
differentiation under the Millet System of the Ottomans between inhabitants of the 
island created two rival ethnic identities and gradually started shaping the future 
position of nationalist conflict of Cyprus. As an example, the Christian bourgeoisie 
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class who controlled the trade sector were developing themselves parallel to the 
process of modernization.  
The importance of ethnicity and other forms of identity increased among the 
Greek Christian community, which caused the development of an extreme nationalist 
group against others, especially against the Turkish Muslims on the island, at the 
beginning of the 1900s. In other words, as a result of modernization, people’s 
expectations in many areas, including politics, economics and sociocultural areas, had 
been transformed from the traditional level to the modern level, which caused a 
separation between religious groups of the island and paved the way for the creation 
of a nationalist group by non-Muslims against others. On the other hand, while Greek 
Christians were modernizing, Turkish Muslims were still a part of a ruling class under 
the effect of the traditional system and not in line with developments of the modern 
world. They suffered as a result of their insulation from new trends and customs of 
modernization, which weakened them vis-à-vis Greek Christians on the island at the 
end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. Actually, as 
a result of naming a traditional community, Turkish Muslims continued living in 
limited life standards and following religious-based regimes that prevented them from 
developing nationalist feelings against others. Obviously, unequal developments on 
the basis of modernization created two different communities on the island, which 
caused problems in their relationship in the long term and eventually turned their 
relations into violent conflict.   
 Although a new political system was introduced to the island with the arrival 
of the British in 1878, Greek Cypriots saw this as an opportunity for their national 
ideal (union with Greece). The new political system, to some extent, replaced the 
millet system and aimed to provide equality under the same system of governance for 
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both communities. Under Ottoman rule, communities on the island were treated on 
the basis of their religions instead of on an equal basis. The British allowed the Greek 
community to put their nationalist ideologies into effect and be a part of the Greek 
motherland. The British also provided opportunities for both communities to develop 
a print media in order to express their political beliefs and opinions. This opened a 
new door for the Greek community of the island to achieve their mission by using 
media as a tool for spreading and imposing national aims throughout the Greek 
Cypriot community. Along with the growth of literacy among communities of the 
island, people, especially Greeks, started using the media, such as newspapers, as a 
tool to develop nationalist feelings. In addition, teachers were also playing a 
significant role in imposing and spreading ethno-nationalism among members of 
ethnic groups in order to maintain their ethnic ties and to keep alive their unique 
ethnic identities by underscoring the differences between them and others in the 
island. It can be clearly seen that “the main mechanisms of nation -building were the 
educational system- which was in the hands of the Orthodox church – the activities of 
voluntary associations formed by intellectuals mostly educated in Greece, and the 
Greek consulate” that was a sign of the ethnonationalist conflict on the island that 
would lead to a division of the island later in its history (Cited in Mavratsas, 1996, p. 
87).  
After the educational systems of both communities had become a tool for 
spreading national feelings among member of their ethnic groups, the British 
administration realized the coming danger and tried to get full control of the 
educational system of both communities during its administration to prevent the 
development of ethno-nationalism in an attempt to maintain its position in the island. 
Both communities used the schools as an instrument of spreading nationalism and 
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imposing ethnic identities among the respective population by following a traditional-
based educational system instead of secular-based system in order to dominate people 
more easily. The curricula of the educational system of the Greek community 
emphasized the very strong primordial ties with motherland Greece and taught the 
language of Socrates, the Bible and Byzantium to students in order to develop a 
literate and a nationalist society for the Greek inhabitants of the island. As an example 
of nationalist Greek Cypriot society, Greek society denied the teaching and learning 
of the Turkish language throughout their history on the island, although the island was 
bilingual. In other words, the Turkish language was never put into their curricula even 
though there were some other elective language courses in the Greek schools. In order 
to develop a literate and nationalist society according to Greek Cypriots, the 
educational system needed to be in their hands, because education was the easiest way 
for them to instill Greek irredentist nationalism throughout Cyprus in order to fight 
for the Greek Cypriot’s right of self-determination, which was to unite with 
motherland Greece. On the other hand, Muslim students were taught the languages of 
the Qur’an and of poetry. These languages were Turkish, Arabic, and Persian. 
Comparing the Turkish curricula and Greek curricula, it could be said that the Turkish 
were a little bit more flexible than the Greeks because the Greek language could be 
found in the Turkish schools’ curricula.  
Also, in most of the mixed villages, Turkish people spoke Greek in order to 
communicate with their neighbors. Basically, it can be said that Greek Cypriots were 
more nationalist than Turkish Cypriots throughout their history on the island. 
However, the Muslims schools’ curricula emphasized the strong bonds with the 
Republic of Turkey after the Turkish republic was declared in 1923. Additionally, the 
curriculum of the Turkish community of the island was changed on the basis of the 
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Kemalist reforms of the new state. Along with ethnic closeness toward the Turkish 
Republic, the identity of the Muslims was replaced with “Turkish” on the island in 
line with what was also occurring in Turkey. As Bryant (2002) states, “Turkish 
identity was self-consciously constructed for them by Ataturk in the republican 
period” (p. 525). In this sense, it is clear that the idea of “Turkishness,” which was a 
recently constructed identity, was a new adopted ethnic concept within the Turkish 
Cypriot community at the beginning of the twentieth century. At the same time, the 
primordial ties of the Greek Cypriots with Greece on the basis of blood and descent 
had existed for thousands of years on the island. In other words, the effect of both 
motherlands’ nationalism shows that “…the Muslims came to identify themselves as 
Turks and the Orthodox Christians as Greeks…” in different time periods; however, 
at the end, the differentiation of ethnic identities caused two rival nationalist 
movements on the basis of ethnicity (Papadakis, 2008, p. 139). In this sense, it could 
be said that “ethnicity, thus, began to be politicized and to replace religion as the main 
identifying attribute” (Mavratsas, 1996, p 87).  
As a result of the close ties to the motherland, Greek Cypriot nationalism was 
developed almost a century earlier than Turkish Cypriot nationalism. Since the 
beginning of the development of Greek Cypriot nationalism, Greek Cypriots, 
particularly the Church of Cyprus, struggled against the British colonial rule for 
decolonization of the island in order to have unification with Greece. On the other 
hand, the Turkish community stayed for a long time under the Ottoman influence until 
the declaration of the Republic of Turkey. The establishment of the Turkish Republic 
basically paved the way for the development of nationalist movements in Turkish 
Cypriot community as well. They became closer to the Turkish Republic by adopting 
and putting into effect the Kemalist reforms of the Republic of Turkey (new 
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alphabets, numbers, dress code, etc.) in order to catch up with the modern world and 
to attract the attention of Turkey to the current Cyprus problem. Turkish Cypriots also 
adopted a national movement in line with the ideology of the Republic of Turkey in 
order to maintain their existence on the island. Actually, Turkish Cypriots were 
obliged to develop a contra-nationalism against Greek Cypriots and adopted Turkish 
nationalism in order to develop their nationalist movement to struggle for their future 
on the island. However, along with the development of the Turkish nationalist 
movement, the serious problems between the two communities started and after 
awhile turned into violent conflict in the twentieth century.  
Nationalist movements of both communities became strong organizations in 
the middle of twentieth century, particularly during the struggle for independence 
against the British colonial rule. First, the Greek Cypriot nationalist organization 
EOKA was established during the 1950s for achieving enosis (the unification with 
Greece). Along with the establishment of the armed organization EOKA, Greek 
Cypriot nationalism reached its peak at this time. On the other side, Turkish Cypriot 
nationalism was born as a reaction to Greek Cypriot nationalism. As a result of the 
development of nationalist movements of the Turkish Cypriot community, the 
ideology of their struggle was born, which was called Taksim (partition in the island 
and unification with Turkey) as an answer to Greek Cypriot ideology of enosis. On 
the other hand, following the establishment of the Greek Cypriot armed organization 
EOKA, the Turkish Cypriot organization TMT was established to respond the actions 
of EOKA.  
In 1960, when the island became independent in a united form under the name 
of the Republic of Cyprus, both ethnic communities became more nationalist through 
the educational system, religious leaders, and written media until 1974, when the 
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biggest violent conflict broke out between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus undermined the aspirations of the Greek 
Cypriots to achieve enosis and forced them to live under the same roof with Turkish 
Cypriots and also to adopt “Cypriotism” “in the form of “ethnic community 
identification: Greek Cypriotism and Turkish Cypriotism, respectively” (Loizides, 
2007, p. 174). This case was an unexpected situation for an Eastern type of 
nationalism (Greek Cypriot nationalism) to share the administrative system with 
Turkish Cypriots who were a minority on the island according to Greeks. By 
extension, Greek Cypriots were not very comfortable with living together with 
Turkish Cypriots and sharing the collective identity with Turkish inhabitants of the 
island because they had different blood, language, religions, culture and historical 
origins.  
However, along with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the form of 
identity “Cypriotism” was constructed in order to create a civic society on the island. 
However, from the beginning, both communities were against the idea of 
“Cypriotism” because both Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities strongly believed 
that the given features, including “being born into a particular religious community, 
speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following 
particular social practices” were important to be a part of a specific group rather than 
a constructed group (Geertz, 1963, p. 109-110). As Mavratsas (1996) states, “The 
main internal opposition against Greek-Cypriot nationalism has come from what may 
be broadly called “Cypriotism,” a political ideology and cultural discourse that, by 
placing the center of attention on Cyprus, rather than the Greek nation, functions as a 
territorial nationalism with strong civic elements” (p. 87). Cypriotism, thus, “does not 
deny the Greek or Turkish ethnicity of the inhabitants of the island; it stresses, 
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however, that their ethnic identity and, thus, on a more general level, their culture, has 
also acquired sui generis features that not only differentiate the Greek and the Turkish 
Cypriots from the Greeks and the Turks but also create some common ground 
between the two communities of the island” (Mavratsas, 1996, p. 87). Although it did 
not deny their ethnicity, both communities were not satisfied with the idea of sharing 
the same identity under the same roof. Evidently, both ethnic communities on the 
island were closer to the primordial approach by seeing themselves more closely 
related to their motherlands than to each other. Based on this description, and 
according to Kızılyürek (2005a), the case of Cyprus constitutes an “anomaly” because 
the new state of Cyprus and the newly constructed identity of Cypriotism indicated  
that the island “has its own sui generis character and, thus, must be viewed as an 
entity which is independent from both of the motherlands of the two main 
communities of the island – i.e., Greece and Turkey.” However, neither community 
agreed with that idea (Kızılyürek, 2005a; Mavratsas, 1996, p. 87). 
Besides the newly constructed identity for inhabitants, there were a couple of 
other reforms in the constitution of the new state that caused new problems between 
Turkish and Greek inhabitants of the island. Those changes were to provide equal 
rights for both communities. However, these new laws of the new constitution of the 
new state did not meet the expectations of either community, particularly the Greek 
Cypriots’ expectations, because they were still focusing on their national aim of 
enosis. Greek Cypriots became more nationalist and turned their ideologies into 
violent action right after the new state was established because all these new laws of 
the constitution were against the idea of enosis; sharing the power of the state equally 
with Turkish Cypriots was totally against their political ideology. However, Greek 
Cypriots started gaining benefit from the new state in a short while after the 
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establishment of the state. In addition, the new situation brought a new idea to Greek 
Cypriots, which was to use the administration of the republic according to their  
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needs to achieve Enosis. In order to achieve their new idea, they had to find a way to 
exclude the Turkish community from the administration of the new state to gain the 
full power of it. Obviously, Greek Cypriots were seeking to build up a state based on 
the ethno-cultural dynamics by which Turkish Cypriots were excluded in order to 
serve its own rights. Considering “the ethno-cultural vision of community is based on 
the belief of common ancestry and ethno-cultural sameness,” the seeds of Eastern 
type of nationalism, which is based on primordialism, within Greek Cypriots cannot 
be ignored (Vural and Peristianis, 2008, p. 42). As a result, once Greek Cypriots 
realized that the new state would open new doors to achieve their national idea, they 
chose to adopt the republic. In this sense, it is clear that the strategy of Greek 
irredentism was a way to draw the fate of their struggle in the island by using the 
republic as a tool for their national aim. Eventually, this led to the idea of 
monopolizing the Republic of Cyprus without Turkish Cypriots. According to Eastern 
nationalism, multi-ethnic nations usually ignore minorities and their rights. Multi-
ethnic Eastern nations usually face political violence by citizens of the nation state 
when they exclude minorities from the system. In 1963, political violence among 
citizens (both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots) of Cyprus flared. In three years after 
the first violent conflict after the establishment of the republic, Greek Cypriots 
reached their aim and the independent Republic of Cyprus became a symbol of 
Hellenic Nationalism (Kızılyürek, 2005a). Along with that, the Turkish were excluded 
from the governance of the state and moved into enclaves until 1974. 
As a result of these extremist nationalist struggles of both communities, the 
island was ethnically and geographically divided into two parts, north and south, in 
1974. After these violent events and ethnic separation of the communities of the 
island, the two forms of nationalism continued to strengthen their meanings in 
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different forms into their separate territories. Along with the 1974 partition, both 
communities used the past events of the island to maintain their rights for the island in 
order to strengthen their nationalist ideologies. Overall, as a result of the ethno-
nationalist conflict, the island divided into two parts by emphasizing the differences 
of ethnic ties of both communities. After the partition, the nationalist ideologies of 
both communities changed their meaning and their target comparing them in pre-1974 
years because, basically, after the division of the island, the mission of enosis would 
never have a chance to be completed. Actually, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish 
Cypriot nationalist struggles developed new paths after the partition in 1974. For 
instance, Greek Cypriots adopted the Republic of Cyprus in order to rule themselves 
rather than becoming a part of Greece. In other words, the partition of 1974 was a 
signal of the end of the struggle for enosis among the Greek community of the island. 
Greek Cypriots changed their political ideology and adopted the Republic and 
Cypriotsim in the post 1974 years.  
Additionally, after the partition, the idea of nationalism and Cypriotism 
“corresponds to the political opposition between right and left” in each community 
(Mavratsas, 1996, p. 92). To put it another way, as Papadakis (2008) states, “For 
much of the twentieth century another conflict persisted, this time within each ethnic 
group between forces of the right and the left, with its own record of violence against 
the left” (p. 131). For instance, while the right wing of the Turkish community was 
still seeking to be part of Turkey, the leftist wing of the Turkish community was 
supporting the idea of reunification with Greek Cypriots of the island and Cypriotism. 
For instance, while the right wing of Turkish Cypriots were Turkocentrists who 
supported Turkishness, the leftists Turkish Cypriots were Cypriocentrism who 
supported Cypriotism (Kızılyürek, 2005b). One of the main reasons for the 
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development of leftist idea was because of the way Turkey treated them after the 
partition.  Although, after the partition, both communities started to live in their new 
homes, the Turkish people did not really find what they were expecting (i.e., safety, 
democracy, liberty) from Turkey. With all the disappointments of Turkish Cypriots, 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established in 1983, which is only 
recognized by Turkey. However, on the other side of the island, Greek Cypriots 
started their new lives under the state of the Republic of Cyprus, which is recognized 
by the world, and they continued gaining advantages from the current situation of the 
island.  
Although the partition of the island brought happiness to the Turkish Cypriot 
community from the beginning, it still brought a lot of disappointment, anxiety, and 
fear for their future by mainland Turkey. The interference of Turkey in many areas of 
social and economic life and colonization of new Turkish settlers on the island 
prevented the development of the northern region of the island, while the southern 
part of the island continued to developing. Obviously, considering the lack of the 
access to the economic and politic benefits of international recognition, the Turkish 
Cypriot community became economically and politically dependent on Turkey, which 
caused a lot of problems for the Turkish Cypriot community in the post-1974 years. 
As a result of this negative effect on the Turkish Cypriot community, “the term 
“motherland” is no longer used for Turkey, while the terms “our island” or “our 
country” are often used for Cyprus” (cited in Mavratsas, 1996, p. 138). Additionally, 
people in northern Cyprus started to use “Cypriots” instead of “Turks” to describe 
themselves and to underline the difference between Turkish people and themselves.  
Overall, it could be historically argued that Greek Cypriot irredentist nationalism 
gradually developed as a reaction to the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the 
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British Empire to fulfill the purpose for enosis/union with Greece starting from 1850s 
until the middle of 1900s. The Greek Orthodox Church of the island played a very 
important role in the development of irredentist national ideology of Greek Cypriots, 
Table 5: Western and Eastern Concepts of Nationalism as Applied to Greek and 
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which was a part of Hellenic nationalism (national liberation movement of Greece). 
Greek irredentism, based on “Megali Idea” (big idea, major mission), was developed 
to encompass all Greeks by sharpening and imposing national feelings and national 
identity within Greek societies including Greek Cypriots of Cyprus to maintain and 
safeguard the political unity of Hellene – Orthodox society. Overall, as mentioned in 
historical narratives of Cyprus, the ethnocentric idea of Greece, which is also called 
Hellenic nationalism, was strongly supported by Greek Cypriots, particularly by the 
dominant power Orthodox Church, in order to achieve union geographically, 
culturally and politically with Greece to expand the territorial bases of Greek society 
on the basis of primordial tie with all Greeks.  
On the other hand, following the Greek Cypriot irredentist nationalism, 
Turkish Cypriot defensive nationalism, which was in line with Turkish nationalism, 
was created as a reaction to Greek nationalism to fulfill the purpose for partition on 
the basis of ethnic origin in the island from the beginning of the 1920s after the 
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Republic of Turkey was established. As has been documented, Turkish nationalism 
was born in order to transform the society from state to nation and followed 
Kemalism, which was developed with Western elements on the basis of 
modernization at the beginning of the 1900s. The seed of Turkish nationalism was 
planted when the Ottoman modernization period started with the entrance of 
European powers into the territory of the Ottomans. Along with that, beginning with 
the Tanzimat period, the Ottoman elites who were called Young Turks, and later the 
Republican elites, who were called the Kemalist group, adopted Western 
developments and followed modernization to create a competitive environment 
against the rise of Western powers in their territory and included Turkish Cypriot 
community in their plan. In this sense, it could be said that the modernization period 
of Turkish Cypriots paralleled changes at the same time in the Republic of Turkey. As 
a result, nationalism among Turkish Cypriots gradually started spreading into Turkish 
Cypriot community during the last years of the Ottoman Empire and gained its latest 
meaning with the ideology of Kemalism after the Turkish Republic established in 
1923.  
Based on Turkish nationalism, the ideology “taksim” was developed by 
Turkish Cypriots as a respond for enosis and was imposed on the mass of Turkish 
Cypriots in order to partition of the island on the basis of ethnicity. Comparing both 
ethnic groups’ national struggles, it is clear that the process of the development of the 
Turkish Cypriot national movement started almost a century after Greek Cypriots 
because Muslims maintained their place in the government and followed the 
traditional regime of the current administration of the island, which weakened them 
against Greek Christians. In other words, Greek Cypriot irredentist ideology was the 
dominant movement in the political culture of the island, which caused the birth of 
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contra-Turkish Cypriot nationalist ideology at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
However, although both nationalist movements were born in different periods and for 
different purposes, foreign conspiracies including Britain, Greece and Turkey paved 
the way for the creation of two rival nationalist groups in the island in order to serve 
their self-interests.  
 Theoretically, this study highlights embracing two forms of nationalism in 
order to study the Cyprus case in terms of understanding the current situation of the 
island of Cyprus. Eastern and Western types of nationalism were on the rise in the 
island within two ethnic groups. Different types of nationalism under the different 
names appeared on the island throughout its history, such as anti-colonial nationalism, 
ethnonationalism, European nationalism, Eastern nationalism, and Western 
nationalism since the end of nineteenth century. To some extent, according to Kohn’s 
(2005) characterization of nationalism, Eastern nations are organic in terms of process 
of nation-building on the basis of a blood bond; on the other hand, Western 
nationalism is more political and civic, which was based on “a community of laws” 
compared with Eastern nationalism. According to Kohn, Eastern nationalism is based 
on emotional and authoritarian structure as opposed to the rational, pluralistic and 
optimistic structures in Western nationalism. Generally, the facets that members of an 
ethnically defined nationwide grouping share include physical characteristics, 
sociocultural elements, religion, linguistic backgrounds, and a common ancestry. On 
the other hand, Western nationalism “defines the term of citizenship and political 
participation. Members of a national grouping that is defined in civic terms share 
participation in a circumscribed political community, common political values, a 
sense of belonging to the state in which they reside, and, usually, a common 
language” (Kupchan, 1995, p. 4). Briefly, Eastern nationalism is constructed on the 
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basis of “a blood related group” and the identification formation was created on the 
basis of “blood” (cited in Bacık, 2002, p. 21). Civic identity is a constructed identity 
and “outsiders can become members of the civic community, but only by participating 
in the local practices and institutions and by slowly adopting the customs and even the 
modes of reflexive criticism” as in the example of the constructed 1960 state of 
Cyprus (Tempelman, 1999, p. 18). According to Bryant (2004), “Both of the 
dominating nationalisms present in Cyprus appear to conform to these ideal typical 
models, and the manner in which they invoke ideas about forms of ‘natural’ relations 
that can constitute the basis for forms of historical proof” (p. 213). Also, considering 
the ethno-cultural similarities with the motherlands, it is clear that all factors, as 
previously mentioned, are basically historical evidence of the characteristic of the 
Greek-Hellenic nationalism and Turkish nationalism as reflected in Cyprus. 
Especially after the establishment of Turkish and Greek nation-states, the progress of 
nationalism of these two nation-states produce a strong effect on shaping nationalist 
ideologies of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and their ethno-national 
identities separately and parallel with the motherlands’ nationalism instead of creating 
a common cultural environment on the island.   
Generally, according to the characterization of nationalism of Hans Kohn 
(2005), Turkish Cypriot nationalism represents a Western type of nationalism that is a 
form of “Civic” or “Euro” nationalism and is a “constructed type” that “gives itself a 
historical origin and places emphasis on chronologies and the process of 
homogenization” (Bryant, 2004, p. 213). Yannis Papadakis (2008) also claims that 
“The Turkish Cypriot side follows a social-constructivist model of history, which 
presents nationalism and national identity as emerging under specific historical 
conditions rather than as a given” (para. 1). The historical background of Turkish 
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Cypriots emphasizes conquests -- the 1571 Ottoman conquest and the 1974 Turkish 
conquest -- “and does not claim an ineluctable destiny for the island or themselves” 
(Bryant, 2004, p. 213). Bryant also claims that this history of conquests was the main 
reason that Turkish Cypriots adopted the Turkish identity that was constructed by the 
leader of the Republic of Turkey, Ataturk, in the 1920s. As discussed in the historical 
narratives of the island, it is clear that Turkish Cypriots see themselves as a part of the 
island just because they fought and struggled for the island since they conquered it in 
1571. On the other hand, Greek-Cypriot nationalism represents an Eastern type of 
nationalism, which is a form of “Ethnic” nationalism that is “primordialist” and has a 
strong ethnic bond by blood with Hellenic-Orthodox (Bryant, 2004, p. 213). Bryant 
(2002), in a different study, states that “the Greek Cypriot community has tended to 
use metaphors of “soul” or “spirit” to represent their kinship with the land, along with 
accompanying attributes of spiritual purity” (p. 511). Greek Cypriots “claim a 
spiritual birth through the unity of history, religion, and land;” however, on the other 
hand, “Turkish Cypriot nationalists claim a more literal birth through the conquest of 
Cyprus by Turkish warriors whose blood spilled into and fertilized the land” (Bryant, 
2004, p. 213-14). According to Kızılyürek (2005b), the nationalism of Turkish 
Cypriots developed on the basis of “blood and ancestor,” along with power; on the 
other hand, the Greek Cypriot nationalism developed on the basis of “culture and 
religious,” along with purity. 
Overall, I have argued that the rise and fall of both Cypriot nationalist 
movements created two enemies and also created two rival ethnic identities, which 
caused the failure of the civic nation state in 1960. The establishment of the 1960 state 
was an important step in order to create a peaceful solution for the coexistence of two 
ethnic communities in the island; it did not succeed because the clash between 
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different national ideologies of both communities was very strong. Eventually, 
Eastern-based Greek Cypriot irredentist nationalism was the dominant movement in 
the political culture of the island for the last couple of centuries, accompanied by a 
sense of ethnicity based on similarities in physical characteristics, cultural and ethnic 
commonality, and religion in order to talk about a nation state on the basis of 
ethnicity. According to this description, Eastern type of societies, such as Greek 
Cypriots, generally pursue an “exclusive” and “discriminatory” policy against others 
who bear different blood, such Turkish Cypriots. This policy was the main reason for 
the failure of the 1960 state because Eastern-based ethnic communities strongly 
believe that the nation state must be an organic whole, in which the blood ties are the 
most important factor.  
 The strong impact of the Greek Orthodox Church of the island on the failure 
of the 1960 civic state cannot be ignored. As a result of Eastern nationalism, the 
church of the island lacks liberal, secular, and democratic features and has dominated 
the Greek Cypriot people for centuries in order to keep their power alive. Even today, 
the authoritarian regime of the church plays a very important role in assessing the 
political, cultural structure of Greek Cypriot community. Actually, the Eastern-based 
illiberal church of the island has been behind the conflicting environment between 
Turkish and Greek communities in terms of its authoritarian regime to prevent the 
creation of a civic state in which both communities equally share the power and share 
the common national identity.   
As a result, the two rival nationalisms of the island could not achieve Western 
(political and civic) nationalism based on a constitutional citizenship although the 
structure of civic nation was constructed under the state of the Republic of Cyprus in 
1960. Eventually, the policies of dominant Eastern (cultural and ethnic) notions of 
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Greek Cypriot irredentist nationalism turned against Turkish Cypriots, which ended 
up with the failure of the civic nation state of 1960. The dominating Greek Cypriot 
nationalism thus created today’s political position of the island where both ethnic 
communities live their lives in economically, politically, and socio-culturally separate 
territories. Even today, the negotiations continue to build a liberal, secular, and 
democratic nation on the island where both communities would be part of it. It is clear 
that the relations between both ethnic communities are still developing based on the 
historical past of both nationalisms of the island. 
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